The Decision on Turkish EU accession in December 2002: The logic of anarchy, collective action problems and rhetorical action

Studies of the EU accession of the East and Central European Countries have stressed the importance of neo-liberal institutionalism as an explanation for Member State preferences. In this paper it is argued that Member States’ preferences over Turkish EU accession are better explained by power politics and neo-realism. It seems therefore that Turkey’s way to the EU follows another path than the East and Central Countries. Turkish accession raises the question of the EU’s role in a uni-polar world order – whether the EU should develop into an independent actor on the world stage or not. However, when it comes to the interaction among the Member States in order to decide on when to open accession negotiations with Turkey the constitutive values of the EU seriously modify the outcome that pure power politics would have let to.

The private and fiscal returns to schooling and the effect of public policies on private incentives to invest in education: a general framework and some results for the EU

This paper develops a comprehensive framework for the quantitative analysis of the private and fiscal returns to schooling and of the effect of public policies on private incentives to invest in education. This framework is applied to 14 member states of the European Union. For each of these countries, we construct estimates of the private return to an additional year of schooling for an individual of average attainment, taking into account the effects of education on wages and employment probabilities after allowing for academic failure rates, the direct and opportunity costs of schooling, and the impact of personal taxes, social security contributions and unemployment and pension benefits on net incomes. We also construct a set of effective tax and subsidy rates that measure the effects of different public policies on the private returns to education, and measures of the fiscal returns to schooling that capture the long-term effects of a marginal increase in attainment on public finances under c

Credit markets and the propagation of monetary policy shocks

This paper analyzes the propagation of monetary policy shocks through the creation of credit in an economy. Models of the monetary transmission mechanism typically feature responses which last for a few quarters contrary to what the empirical evidence suggests. To propagate the impact of monetary shocks over time, these models introduce adjustment costs by which agents find it optimal to change their decisions slowly. This paper presents another explanation that does not rely on any sort of adjustment costs or stickiness. In our economy, agents own assets and make occupational choices. Banks intermediate between agents demanding and supplying assets. Our interpretation is based on the way banks create credit and how the monetary authority affects the process of financial intermediation through its monetary policy. As the central bank lowers the interest rate by buying government bonds in exchange for reserves, high productive entrepreneurs are able to borrow more resources from low productivity agents. We show that this movement of capital among agents sets in motion a response of the economy that resembles an expansionary phase of the cycle.

Stakeholder activism, managerial entrenchment, and the congruence of interests between shareholders and stakeholders

We argue that when stakeholder protection is left to the voluntary initiative of managers, concessions to social activists and pressure groups can turn into a self-entrenchment strategy for incumbent CEOs. Stakeholders other than shareholders thus benefit from corporate governance rules putting managers under a tough replacement threat. We show that a minimal amount of formal stakeholder protection, or the introduction of explicit covenants protecting stakeholder rights in the firm charter, may deprive CEOs of the alliance with powerful social activists, thus increasing managerial turnover and shareholder value. These results rationalize a recent trend whereby well-known social activists like Friends of the Earth and active shareholders like CalPERS are showing a growing support for each other's agendas.

Absolute and relative deprivation and the measurement of poverty

This paper develops the link between poverty and inequality by focussing on a class of poverty indices (some of them well-known) which aggregate normative concerns for absolute and relative deprivation. The indices are distinguished by a parameter that captures the ethical sensitivity of poverty measurement to ``exclusion'' or ``relative-deprivation'' aversion. We also show how the indices can be readily used to predict the impact of growth on poverty. An illustration using LIS data finds that he United States show more relative deprivation than Denmark and Belgium whatever the percentiles considered, but that overall deprivation comparisons of the four countries considered will generally necessarily depend on the intensity of the ethical concern for relative deprivation. The impact of growth on poverty is also seen to depend on the presence of and on the attention granted to concerns over relative deprivation. }

Political institutions and the development of telecommunications

It has traditionally been argued that the development of telecommunications infrastructure is dependent on the quality of countries' political institutions. We estimate the effect of political institutions on the diffusion of three telecommunications services and find it to be much smaller in cellular telephony than in the others. By evaluating the importance of institutions for technologies rather than for industries, we reveal important growth opportunities for developing countries and offer policy implications for alleviating differences between countries in international telecommunications development. Keywords: Political constraints, telecommunications, GMM, economic development. JEL codes: O1, O3.

Democracy and the curse of natural resources

We propose a theoretical model to explain empirical regularities related to the curse of natural resources. This is an explicitly political model which emphasizes the behavior and incentives of politicians. We extend the standard voting model to give voters political control beyond the elections. This gives rise to a new restriction into our political economy model: policies should not give rise to a revolution. Our model clarifies when resource discoveries might lead to revolutions, namely, in countries with weak institutions. Natural resources may be bad for democracy by harming political turnover. Our model also suggests a non-linear dependence of human capital on natural resources. For low levels of democracy human capital depends negatively on natural resources, while for high levels of democracy the dependence is reversed. This theoretical finding is corroborated in both cross section and panel data regressions.

Television and the construction of identity: Barcelona, Olympic host

This document, originally published as part of the book The Keys of success: the social, sporting, economic and communications impact of Barcelona’92, comes from a larger study that looked at all aspects of television in the Olympics and can be found in its original version, in Miquel de Moragas Spà, Nancy K. Rivenburgh and James F. Larson (1996). Television in the Olympics. London: John Libbey.

Europeanization and the Emergence of a European Society

This article examines the European integration process from a sociological perspective, where the main focus is the examination of the social consequences of the integration process. The European Union has advanced significantly in the economic, social, and political integration processes. This has resulted in a rapid Europeanization of behavior. There has hardly been any progress, however, toward the development of European social groups. This article examines the causes of this lag and concludes that it is highly unlikely that in the middle run there be significant progress toward the Europeanization of society.

Increasing the scalability and the speedup of a fish school distributed simulator

El present treball fa un anàlisi i desenvolupament sobre les millores en la velocitat i en l’escalabilitat d'un simulador distribuït de grups de peixos. Aquests resultats s’han obtingut fent servir una nova estratègia de comunicació per als processos lògics (LPs) i canvis en l'algoritme de selecció de veïns que s'aplica a cadascun dels peixos en cada pas de simulació. L’idea proposada permet que cada procés lògic anticipi futures necessitats de dades pels seus veïns reduint el temps de comunicació al limitar la quantitat de missatges intercanviats entre els LPs. El nou algoritme de selecció dels veïns es va desenvolupar amb l'objectiu d'evitar treball innecessari permetent la disminució de les instruccions executades en cada pas de simulació i per cadascun del peixos simulats reduint de forma significativa el temps de simulació.