Mean-payoff games and propositional proofs

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

On reduced games and the lexmax solution

For a family of reduced games satisfying a monotonicity property, we introduced the reduced equal split-off set, an extension of the equal split-off set (Branzei et. al, 2006), and study its relation with the core. Regardless of the reduction operation we consider, the intersection between both sets is either empty or a singleton containing the lexmax solution (Arin et al., 2008). We also provide a procedure for computing the lexmax solution for a class of games that includes games with large core (Sharkey, 1982). [JEL Classification: C71]

The pedagogical value of games and songs : The perceptions of teachers

Aquest estudi intenta explorar i descobrir les actituds i creences d’alguns mestres de llengua anglesa de Catalunya sobre la naturalesa dels jocs i les cançons, així com el paper que juguen en les seves aules per ensenyar l’anglès als infants. Les opinions dels mestres de llengua anglesa van ser recollides mitjançant un qüestionari que contenia preguntes sobre els jocs i les cançons i els resultats s’analitzen i s’exposen en aquest estudi.

El juego y su estructura interna en relación con el trabajo de la condición física en primaria = Games and their internal structure in relation to the work of physical condition in Primary Education

One of the methodological resources that teachers use in a generalised way in Physical Education classes is the game. Inthis article we define the concept of game and analyse the characteristics of their internal structure. On the other hand welook at the concepts of physical condition and conditional skills and describe the objectives of its work in Primary Education.Finally, we relate these concepts and propose two practical examples of modifying the internal structure of the game so asto produce variations in the implied conditional skills

Equilibrium play and best response to (Stated) beliefs in constant sum games

We report experimental results on one-shot two person 3x3 constant sum games played by non-economists without previous experience in the laboratory. Although strategically our games are very similar to previous experiments in which game theory predictions fail dramatically, 80% of actions taken in our experiment coincided with the prediction of the unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and 73% of actions were best responses to elicited beliefs. We argue how social preferences, presentation effects and belief elicitation procedures may influence how subjects play in simple but non trivial games and explain the diferences we observe with respect to previous work.

Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games

By introducing physical outcomes in coalitional games we note that coalitional games and social choice problems are equivalent (implying that so are the theory of implementation and the Nash program). This facilitates the understanding of the role of invariance and randomness in the Nash program. Also, the extent to which mechanisms in the Nash program perform ``real implementation'' is examined.

Internet and the Olympic Movement

Paper analysing the increasing importance of Internet in organisations, the evolution of the use of information technology in the Olympic Games and the challenges that Internet can bring to the Olympic Movement. This paper was presented at the 11th IASI World Conference on Sports Information (Lausanne, 25-27 April 2001)

The Olympic Movement and Information Society: New Internet Challenges and Opportunities

Article describing the current situation of the Internet, the use of Internet by sport institutions, and the relationship between the Internet and the Olympic Games, and the Olympic Movement. This paper was presented at the International Symposium on Television in the Olympic Games held in Lausanne in October 1998.

Politics and the Olympics: some new dimensions

Paper given at the Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials, Barcelona in 1995 analysing the relationship between politics, the Olympic Games and the Olympic Movement and their influences.

The Cultural Olympiad: objectives, programme and development

Working paper analysing the Cultural Olympiad of Barcelona in 1992. This was published as a chapter of the book entitled "Olympic Games, media and cultural exchanges: the experience of the last four summer Olympic Games" and edited by M. Ladrón de Guevara and M. Bardají.

Global Nash convergence of Foster and Young's regret testing

We construct an uncoupled randomized strategy of repeated play such that, if every player follows such a strategy, then the joint mixed strategy profiles converge, almost surely, to a Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game. The procedure requires very little in terms of players' information about the game. In fact, players' actions are based only on their own past payoffs and, in a variant of the strategy, players need not even know that their payoffs are determined through other players' actions. The procedure works for general finite games and is based on appropriate modifications of a simple stochastic learningrule introduced by Foster and Young.

Finite horizon bargaining and the consistent field

This paper explores the relationships between noncooperative bargaining games and the consistent value for non-transferable utility (NTU) cooperative games. A dynamic approach to the consistent value for NTU games is introduced: the consistent vector field. The main contribution of the paper is to show that the consistent field is intimately related to the concept of subgame perfection for finite horizon noncooperative bargaining games, as the horizon goes to infinity and the cost of delay goes to zero. The solutions of the dynamic system associated to the consistent field characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs of the noncooperative bargaining games. We show that for transferable utility, hyperplane and pure bargaining games, the dynamics of the consistent fields converge globally to the unique consistent value. However, in the general NTU case, the dynamics of the consistent field can be complex. An example is constructed where the consistent field has cyclic solutions; moreover, the finite horizon subgame perfect equilibria do not approach the consistent value.

Measuring strategic uncertainty in coordination games

This paper explores three aspects of strategic uncertainty: its relation to risk, predictability of behavior and subjective beliefs of players. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Behavior in coordination games is related to risk aversion, experience seeking, and age.From the distribution of certainty equivalents we estimate probabilities for successful coordination in a wide range of games. For many games, success of coordination is predictable with a reasonable error rate. The best response to observed behavior is close to the global-game solution. Comparing choices in coordination games with revealed risk aversion, we estimate subjective probabilities for successful coordination. In games with a low coordination requirement, most subjects underestimate the probability of success. In games with a high coordination requirement, most subjects overestimate this probability. Estimating probabilistic decision models, we show that the quality of predictions can be improved when individual characteristics are taken into account. Subjects behavior is consistent with probabilistic beliefs about the aggregate outcome, but inconsistent with probabilistic beliefs about individual behavior.

Usando um Jogo Digital na Sala de Aula do Ensino Fundamental: Visão dos Professores

A digital game was created as a resource for cognitive learning and afterwards it was used in primary schools in order to survey its active users. The methods used to recollect data were observation, in-depth interviews and focus groups. The main target of this study is to collect points of view of different primary school teachers. Conclusions show us how the group of study members perceive the use of digital games in the classroom.

Regular population monotonic allocation schemes and the core

A subclass of games with population monotonic allocation schemes is studied, namelygames with regular population monotonic allocation schemes (rpmas). We focus on theproperties of these games and we prove the coincidence between the core and both theDavis-Maschler bargaining set and the Mas-Colell bargaining set