Searching for consensus in ahp-group decision making. A bayesian perspective

This paper sets out to identify the initial positions of the different decisionmakers who intervene in a group decision making process with a reducednumber of actors, and to establish possible consensus paths between theseactors. As a methodological support, it employs one of the most widely-knownmulticriteria decision techniques, namely, the Analytic Hierarchy Process(AHP). Assuming that the judgements elicited by the decision makers follow theso-called multiplicative model (Crawford and Williams, 1985; Altuzarra et al.,1997; Laininen and Hämäläinen, 2003) with log-normal errors and unknownvariance, a Bayesian approach is used in the estimation of the relative prioritiesof the alternatives being compared. These priorities, estimated by way of themedian of the posterior distribution and normalised in a distributive manner(priorities add up to one), are a clear example of compositional data that will beused in the search for consensus between the actors involved in the resolution ofthe problem through the use of Multidimensional Scaling tools

Estimating Bayesian decision problems with heterogeneous priors

In many areas of economics there is a growing interest in how expertise andpreferences drive individual and group decision making under uncertainty. Increasingly, we wish to estimate such models to quantify which of these drive decisionmaking. In this paper we propose a new channel through which we can empirically identify expertise and preference parameters by using variation in decisionsover heterogeneous priors. Relative to existing estimation approaches, our \Prior-Based Identification" extends the possible environments which can be estimated,and also substantially improves the accuracy and precision of estimates in thoseenvironments which can be estimated using existing methods.

Group preference structures in AHP–group decision making

This paper presents a procedure that allows us to determine the preference structures(PS) associated to each of the different groups of actors that can be identified in a groupdecision making problem with a large number of individuals. To that end, it makesuse of the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Saaty, 1980) as the technique to solvediscrete multicriteria decision making problems. This technique permits the resolutionof multicriteria, multienvironment and multiactor problems in which subjective aspectsand uncertainty have been incorporated into the model, constructing ratio scales correspondingto the priorities relative to the elements being compared, normalised in adistributive manner (wi = 1). On the basis of the individuals’ priorities we identifydifferent clusters for the decision makers and, for each of these, the associated preferencestructure using, to that end, tools analogous to those of Multidimensional Scaling.The resulting PS will be employed to extract knowledge for the subsequent negotiationprocesses and, should it be necessary, to determine the relative importance of thealternatives being compared using anyone of the existing procedures

Organisational structure, communication and group ethics

This paper investigates experimentally how organisational decision processes affect the moral motivations of actors inside a firm that must forego profits to reduce harming a third party. In a "vertical" treatment, one insider unilaterally sets the harm-reduction strategy; the other can only accept or quit. In a "horizontal" treatment, the insiders decide by consensus. Our 2-by-2 design also controls for communication effects. In our data, communication makes vertical firms more ethical; voice appears to mitigate "responsibility-alleviation" in that subordinates with voice feel responsible for what their firms do. Vertical firms are then more ethical than the horizontal firms for which our bargaining data reveal a dynamic form of responsibility-alleviation and our chat data indicate a strong "insider-outsider" effect.

The impact of gender composition on team performance and decision-making: Evidence from the field

We investigate whether the gender composition of teams affect theireconomic performance. We study a large business game, played in groups ofthree, where each group takes the role of a general manager. There are twoparallel competitions, one involving undergraduates and the other involvingMBAs. Our analysis shows that teams formed by three women aresignificantly outperformed by any other gender combination, both at theundergraduate and MBA levels. Looking across the performancedistribution, we find that for undergraduates, three women teams areoutperformed throughout, but by as much as 10pp at the bottom and by only1pp at the top. For MBAs, at the top, the best performing group is two menand one woman. The differences in performance are explained bydifferences in decision-making. We observe that three women teams are lessaggressive in their pricing strategies, invest less in R&D, and invest more insocial sustainability initiatives, than any other gender combination teams.Finally, we find support for the hypothesis that it is poor work dynamicsamong the three women teams that drives the results.

Differences based on fine motor behaviour in Parkinson's patients compared to an age matched control group in proprioceptive and visuo-proprioceptive test conditions

Personality differences based on fine motor precision performance were studied in early stage Parkinson's patients and an age-matched control group under two different test conditions: proprioceptive + visual information and proprioceptive information alone. A comparative data analysis for deviations of three measured movement types (transversal, frontal and sagittal) was done for both hands (dominant and non-dominant) with relation to personality dimensions. There were found significant differences between the two groups in decision making dimension and emotionality. After splitting the data for gender subgroups, some significant differences were found for men but not for women. The differences in fine motor task performance varied, being better in some directions for the Parkinson"s patients and worse in others. The findings may suggest that medication has both positive and negative effects on motor performance and provoke personality changes, being more pronounced in men.

The unbounded dead-end depth propertie is not a group invariant

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Examples of retracts in a free group that are not the fixed subgroup of any group of automorphisms

Let F be a free group of rank at least three. We show that some retracts of F previously studied by Martino-Ventura are not equal to the fixed subgroup of any group of automorphisms of F. This shows that, in F, there exist subgroups that are equal to the fixed subgroup of some set of endomorphisms but are not equal to the fixed subgroup of any set of automorphisms. Moreover, we determine the Galois monoids of these retracts, where, by the Galois monoid of a subgroup H of F, we mean the monoid consisting of all endomorphisms of F that fix H.

The automorphism group of a free-by-cyclic group in rank 2

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Growth of positive words and lower bounds of the growth rate for Thompson's group (F)p

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Computational explorations in Thompson's group F

Here we describe the results of some computational explorations in Thompson's group F. We describe experiments to estimate the cogrowth of F with respect to its standard finite generating set, designed to address the subtle and difficult question whether or not Thompson's group is amenable. We also describe experiments to estimate the exponential growth rate of F and the rate of escape of symmetric random walks with respect to the standard generating set.

Combinatorial and metric properties of Thompson's group T

We discuss metric and combinatorial properties of Thompson's group T, such as the normal forms for elements and uniqueness of tree pair diagrams. We relate these properties to those of Thompson's group F when possible, and highlight combinatorial differences between the two groups. We define a set of unique normal forms for elements of T arising from minimal factorizations of elements into convenient pieces. We show that the number of carets in a reduced representative of T estimates the word length, that F is undistorted in T, and that cyclic subgroups of T are undistorted. We show that every element of T has a power which is conjugate to an element of F and describe how to recognize torsion elements in T.

On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model

For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q-separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. In order to prove this result, we also show that under this domain of preferences (which contains the domain of responsive preferences of the college admissions problem) the workers-optimal stable matching is weakly Pareto optimal for the workers and the Blocking Lemma holds as well. We exhibit an example showing that none of these three results remain true if the preferences of firms are substitutable but not quota q-separable.

When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in rent seeking contests and policy conflicts

This paper analyzes secession and group formation in a general model of contest inspired by Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a symmetric coalition structure. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests.

Stable coalition structures with fixed decision scheme

This paper studies the stability of a finite local public goods economy in horizontal differentiation, where a jurisdiction's choice of the public good is given by an exogenous decision scheme. In this paper, we characterize the class of decision schemes that ensure the existence of an equilibrium with free mobility (that we call Tiebout equilibrium) for monotone distribution of players. This class contains all the decision schemes whose choice lies between the Rawlsian decision scheme and the median voter with mid-distance of the two median voters when there are ties. We show that for non-monotone distribution, there is no decision scheme that can ensure the stability of coalitions. In the last part of the paper, we prove the non-emptiness of the core of this coalition formation game