Using qualia information to identify lexical semantic classes in an unsupervised clustering task

Acquiring lexical information is a complex problem, typically approached by relying on a number of contexts to contribute information for classification. One of the first issues to address in this domain is the determination of such contexts. The work presented here proposes the use of automatically obtained FORMAL role descriptors as features used to draw nouns from the same lexical semantic class together in an unsupervised clustering task. We have dealt with three lexical semantic classes (HUMAN, LOCATION and EVENT) in English. The results obtained show that it is possible to discriminate between elements from different lexical semantic classes using only FORMAL role information, hence validating our initial hypothesis. Also, iterating our method accurately accounts for fine-grained distinctions within lexical classes, namely distinctions involving ambiguous expressions. Moreover, a filtering and bootstrapping strategy employed in extracting FORMAL role descriptors proved to minimize effects of sparse data and noise in our task.

Automatic filtering and substantiation of drug safety signals

Drug safety issues pose serious health threats to the population and constitute a major cause of mortality worldwide. Due to the prominent implications to both public health and the pharmaceutical industry, it is of great importance to unravel the molecular mechanisms by which an adverse drug reaction can be potentially elicited. These mechanisms can be investigated by placing the pharmaco-epidemiologically detected adverse drug reaction in an information-rich context and by exploiting all currently available biomedical knowledge to substantiate it. We present a computational framework for the biological annotation of potential adverse drug reactions. First, the proposed framework investigates previous evidences on the drug-event association in the context of biomedical literature (signal filtering). Then, it seeks to provide a biological explanation (signal substantiation) by exploring mechanistic connections that might explain why a drug produces a specific adverse reaction. The mechanistic connections include the activity of the drug, related compounds and drug metabolites on protein targets, the association of protein targets to clinical events, and the annotation of proteins (both protein targets and proteins associated with clinical events) to biological pathways. Hence, the workflows for signal filtering and substantiation integrate modules for literature and database mining, in silico drug-target profiling, and analyses based on gene-disease networks and biological pathways. Application examples of these workflows carried out on selected cases of drug safety signals are discussed. The methodology and workflows presented offer a novel approach to explore the molecular mechanisms underlying adverse drug reactions

Linear transceiver design in nonregenerative relays with channel state information

This paper deals with the design of nonregenerativerelaying transceivers in cooperative systems where channel stateinformation (CSI) is available at the relay station. The conventionalnonregenerative approach is the amplify and forward(A&F) approach, where the signal received at the relay is simplyamplified and retransmitted. In this paper, we propose an alternativelinear transceiver design for nonregenerative relaying(including pure relaying and the cooperative transmission cases),making proper use of CSI at the relay station. Specifically, wedesign the optimum linear filtering performed on the data to beforwarded at the relay. As optimization criteria, we have consideredthe maximization of mutual information (that provides aninformation rate for which reliable communication is possible) fora given available transmission power at the relay station. Threedifferent levels of CSI can be considered at the relay station: onlyfirst hop channel information (between the source and relay);first hop channel and second hop channel (between relay anddestination) information, or a third situation where the relaymay have complete cooperative channel information includingall the links: first and second hop channels and also the directchannel between source and destination. Despite the latter beinga more unrealistic situation, since it requires the destination toinform the relay station about the direct channel, it is useful as anupper benchmark. In this paper, we consider the last two casesrelating to CSI.We compare the performance so obtained with theperformance for the conventional A&F approach, and also withthe performance of regenerative relays and direct noncooperativetransmission for two particular cases: narrowband multiple-inputmultiple-output transceivers and wideband single input singleoutput orthogonal frequency division multiplex transmissions.

Security prices and market transparency: the role of prior information

This paper analyzes the role of traders' priors (proper versus improper) on the implications of market transparency by comparing a pre-trade transparent market with an opaque market in a set-up based on Madhavan (1996). We show that prices may be more informative in the opaque market, regardless of how priors are modelled. In contrast, the comparison of market liquidity and volatility in the two market structures are affected by prior specification. Key words: Market microstructure, Transparency, Prior information

Delegation and information sharing in oligopoly

Information sharing in oligopoly has been analyzed by assuming that firms behave as a sole economic agent. In this paper I assume that ownership and management are separated. Managers are allowed to falsely report their costs to owners and rivals. Under such circumstances, if owners want to achieve information sharing they must use managerial contracts that implement truthful cost reporting by managers as a dominant strategy. I show that, contrary to the classical result, without the inclusion of message-dependent payments in managerial contracts there will be no information sharing. On the other hand, with the inclusion of such publicly observable payments and credible ex-ante commitment by owners not to modify these payments, there will be perfect information sharing without the need for third parties. Keywords: Information sharing, Delegation, Managerial contracts. JEL classification numbers: D21, D82, L13, L21

The Instrumental voter goes to the news-agent: demand for information, election closeness, and the media

This paper studies the impact of instrumental voting on information demand and mass media behaviour during electoral campaigns. If voters act instrumentally then information demand should increase with the closeness of an election. Mass media are modeled as profit-maximizing firms that take into account information demand, the value of customers to advertisers and the marginal cost of customers. Information supply should be larger in electoral constituencies where the contest is expected to be closer, there is a higher population density, and customers are on average more profitable for advertisers. The impact of electorate size is theoretically undetermined. These conclusions are then tested with comfortable results on data from the 1997 general election in Britain.

Spatial competition between two candidates of different quality: the effects of candidate ideology and private information

This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elections, where one candidate enjoys a quality advantage over the other candidate. The candidates care about winning and also have policy preferences. There is two-dimensional private information. Candidate ideal points as well as their tradeoffs between policy preferences and winning are private information. The distribution of this two-dimensional type is common knowledge. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, with a distribution that is commonly known by both candidates. Pure strategy equilibria always exist in this model. We characterize the effects of increased uncertainty about the median voter, the effect of candidate policy preferences, and the effects of changes in the distribution of private information. We prove that the distribution of candidate policies approaches the mixed equilibrium of Aragones and Palfrey (2002a), when both candidates' weights on policy preferences go to zero.

Information-sharing implications of horizontal mergers

We analyze the effects of uncertainty and private information on horizontal mergers. Firms face uncertain demands or costs and receive private signals. They may decide to merge sharing their private information. If the uncertainty parameters are independent and the signals are perfect, uncertainty generates an informational advantage only to the merging firms, increasing merger incentives and decreasing free-riding effects. Thus, mergers become more profitable and stable. These results generalize to the case of correlated parameters if the correlation is not very severe, and for perfect correlation if the firms receive noisy signals. From the normative point of view, mergers are socially less harmful compared to deterministic markets and may even be welfare enhancing. If the signals are, instead, publicly observed, uncertainty does not necessarily give more incentives to merge, and mergers are not always less socially harmful.

Asymmetric demand information in uniform and discriminatory call auctions: an experimental analysis motivated by electricity markets

We study the outcomes of experimental multi-unit uniform and discriminatory auctions with demand uncertainty. Our study is motivated by the ongoing debate about market design in the electricity industry. Our main aim is to compare the effect of asymmetric demand-information between sellers on the performance of the two auction institutions. In our baseline conditions all sellers have the same information, whereas in our treatment conditions some sellers have better information than others. In both information conditions we find that average transaction prices and price volatility are not significantly different under the two auction institutions. However, when there is asymmetric information among sellers the discriminatory auction is significantly less efficient. These results are not in line with the typical arguments made in favor of discriminatory pricing in electricity industries; namely, lower consumer prices and less price volatility. Moreover, our results provide some indication that discriminatory auctions reduce technical efficiency relative to uniform auctions.

General equilibrium with asymmetric information: a dual approach

We study markets where the characteristics or decisions of certain agents are relevant but not known to their trading partners. Assuming exclusive transactions, the environment is described as a continuum economy with indivisible commodities. We characterize incentive efficient allocations as solutions to linear programming problems and appeal to duality theory to demonstrate the generic existence of external effects in these markets. Because under certain conditions such effects may generate non-convexities, randomization emerges as a theoretic possibility. In characterizing market equilibria we show that, consistently with the personalized nature of transactions, prices are generally non-linear in the underlying consumption. On the other hand, external effects may have critical implications for market efficiency. With adverse selection, in fact, cross-subsidization across agents with different private information may be necessary for optimality, and so, the market need not even achieve an incentive efficient allocation. In contrast, for the case of a single commodity, we find that when informational asymmetries arise after the trading period (e.g. moral hazard; ex post hidden types) external effects are fully internalized at a market equilibrium.

Mediation incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication

We analyze a continuous-time bilateral double auction in the presence of two-sided incomplete information and a smallest money unit. A distinguishing feature of our model is that intermediate concessions are not observable by the adversary: they are only communicated to a passive auctioneer. An alternative interpretation is that of mediated bargaining. We show that an equilibrium using only the extreme agreements always exists and display the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of (perfect Bayesian) equilibra which yield intermediate agreements. For the symmetric case with uniform type distribution we numerically calculate the equilibria. We find that the equilibrium which does not use compromise agreements is the least efficient, however, the rest of the equilibria yield the lower social welfare the higher number of compromise agreements are used.

Allocative and productive efficiency in REE with asymetric information

We characterize the divergence between informational and economic efficiency in a rational expectations competitive market with asymmetric information about the costs of production. We find that prices may contain too much or too little information with respect to incentive efficient allocations depending on whether the main role of the price is, respectively, the traditional as index of scarcity or informational. Only when REE degenerate to Cournot equilibria the market solution does not show llocative inefficiency. With multidimensional uncertainty we find that the REE price does not have in general the incentive efficient information mix: It pays to sacrifice allocative efficiency at the REE to improve productive efficiency.

Information networks and worker recruitment

This paper studies experimentally how the existence of social information networks affects the ways in which firms recruit new personnel. Through such networks firms learn about prospective employees' performance in previous jobs. Assuming individualistic preferences social networks are predicted not to affect overall labor market behavior, while with social preferences the prediction is that when bilaterally negotiated: (i) wages will be higher and (ii) that workers in jobs with incomplete contracts will respond with higher effort. Our experimental results are consistent with the social preferences view, both for the case of excess demand and excess supply of labor. In particular, the presence of information networks leads to more efficient allocations.

Documentation and sport information: the challenges and opportunities brought by new technologies

This text corresponds to the contents of the seminar “Information Services at the Sport Institutions” held by the author as part of the programme of activities of the Invited Professor of Olympism of the International Chair in Olympism (IOC-UAB) in 2001. The seminar discusses the potential of technologies such as the Internet in sports documentation.