Market Index Biases and Minimum Risk Indices

Markets, in the real world, are not efficient zero-sum games where hypotheses of the CAPM are fulfilled. Then, it is easy to conclude the market portfolio is not located on Markowitz"s efficient frontier, and passive investments (and indexing) are not optimal but biased. In this paper, we define and analyze biases suffered by passive investors: the sample, construction, efficiency and active biases and tracking error are presented. We propose Minimum Risk Indices (MRI) as an alternative to deal with to market index biases, and to provide investors with portfolios closer to the efficient frontier, that is, more optimal investment possibilities. MRI (using a Parametric Value-at-Risk Minimization approach) are calculated for three stock markets achieving interesting results. Our indices are less risky and more profitable than current Market Indices in the Argentinean and Spanish markets, facing that way the Efficient Market Hypothesis. Two innovations must be outlined: an error dimension has been included in the backtesting and the Sharpe"s Ratio has been used to select the"best" MRI

Market Index Biases and Minimum Risk Indices

Markets, in the real world, are not efficient zero-sum games where hypotheses of the CAPM are fulfilled. Then, it is easy to conclude the market portfolio is not located on Markowitz"s efficient frontier, and passive investments (and indexing) are not optimal but biased. In this paper, we define and analyze biases suffered by passive investors: the sample, construction, efficiency and active biases and tracking error are presented. We propose Minimum Risk Indices (MRI) as an alternative to deal with to market index biases, and to provide investors with portfolios closer to the efficient frontier, that is, more optimal investment possibilities. MRI (using a Parametric Value-at-Risk Minimization approach) are calculated for three stock markets achieving interesting results. Our indices are less risky and more profitable than current Market Indices in the Argentinean and Spanish markets, facing that way the Efficient Market Hypothesis. Two innovations must be outlined: an error dimension has been included in the backtesting and the Sharpe"s Ratio has been used to select the"best" MRI

Extreme times in financial markets.

We apply the theory of continuous time random walks (CTRWs) to study some aspects involving extreme events in financial time series. We focus our attention on the mean exit time (MET). We derive a general equation for this average and compare it with empirical results coming from high-frequency data of the U.S. dollar and Deutsche mark futures market. The empirical MET follows a quadratic law in the return length interval which is consistent with the CTRW formalism.

Beyond Value-at-Risk : GlueVaR Distortion Risk Measures

We propose a new family of risk measures, called GlueVaR, within the class of distortion risk measures. Analytical closed-form expressions are shown for the most frequently used distribution functions in financial and insurance applications. The relationship between Glue-VaR, Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Tail Value-at-Risk (TVaR) is explained. Tail-subadditivity is investigated and it is shown that some GlueVaR risk measures satisfy this property. An interpretation in terms of risk attitudes is provided and a discussion is given on the applicability in non-financial problems such as health, safety, environmental or catastrophic risk management

The use of flexible quantile-based measures in risk assessment

A new family of distortion risk measures -GlueVaR- is proposed in Belles- Sampera et al. -2013- to procure a risk assessment lying between those provided by common quantile-based risk measures. GlueVaR risk measures may be expressed as a combination of these standard risk measures. We show here that this relationship may be used to obtain approximations of GlueVaR measures for general skewed distribution functions using the Cornish-Fisher expansion. A subfamily of GlueVaR measures satisfies the tail-subadditivity property. An example of risk measurement based on real insurance claim data is presented, where implications of tail-subadditivity in the aggregation of risks are illustrated.

Information revelation and market incompleteness

\documentstyle[portada,11pt]{article}This paper shows that the presence of private information in aneconomy can be a source of market incompleteness even when it is feasibleto issue a set of securities that completely eliminates the informationalasymmetries in equilibrium. We analyze a simple security design model in which avolume maximizing futures exchange chooses not only the characteristics ofeach individual contract but also the number of contracts. Agents have rationalexpectations and differ in information, endowments and, possibly, attitudestoward risk. The emergence of complete or incomplete markets in equilibriumdepends on whether the {\it adverse selection effect} is stronger or weakerthan the {\it Hirshleifer effect}, as new securitiesare issued and prices reveal more information. When the Hirshleifer effectdominates, the exchange chooses an incomplete set of financial contracts, andthe equilibrium price is partially revealing.

Financial development, labor and market regulations and growth

This paper investigates the importance that market regulation and financial imperfections have on firm growth. We analyse institutions af- fecting labor market as Employment Protection Laws (EP) and Product Market Regulation (PM). We show that together with the beneficial effects of financial development, a firm will get less financing, and thus investless, in a weak financial market (finance effect), the strictness of product and labor market regulations also affect firm growth (labor effect). In particular, we show that the stricter the rules the more detrimental the influence on growth in sectoral value added for a large number of countries. We also show that the labor effect overcomes the positive finance effect.

Security prices and market transparency: the role of prior information

This paper analyzes the role of traders' priors (proper versus improper) on the implications of market transparency by comparing a pre-trade transparent market with an opaque market in a set-up based on Madhavan (1996). We show that prices may be more informative in the opaque market, regardless of how priors are modelled. In contrast, the comparison of market liquidity and volatility in the two market structures are affected by prior specification. Key words: Market microstructure, Transparency, Prior information

Labour market frictions, social policies, and barriers to technology adoption

Barriers to technological changes have recently been shown to be a key element in explaining differences in output per worker across countries. This study examines the role that labour market features and institutions have in explaining barriers to technology adoption. I build a model that includes labour market frictions, capital market imperfections and heterogeneity in workers' skills. I found that the unemployment rate together with the welfare losses that workers experiment after displacement are key factors in explaining the existence of barriers to technology adoption. Moreover, I found that none of these factors alone is sufficient to build these barriers. The theory also suggests that welfare policies like the unemployment insurance system may enhance these kinds of barriers while policies like a severance payment system financed by an income tax seem to be more effective in eliminating them.

Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint

I consider the problem of assigning agents to objects where each agent must pay the price of the object he gets and prices must sum to a given number. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the true preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism will implement both in Nash and strong Nash the set of envy-free allocations. The distinguishing feature of the mechanism is that it treats the announced preferences as the true ones and selects an envy-free allocation with respect to the announced preferences.

Interest rate determination in the interbank market

The purpose of this paper is to study the determinants of equilibrium in the market for daily funds. We use the EONIA panel database which includes daily information on the lending rates applied by contributing commercial banks. The data clearly shows an increase in both the time series volatility and the cross section dispersion of rates towards the end of the reserve maintenance period. These increases are highly correlated. With respect to quantities, we find that the volume of trade as well as the use of the standing facilities are also larger at the end of the maintenance period. Our theoretical model shows how the operational framework of monetary policy causes a reduction in the elasticity of the supply of funds by banks throughout the reserve maintenance period. This reduction in the elasticity together with market segmentation and heterogeneity are able to generate distributions for the interest rates and quantities traded with the same properties as in the data.

Imperfect competition and market liquidity with a supply informed trader

We develop a model of insider trading where agents have private information either about liquidation value or about supply and behave strategically to maximize their profits. The supply informed trader plays a dual role in market making and in information revelation. This trader not only reveals a part of the information he owns, but he also induces the other traders to reveal more of their private information. The presence of different types of information decreases market liquidity and induces non-monotonicity of the market indicators with respect to the variance of liquidation value. Replacing the noise introduced by liquidity traders with a random supply also allows us to study the effect the shocks on different components of supply have on prices and quantities.

Competition with forward contracts: a laboratory analysis motivated by electricity market design

We use experiments to study the efficiency effects for a market as a whole of adding the possibility of forward contracting to a pre-existing spot market. We deal separately with the cases where spot market competition is in quantities and where it is in supply functions. In both cases we compare the effect of adding a contract market with the introduction of an additional competitor, changing the market structure from a triopoly to a quadropoly. We find that, as theory suggests, for both types of competition the introduction of a forward market significantly lowers prices. The combination of supply function competition with a forward market leads to high efficiency levels.

The daily market for funds in Europe: what has changed with the EMU?

This paper presents evidence that the existence of deposit and lending facilities combined with an averaging provision for the reserve requirement are powerful tools to stabilize the overnight rate. We reach this conclusion by comparing the behavior of this rate in Germany before and after the start of the EMU. The analysis of the German experience is useful because it allows to isolate the effects on the overnight rate of these particular instruments of monetary policy. To show that this outcome is a general conclusion and not a particular result of the German market, we develop a theoretical model of reserve management which is able to reproduce our empirical findings.

The provision of quality in a bilateral search market

We accomplish two goals. First, we provide a non-cooperative foundation for the use of the Nash bargaining solution in search markets. This finding should help to close the rift between the search and the matching-and-bargaining literature. Second, we establish that the diversity of quality offered (at an increasing price-quality ratio) in a decentralized market is an equilibrium phenomenon - even in the limit as search frictions disappear.