Observational methodology in football: Development of an instrument to study the offensiva game in football.

The following paper introduces a new approach to the analysis of offensive game in football. Therefore, the main aim of this study was to create an instrument for collecting information for the analysis of offensive action and interactions game. The observation instrument that was used to accomplish the main objective of this work consists of a combination of format fields (FC) and systems of categories (SC). This methodology is a particular strategy of the scientific method that has as an objective to analyse the perceptible behaviour that occurs in habitual contexts, allowing them to be formally recorded and quantified and using an ad hoc instrument in order to obtain a behaviour systematic registration that, since they have been transformed in quantitative data with the necessary reliability and validity determined level, will allow analysis of the relations between these behaviours. The codifications undertaken to date in various games of football have shown that it serves the purposes for which it was developed, allowing more research into the offensive game methods in football.

The illusion of control, the structures of prizes and the demand for football pools in Spain

Using data for all the fixtures for the seasons from 1972-73 to 2002-03, we estimate a dynamic model of demand for football pools in Spain paying attention to whether their main economic explanatory variable is the effective price of a ticket or the jackpot. Additionally, we evaluate the importance of the composition of the list of games in terms of whether First Division matches are included or not. Results show that the jackpot model is preferred to the effective price model, having important implications in terms of how the structure of the game should be changed in order to increase demand.

Setting the rules of the game: The choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies

The origins of electoral systems have received scant attention in the literature. Looking at the history of electoral rules in the advanced world in the last century, this paper shows that the existing wide variation in electoral rules across nations can be traced to the strategic decisions that the current ruling parties, anticipating the coordinating consequences of different electoral regimes, make to maximize their representation according to the following conditions. On the one hand, as long as the electoral arena does not change substantially and the current electoral regime serves the ruling parties well, the latter have no incentives to modify the electoral regime. On the other hand, as soon as the electoral arena changes (due to the entry of new voters or a change in their preferences), the ruling parties will entertain changing the electoral system, depending on two main conditions: the emergence of new parties and the coordinating capacities of the old ruling parties. Accordingly, if the new parties are strong, the old parties shift from plurality/majority rules to proportional representation (PR) only if the latter are locked into a 'non-Duvergerian' equilibrium; i.e. if no old party enjoys a dominant position (the case of most small European states)--conversely, they do not if a Duvergerian equilibrium exists (the case of Great Britain). Similarly, whenever the new entrants are weak, a non-PR system is maintained, regardless of the structure of the old party system (the case of the USA). The paper discusses as well the role of trade and ethnic and religious heterogeneity in the adoption of PR rules.

On the dimension of the core of the assignment game

The set of optimal matchings in the assignment matrix allows to define a reflexive and symmetric binary relation on each side of the market, the equal-partner binary relation. The number of equivalence classes of the transitive closure of the equal-partner binary relation determines the dimension of the core of the assignment game. This result provides an easy procedure to determine the dimension of the core directly from the entries of the assignment matrix and shows that the dimension of the core is not as much determined by the number of optimal matchings as by their relative position in the assignment matrix.

On the dimension of the core of the assignment game

The set of optimal matchings in the assignment matrix allows to define a reflexive and symmetric binary relation on each side of the market, the equal-partner binary relation. The number of equivalence classes of the transitive closure of the equal-partner binary relation determines the dimension of the core of the assignment game. This result provides an easy procedure to determine the dimension of the core directly from the entries of the assignment matrix and shows that the dimension of the core is not as much determined by the number of optimal matchings as by their relative position in the assignment matrix.

Anàlisi de la incidència del sistema de joc en la creació de situacions de superioritat numèrica en el futbol amb el juvenil “A” del Futbol Club Barcelona

El present treball es centra en l’estudi de les situacions de superioritat numèrica generades al llarg de la temporada 2013-2014 de l’equip Juvenil A del Futbol Club Barcelona. L’objectiu principal d’aquest treball és esbrinar quina incidència té el sistema de joc 1-4-3-3 en la creació d’aquestes situacions ofensives en el joc de l’equip. Per tal d’enregistrar múltiples situacions de joc i diferenciar la seva complexitat, s’han establert tres variables d’estudi: la zona del camp on es crea la superioritat numèrica (dividint el camp en 12 zones), el tipus de superioritat produïda (2 contra 1, 3 contra 1, 3 contra 2, 4 contra 2 i 4 contra 3), i la freqüència d’interacció dels jugadors en les situacions de superioritat en relació al networking (jugadors que intervenen en les situacions de superioritat per tal de poder establir relacions entre posicions del sistema de joc 1-4-3-3). El mètode utilitzat és notacional (ja que s’enregistra la freqüència en què succeeix un fenomen a partir d’unes taules creades especialment per l’enregistrament de dades), on fent ús de la proposta de Gréhaigne (2001) s’analitzen 8 partits al llarg de la temporada 2013-2014. Els resultats obtinguts mostren que es produeixen més superioritats a les zones 4 i 6 (20,37% respectivament), seguides de les zones 7 (14,81%) i 5 (13,89%). El major tipus de superioritat ha estat el 2 contra 1 (48,15%) seguit del 3 contra 2 (39,81%). La interacció més freqüent entre jugadors en les situacions de 2 contra 1 ha estat: lateral dret i central dret (26,92%) i lateral esquerre i central esquerre (21,15%). En les situacions de tres jugadors (3 contra 1) ha estat: entre el central dret, central esquerre i el pivot (28,57%) i entre el central dret, el lateral dret i el pivot (28,75%). En les situacions de 3 contra 2: lateral dret, l’interior dret i l’extrem dret (18,60%) i entre el central esquerre, el lateral esquerre i l’interior esquerre (18,60%). Pel que fa a les situacions de 4 contra 2 no se n’ha produït cap, i les de 4 contra 3 hi ha una igualtat entre diverses posicions(16,67%), però no s’observen dades molt significatives en quan a la intervenció, excepte la posició del pivot que intervé en gairebé totes. Aquestes dades, s’assimilen al que diuen Sans i Frattarola (2009) sobre el fet que en la zona d’inici es creen més situacions de superioritat que en la zona de progressió i finalització. També Castelo (1999) aporta un estudi sobre els percentatges d’aportacions ofensives dels jugadors en funció de l’espai i la demarcació, però tot i que en aquest cas no ho compara amb situacions de superioritat numèrica, les dades extretes son interessants per la comparativa amb l’estudi que es presenta.

Coalition formation in a contest game with three heterogeneous players

We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions following a bargaining protocol similar to the one proposed by Gul (1989). Afterwards, coalitions play the contest game of Esteban and Ray (1999) within the resulting coalition structure of the first stage. We find that the grand coalition forms whenever the distribution of the bargaining power in the coalition formation game is equal to the distribution of the relative efficiency of effort. Finally, we use the case of equal bargaining power for all individuals to show that other types of coalition structures may be observed as well.

A generalized assignment game

The proposed game is a natural extension of the Shapley and Shubik Assignment Game to the case where each seller owns a set of different objets instead of only one indivisible object. We propose definitions of pairwise stability and group stability that are adapted to our framework. Existence of both pairwise and group stable outcomes is proved. We study the structure of the group stable set and we finally prove that the set of group stable payoffs forms a complete lattice with one optimal group stable payoff for each side of the market.

Does affirmative action reduce effort incentives? A contest game analysis

In this paper a contest game with heterogeneous players is analyzed in which heterogeneity could be the consequence of past discrimination. Based on the normative perception of the heterogeneity there are two policy options to tackle this heterogeneity: either it is ignored and the contestants are treated equally, or affirmative action is implemented which compensates discriminated players. The consequences of these two policy options are analyzed for a simple two-person contest game and it is shown that the frequently criticized trade-off between affirmative action and total effort does not exist: Instead, affirmative action fosters effort incentives. A generalization to the n-person case and to a case with a partially informed contest designer yields the same result if the participation level is similar under each policy.

Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game

We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that our results contradict the independence of group-size prediction: conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are substantially above equilibrium. Towards the end of the experiment material losses in groups are 257% of the predicted level. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the investment behaviour of individual group members. Second, allowing group members to punish each other after individual contributions to the contest effort are revealed leads to even larger conflict expenditures. Now material losses are 869% of the equilibrium level and there is much less heterogeneity in individual group members' investments. These results contrast strongly with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency and leads to higher material payoffs.

Vigilance behavior of Pyrenean chamois (Rupicapra pyrenaica pyrenaica): Effect of sex and position in the herd

The Pyrenean chamois (Rupicapra pyrenaica pyrenaica) is a mountain-dwelling ungulate with an extensive presence in open areas. Optimal group size results from the trade off between advantages (a reduction in the risk of predation) and disadvantages (competition between members of the herd) of group living. In addition, advantages and disadvantages of group living may vary depending on the position of each individual within the herd. Our objective was to study the effect of central vs. peripheral position in the herd on feeding and vigilance behavior in male and female Pyrenean chamois and to ascertain if a group size effect existed. We used focal animal sampling and recorded social interactions when a focal animal was involved. With males, vigilance rate was higher in the central part of the group than at the periphery, probably due to a higher density of animals in the central part of the herd and a higher probability of being disturbed by conspecifics. With females, vigilance rate did not differ according to position in the herd. Females spent more time feeding than males, and males showed a higher frequency of the vigilance behavior than females. We did not observe a clear relationship between group size and vigilance behavior. The differences in vigilance behavior might be due to social interactions.

Dynamic stackelberg game with risk-averse players: optimal risk-sharing under asymmetric information

The objective of this paper is to clarify the interactive nature of the leader-follower relationship when both players are endogenously risk-averse. The analysis is placed in the context of a dynamic closed-loop Stackelberg game with private information. The case of a risk-neutral leader, very often discussed in the literature, is only a borderline possibility in the present study. Each player in the game is characterized by a risk-averse type which is unknown to his opponent. The goal of the leader is to implement an optimal incentive compatible risk-sharing contract. The proposed approach provides a qualitative analysis of adaptive risk behavior profiles for asymmetrically informed players in the context of dynamic strategic interactions modelled as incentive Stackelberg games.

The Multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria

A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multiunit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. We define a competitive equilibrium for this generalized assignment game and prove its existence by using only linear programming. In particular, we show how to compute equilibrium price vectors from the solutions of the dual linear program associated to the primal linear program defined to find optimal assignments. Using only linear programming tools, we also show (i) that the set of competitive equilibria (pairs of price vectors and assignments) has a Cartesian product structure: each equilibrium price vector is part of a competitive equilibrium with all optimal assignments, and vice versa; (ii) that the set of (restricted) equilibrium price vectors has a natural lattice structure; and (iii) how this structure is translated into the set of agents' utilities that are attainable at equilibrium.

On Cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria

We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We first establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and it contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. We then state and prove three limit results for replicated markets. First, the sequence of Cores of replicated markets converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs when the number of replicas tends to infinity. Second, the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. Third, for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payoff that is not a competitive equilibrium payoff.

Open Chess Game Analyzer

Aquest document detalla la feina que s'ha dut a terme per desenvolupar el projecte Open Chess Game Analyzer. La finalitat del mateix és desenvolupar un aplicatiu lliure que sigui capaç d'analitzar partides d'escacs a partir d'un fitxer PGN.