A statistical procedure for testing social reciprocity at group, dyadic and individual levels

This paper examines statistical analysis of social reciprocity, that is, the balance between addressing and receiving behaviour in social interactions. Specifically, it focuses on the measurement of social reciprocity by means of directionality and skew-symmetry statistics at different levels. Two statistics have been used as overall measures of social reciprocity at group level: the directional consistency and the skew-symmetry statistics. Furthermore, the skew-symmetry statistic allows social researchers to obtain complementary information at dyadic and individual levels. However, having computed these measures, social researchers may be interested in testing statistical hypotheses regarding social reciprocity. For this reason, it has been developed a statistical procedure, based on Monte Carlo sampling, in order to allow social researchers to describe groups and make statistical decisions.

Testing Cayley graph densities

We present a computer-assisted analysis of combinatorial properties of the Cayley graphs of certain finitely generated groups: Given a group with a finite set of generators, we study the density of the corresponding Cayley graph, that is, the least upper bound for the average vertex degree (= number of adjacent edges) of any finite subgraph. It is known that an m-generated group is amenable if and only if the density of the corresponding Cayley graph equals to 2m. We test amenable and non-amenable groups, and also groups for which amenability is unknown. In the latter class we focus on Richard Thompson’s group F.

Testing for convergence clubs in income per-capita: A predictive density approach

The paper proposes a technique to jointly test for groupings of unknown size in the cross sectional dimension of a panel and estimates the parameters of each group, and applies it to identifying convergence clubs in income per-capita. The approach uses the predictive density of the data, conditional on the parameters of the model. The steady state distribution of European regional data clusters around four poles of attraction with different economic features. The distribution of incomeper-capita of OECD countries has two poles of attraction and each grouphas clearly identifiable economic characteristics.

An overall statistic for testing symmetry in social interactions

The present work focuses the attention on the skew-symmetry index as a measure of social reciprocity. This index is based on the correspondence between the amount of behaviour that each individual addresses to its partners and what it receives from them in return. Although the skew-symmetry index enables researchers to describe social groups, statistical inferential tests are required. The main aim of the present study is to propose an overall statistical technique for testing symmetry in experimental conditions, calculating the skew-symmetry statistic (Φ) at group level. Sampling distributions for the skew- symmetry statistic have been estimated by means of a Monte Carlo simulation in order to allow researchers to make statistical decisions. Furthermore, this study will allow researchers to choose the optimal experimental conditions for carrying out their research, as the power of the statistical test has been estimated. This statistical test could be used in experimental social psychology studies in which researchers may control the group size and the number of interactions within dyads.

Testing reciprocity in social interactions: A comparison between the Directional consistency and Skew symmetry statistics

In the present work we focus on two indices that quantify directionality and skew-symmetrical patterns in social interactions as measures of social reciprocity: the Directional consistency (DC) and Skew symmetry indices. Although both indices enable researchers to describe social groups, most studies require statistical inferential tests. The main aims of the present study are: firstly, to propose an overall statistical technique for testing null hypotheses regarding social reciprocity in behavioral studies, using the DC and Skew symmetry statistics (Φ) at group level; and secondly, to compare both statistics in order to allow researchers to choose the optimal measure depending on the conditions. In order to allow researchers to make statistical decisions, statistical significance for both statistics has been estimated by means of a Monte Carlo simulation. Furthermore, this study will enable researchers to choose the optimal observational conditions for carrying out their research, as the power of the statistical tests has been estimated.

Emergent patterns of social organization in captive Cercocebus torquatus: Testing the GrooFiWorld agent-based model

We empirically applied the GrooFiWorld agent-based model (Puga-González et al. 2009) in a group of captive mangabeys (Cercocebus torquatus). We analysed several measurements related to aggression and affiliative patterns. The group adopted a combination of despotic and egalitarian behaviours resulting from the behavioural flexibility observed in the Cercopithecinae subfamily. Our study also demonstrates that the GrooFiWorld agent-based model can be extended to other members of the Cercopithecinae subfamily generating parsimonious hypotheses related to the social organization.

The unbounded dead-end depth propertie is not a group invariant

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Examples of retracts in a free group that are not the fixed subgroup of any group of automorphisms

Let F be a free group of rank at least three. We show that some retracts of F previously studied by Martino-Ventura are not equal to the fixed subgroup of any group of automorphisms of F. This shows that, in F, there exist subgroups that are equal to the fixed subgroup of some set of endomorphisms but are not equal to the fixed subgroup of any set of automorphisms. Moreover, we determine the Galois monoids of these retracts, where, by the Galois monoid of a subgroup H of F, we mean the monoid consisting of all endomorphisms of F that fix H.

The automorphism group of a free-by-cyclic group in rank 2

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Growth of positive words and lower bounds of the growth rate for Thompson's group (F)p

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Computational explorations in Thompson's group F

Here we describe the results of some computational explorations in Thompson's group F. We describe experiments to estimate the cogrowth of F with respect to its standard finite generating set, designed to address the subtle and difficult question whether or not Thompson's group is amenable. We also describe experiments to estimate the exponential growth rate of F and the rate of escape of symmetric random walks with respect to the standard generating set.

Combinatorial and metric properties of Thompson's group T

We discuss metric and combinatorial properties of Thompson's group T, such as the normal forms for elements and uniqueness of tree pair diagrams. We relate these properties to those of Thompson's group F when possible, and highlight combinatorial differences between the two groups. We define a set of unique normal forms for elements of T arising from minimal factorizations of elements into convenient pieces. We show that the number of carets in a reduced representative of T estimates the word length, that F is undistorted in T, and that cyclic subgroups of T are undistorted. We show that every element of T has a power which is conjugate to an element of F and describe how to recognize torsion elements in T.

On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model

For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q-separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. In order to prove this result, we also show that under this domain of preferences (which contains the domain of responsive preferences of the college admissions problem) the workers-optimal stable matching is weakly Pareto optimal for the workers and the Blocking Lemma holds as well. We exhibit an example showing that none of these three results remain true if the preferences of firms are substitutable but not quota q-separable.

When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in rent seeking contests and policy conflicts

This paper analyzes secession and group formation in a general model of contest inspired by Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a symmetric coalition structure. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests.