Impact of community structure on information transfer

The observation that real complex networks have internal structure has important implication for dynamic processes occurring on such topologies. Here we investigate the impact of community structure on a model of information transfer able to deal with both search and congestion simultaneously. We show that networks with fuzzy community structure are more efficient in terms of packet delivery than those with pronounced community structure. We also propose an alternative packet routing algorithm which takes advantage of the knowledge of communities to improve information transfer and show that in the context of the model an intermediate level of community structure is optimal. Finally, we show that in a hierarchical network setting, providing knowledge of communities at the level of highest modularity will improve network capacity by the largest amount.

Information Mobility: Information Dissemination in Mobile Networks

En el nostre projecte, considerem un escenari urbà o interurbà on persones amb dispositius mòbils (smartphones) o vehicles equipats amb interfícies de comunicació, estan interessats en compartir fitxers entre ells o descarregar-los al creuar Punts d’Accés (APs) propers a la carretera. Estudiem la possibilitat d’utilizar la cooperació en les trobades casuals entre nodes per augmentar la velocitat de descàrrega global. Amb aquest objectiu, plantejem algoritmes per a la selecció de quins paquets, per a quins destins i quins transportistes s’escullen en cada moment. Mitjançant extenses simulacions, mostrem com les cooperacions carry&forward dels nodes augmenten significativament la velocitat de descàrrega dels usuaris, i com aquest resultat es manté per a diversos patrons de mobilitat, col•locacions d'AP i càrregues de la xarxa. Per altra banda, aparells com els smartphones, on la targeta de WiFi està encesa contínuament, consumeixen l'energia de la bateria en poques hores. En molts escenaris, una targeta WiFi sempre activa és poc útil, perque sovint no hi ha necessitat de transmissió o recepció. Aquest fet es veu agreujat en les Delay Tolerant Networks (DTN), on els nodes intercanvien dades quan es creuen i en tenen l’oportunitat. Les tècniques de gestió de l’estalvi d’energia permeten extendre la duració de les bateries. El nostre projecte analitza els avantatges i inconvenients que apareixen quan els nodes apaguen períodicament la seva targeta wireless per a estalviar energia en escenaris DTN. Els nostres resultats mostren les condicions en que un node pot desconnectar la bateria sense afectar la probabilitat de contacte amb altres nodes, i les condicions en que aquesta disminueix. Per exemple, es demostra que la vida del node pot ser duplicada mantenint la probabilitat de contacte a 1. I que aquesta disminueix ràpidament en intentar augmentar més la vida útil.

Using a Parameterization of a Radiative Transfer Model to Build High-Resolution Maps of Typical Clear-Sky UV Index in Catalonia, Spain

To perform a climatic analysis of the annual UV index (UVI) variations in Catalonia, Spain (northeast of the Iberian Peninsula), a new simple parameterization scheme is presented based on a multilayer radiative transfer model. The parameterization performs fast UVI calculations for a wide range of cloudless and snow-free situations and can be applied anywhere. The following parameters are considered: solar zenith angle, total ozone column, altitude, aerosol optical depth, and single-scattering albedo. A sensitivity analysis is presented to justify this choice with special attention to aerosol information. Comparisons with the base model show good agreement, most of all for the most common cases, giving an absolute error within 0.2 in the UVI for a wide range of cases considered. Two tests are done to show the performance of the parameterization against UVI measurements. One uses data from a high-quality spectroradiometer from Lauder, New Zealand [45.04°S, 169.684°E, 370 m above mean sea level (MSL)], where there is a low presence of aerosols. The other uses data from a Robertson–Berger-type meter from Girona, Spain (41.97°N, 2.82°E, 100 m MSL), where there is more aerosol load and where it has been possible to study the effect of aerosol information on the model versus measurement comparison. The parameterization is applied to a climatic analysis of the annual UVI variation in Catalonia, showing the contributions of solar zenith angle, ozone, and aerosols. High-resolution seasonal maps of typical UV index values in Catalonia are presented

Information-theoretical derivation of an extended thermodynamical description of radiative systems

A radiative equation of the Cattaneo–Vernotte type is derived from information theory and the radiative transfer equation. The equation thus derived is a radiative analog of the equation that is used for the description of hyperbolic heat conduction. It is shown, without recourse to any phenomenological assumption, that radiative transfer may be included in a natural way in the framework of extendedirreversible thermodynamics

Transfer entropy reconstruction and labeling of neuronal connections from simulated calcium imaging

Neuronal dynamics are fundamentally constrained by the underlying structural network architecture, yet much of the details of this synaptic connectivity are still unknown even in neuronal cultures in vitro. Here we extend a previous approach based on information theory, the Generalized Transfer Entropy, to the reconstruction of connectivity of simulated neuronal networks of both excitatory and inhibitory neurons. We show that, due to the model-free nature of the developed measure, both kinds of connections can be reliably inferred if the average firing rate between synchronous burst events exceeds a small minimum frequency. Furthermore, we suggest, based on systematic simulations, that even lower spontaneous inter-burst rates could be raised to meet the requirements of our reconstruction algorithm by applying a weak spatially homogeneous stimulation to the entire network. By combining multiple recordings of the same in silico network before and after pharmacologically blocking inhibitory synaptic transmission, we show then how it becomes possible to infer with high confidence the excitatory or inhibitory nature of each individual neuron.

Security prices and market transparency: the role of prior information

This paper analyzes the role of traders' priors (proper versus improper) on the implications of market transparency by comparing a pre-trade transparent market with an opaque market in a set-up based on Madhavan (1996). We show that prices may be more informative in the opaque market, regardless of how priors are modelled. In contrast, the comparison of market liquidity and volatility in the two market structures are affected by prior specification. Key words: Market microstructure, Transparency, Prior information

Delegation and information sharing in oligopoly

Information sharing in oligopoly has been analyzed by assuming that firms behave as a sole economic agent. In this paper I assume that ownership and management are separated. Managers are allowed to falsely report their costs to owners and rivals. Under such circumstances, if owners want to achieve information sharing they must use managerial contracts that implement truthful cost reporting by managers as a dominant strategy. I show that, contrary to the classical result, without the inclusion of message-dependent payments in managerial contracts there will be no information sharing. On the other hand, with the inclusion of such publicly observable payments and credible ex-ante commitment by owners not to modify these payments, there will be perfect information sharing without the need for third parties. Keywords: Information sharing, Delegation, Managerial contracts. JEL classification numbers: D21, D82, L13, L21

The Instrumental voter goes to the news-agent: demand for information, election closeness, and the media

This paper studies the impact of instrumental voting on information demand and mass media behaviour during electoral campaigns. If voters act instrumentally then information demand should increase with the closeness of an election. Mass media are modeled as profit-maximizing firms that take into account information demand, the value of customers to advertisers and the marginal cost of customers. Information supply should be larger in electoral constituencies where the contest is expected to be closer, there is a higher population density, and customers are on average more profitable for advertisers. The impact of electorate size is theoretically undetermined. These conclusions are then tested with comfortable results on data from the 1997 general election in Britain.

Spatial competition between two candidates of different quality: the effects of candidate ideology and private information

This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elections, where one candidate enjoys a quality advantage over the other candidate. The candidates care about winning and also have policy preferences. There is two-dimensional private information. Candidate ideal points as well as their tradeoffs between policy preferences and winning are private information. The distribution of this two-dimensional type is common knowledge. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, with a distribution that is commonly known by both candidates. Pure strategy equilibria always exist in this model. We characterize the effects of increased uncertainty about the median voter, the effect of candidate policy preferences, and the effects of changes in the distribution of private information. We prove that the distribution of candidate policies approaches the mixed equilibrium of Aragones and Palfrey (2002a), when both candidates' weights on policy preferences go to zero.

Information-sharing implications of horizontal mergers

We analyze the effects of uncertainty and private information on horizontal mergers. Firms face uncertain demands or costs and receive private signals. They may decide to merge sharing their private information. If the uncertainty parameters are independent and the signals are perfect, uncertainty generates an informational advantage only to the merging firms, increasing merger incentives and decreasing free-riding effects. Thus, mergers become more profitable and stable. These results generalize to the case of correlated parameters if the correlation is not very severe, and for perfect correlation if the firms receive noisy signals. From the normative point of view, mergers are socially less harmful compared to deterministic markets and may even be welfare enhancing. If the signals are, instead, publicly observed, uncertainty does not necessarily give more incentives to merge, and mergers are not always less socially harmful.

Asymmetric demand information in uniform and discriminatory call auctions: an experimental analysis motivated by electricity markets

We study the outcomes of experimental multi-unit uniform and discriminatory auctions with demand uncertainty. Our study is motivated by the ongoing debate about market design in the electricity industry. Our main aim is to compare the effect of asymmetric demand-information between sellers on the performance of the two auction institutions. In our baseline conditions all sellers have the same information, whereas in our treatment conditions some sellers have better information than others. In both information conditions we find that average transaction prices and price volatility are not significantly different under the two auction institutions. However, when there is asymmetric information among sellers the discriminatory auction is significantly less efficient. These results are not in line with the typical arguments made in favor of discriminatory pricing in electricity industries; namely, lower consumer prices and less price volatility. Moreover, our results provide some indication that discriminatory auctions reduce technical efficiency relative to uniform auctions.

General equilibrium with asymmetric information: a dual approach

We study markets where the characteristics or decisions of certain agents are relevant but not known to their trading partners. Assuming exclusive transactions, the environment is described as a continuum economy with indivisible commodities. We characterize incentive efficient allocations as solutions to linear programming problems and appeal to duality theory to demonstrate the generic existence of external effects in these markets. Because under certain conditions such effects may generate non-convexities, randomization emerges as a theoretic possibility. In characterizing market equilibria we show that, consistently with the personalized nature of transactions, prices are generally non-linear in the underlying consumption. On the other hand, external effects may have critical implications for market efficiency. With adverse selection, in fact, cross-subsidization across agents with different private information may be necessary for optimality, and so, the market need not even achieve an incentive efficient allocation. In contrast, for the case of a single commodity, we find that when informational asymmetries arise after the trading period (e.g. moral hazard; ex post hidden types) external effects are fully internalized at a market equilibrium.

Mediation incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication

We analyze a continuous-time bilateral double auction in the presence of two-sided incomplete information and a smallest money unit. A distinguishing feature of our model is that intermediate concessions are not observable by the adversary: they are only communicated to a passive auctioneer. An alternative interpretation is that of mediated bargaining. We show that an equilibrium using only the extreme agreements always exists and display the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of (perfect Bayesian) equilibra which yield intermediate agreements. For the symmetric case with uniform type distribution we numerically calculate the equilibria. We find that the equilibrium which does not use compromise agreements is the least efficient, however, the rest of the equilibria yield the lower social welfare the higher number of compromise agreements are used.

Allocative and productive efficiency in REE with asymetric information

We characterize the divergence between informational and economic efficiency in a rational expectations competitive market with asymmetric information about the costs of production. We find that prices may contain too much or too little information with respect to incentive efficient allocations depending on whether the main role of the price is, respectively, the traditional as index of scarcity or informational. Only when REE degenerate to Cournot equilibria the market solution does not show llocative inefficiency. With multidimensional uncertainty we find that the REE price does not have in general the incentive efficient information mix: It pays to sacrifice allocative efficiency at the REE to improve productive efficiency.