Competition with forward contracts: a laboratory analysis motivated by electricity market design

We use experiments to study the efficiency effects for a market as a whole of adding the possibility of forward contracting to a pre-existing spot market. We deal separately with the cases where spot market competition is in quantities and where it is in supply functions. In both cases we compare the effect of adding a contract market with the introduction of an additional competitor, changing the market structure from a triopoly to a quadropoly. We find that, as theory suggests, for both types of competition the introduction of a forward market significantly lowers prices. The combination of supply function competition with a forward market leads to high efficiency levels.

Resum de la tasca realitzada al Center Biomedical Engineering (CBE) del Massachussets Institute of Technology (MIT). Juliol-Agost 2005

Estudi elaborat a partir d’una estada al Center Biomedical Engineering (CBE) del Massachussets Institute of Technology (MIT), durant els mesos de juliol i agost del 2005. S’investiga una metodologia amb l’objectiu d’obtenir biomaterials que puguin actuar de bastida en la interfície os/cartílag, afavorint la diferenciació i creixement cel·lular de cartílag ossificat que pugui actuar d’unió entre l’articulació i l’os. S’experimenta una metodologia per a establir quins són els péptids afavoridors de la formació de teixit ossi utilitzats en materials d’hidroxiapatita. Es conclou que la tecnologia desenvolupada permet disposar d’una plataforma per assajar l’estudi del signaling sobre cèl·lules embrionàries, que permeti desenvolupar materials amb més capacitat diferenciadora.

Thermal tests on the LISA pathfinder engineering model

Report for the scientific sojourn carried out at Albert Einstein Institut in Germany, from April to July 2006.

Memory in contracts: the experience of the EBRD (1991-2003)

The objective of this paper is to identify the role of memory in repeated contracts with moral hazard in financial intermediation. We use the database we have built containing the contracts signed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development EBRD between 1991 and 2003. Our framework is a standard setting of repeated moral hazard. After having controlled for the adverse selection component, we are able to prove that client reputation is the discrimination device according to which the bank fixes the amount of credit for the established clients. Our results unambiguously isolate the effect of memory in the bank's lending decisions.

Memory in contracts: the experience of the EBRD (1991-2003)

The objective of this paper is to identify the role of memory as a screening device in repeated contracts with asymmetric information in financial intermediation. We use an original dataset from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. We propose a simple empirical method to capture the role of memory using the client's reputation. Our results unambiguously isolate the dominant effect of memory on the bank's lending decisions over market factors in the case of established clients.

Optimal coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts in labor Markets

We consider a market where firms hire workers to run their projects and such projects differ in profitability. At any period, each firm needs two workers to successfully run its project: a junior agent, with no specific skills, and a senior worker, whose effort is not verifiable. Senior workers differ in ability and their competence is revealed after they have worked as juniors in the market. We study the length of the contractual relationships between firms and workers in an environment where the matching between firms and workers is the result of market interaction. We show that, despite in a one-firm-one-worker set-up long-term contracts are the optimal choice for firms, market forces often induce firms to use short-term contracts. Unless the market only consists of firms with very profitable projects, firms operating highly profitable projects offer short-term contracts to ensure the service of high-ability workers and those with less lucrative projects also use short-term contracts to save on the junior workers' wage. Intermediate firms may (or may not) hire workers through long-term contracts.

Growth, selection and appropriate contracts

We study a dynamic model where growth requires both long-term investment and the selection of talented managers. When ability is not ex-ante observable and contracts are incomplete, managerial selection imposes a cost, as managers facing the risk of being replaced tend to choose a sub-optimally low level of long-term investment. This generates a trade-off between selection and investment that has implications for the choice of contractual relationships. Our analysis shows that rigid long-term contracts sacrificing managerial selection may be optimal at early stages of economic development and when access to information is limited. As the economy grows, however, knowledge accumulation increases the return to talent and makes it optimal to adopt flexible contractual relationships, where managerial selection is implemented even at the cost of lower investment. Better institutions, in the form of a richer contracting environment and less severe informational frictions, speed up the transition to short-term relationships.

Decentralization of contracts with interim sidecontracting

This paper gives a new explanation for the phenomena of subcontracting. A model in which a principal contracts two agents who work in a sequence on a project, have soft information and can collude is considered. Side-contracts between agents can be signed at any stage of the game. Due to limited liability and moral hazard agents obtain a rent. The principal’s problem is to find the preferable contracting structure. It is shown that in this setting a decentralized contracting structure can be superior to a centralized structure for the principal. The paper derives the conditions under which this holds. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D23, D82, L14, L22. Keywords: Contract delegation, Collusion, Interim side-contracting, Moral hazard.

Engineering the thermal emission of macroporous silicon

Todos los cuerpos emiten luz espontaneamente al ser calentados. El espectro de radiacion es una funcion de la temperatura y el material. Sin embargo, la mayoria de los materiales irradia, en general, en una banda espectral amplia. Algunas matereiales, por el contrario, son capaces de concentrar la radiacion termica en una banda espectral mucho mas estrecha. Estos materiales se conocen como emisores selectivos y su uso tiene un profundo impacto en la eficiencia de sistemas sistemas tales como iluminacion y conversion de energia termofotovoltaica. De los emisores selectivos se espera que sean capaces de operar a altas temperaturas y que emitan en una banda espectral muy concisa. Uno de los metodos mas prometedores para controlar y disenar el espectro de emision termico es la utilizacion de cristales fotonicos. Los cristales fotonicos son estructuras periodicas artificiales capaces de controlar y confinar la luz de formas sin precedentes. Sin embargo, la produccion de dichas estructuras con grandes superficies y capaces de soportar altas temperaturas sigue siendo una dificil tarea. Este trabajo esta dedicada al estudio de las propiedades de emision termica de estructuras 3D de silicio macroporoso en el rango espectral mid-IR (2-30 m). En particular, este trabajo se enfoca en reducir la elevada emisividad del silicio cristalino. Las muestras estudiadas en este trabajo tienen una periodicidad de 4 m, lo que limitan los resultados obtenidos a la banda del infrarrojo medio, aunque estructuras mucho mas pequenas son tecnologicamente realizables con el metodo de fabricacion utilizado. Hemos demostrado que el silicio macroporoso 3D puede inhibir completamente la emision termica en su superficie. Mas aun, esta banda se puede ajustar en un amplio margen mediante pequenos cambios durante la formacion de los macroporos. Tambien hemos demostrado que tanto el ancho como la frecuencia de la banda de inhibicion se puede doblar mediante la aplicacion de tecnicas de postprocesado adecuadas. Finalmente hemos mostrado que es posible crear bandas de baja emisividad arbitrariamente anchas mediante estructuras macroporosas aperiodicas.

Applying recommendations to aligncompetences, methodology and assessment in Telematics, Computing and Electronic Engineering courses

The alignment between competences, teaching-learning methodologies and assessment is a key element of the European Higher Education Area. This paper presents the efforts carried out by six Telematics, Computer Science and Electronic Engineering Education teachers towards achieving this alignment in their subjects. In a joint work with pedagogues, a set of recommended actions were identified. A selection of these actions were applied and evaluated in the six subjects. The cross-analysis of the results indicate that the actions allow students to better understand the methodologies and assessment planned for the subjects, facilitate (self-) regulation and increase students’ involvement in the subjects.

The role of the Teaching Quality and Innovation Support Unit in the ICT Engineering Studies at Universitat Pompeu Fabra

One of the strategies of Universitat Pompeu Fabra to support Quality Learning has been the creation of Units for the Support of Teaching Quality and Innovation within each faculty. In the seminar we will present the role and activities of the Polytechnic School Unit in charge or coordinating the efforts towards quality learning in the Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) Engineering Studies. We will also discuss how these activities are informed to relevant academic stakeholders.

Optimal Contracts, Adverse Selection, and Social Preferences: An Experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

Completing contracts ex post: How car manufacturers manage car dealers

This article illustrates how contracts are completed ex post in practice and, in so doing, indirectly suggests what the real function of contracts may be. Our evidence comes from the contracts between automobile manufacturers and their dealers in 23 dealership networks in Spain. Franchising dominates automobile distribution because of the need to decentralize pricing and control of service decisions. It motivates local managers to undertake these activities at minimum cost for the manufacturer. However, it creates incentive conflicts, both between manufacturers and dealers and among dealers themselves, concerning the level of sales and service provided. It also holds potential for expropriation of specific investments. Contracts deal with these conflicts by restricting dealers decision rights and granting manufacturers extensive completion, monitoring and enforcement powers. The main mechanism that may prevent abuse of these powers is the manufacturers reputational capital.

Employment consequences of restrictive permanent contracts: Evidence from Spanish labor market reforms

Temporary employment contracts allowing unrestricted dismissals wereintroduced in Spain in 1984 and quickly came to account for most new jobs.As a result, temporary employment increased from around 10% in themid-eighties to more than 30% in the early nineties. In 1997, however,the Spanish government attempted to reduce the incidence of temporaryemployment by reducing payroll taxes and dismissal costs for permanentcontracts. In this paper, we use individual data from the Spanish LaborForce Survey to estimate the effects of reduced payroll taxes anddismissal costs on the distribution of employment and worker flows. Weexploit the fact that recent reforms apply only to certain demographicgroups to set up a natural experiment research design that can be usedto study the effects of contract regulations. Our results show that thereduction of payroll taxes and dismissal costs increased the employmentof young workers on permanent contracts, although the effects for youngwomen are not always significant. Results for older workers showinsignificant effects. The results suggest a moderately elastic responseof permanent employment to non-wage labor costs for young men. We alsofind positive effects on the transitions from unemployment and temporaryemployment into permanent employment for young and older workers, althoughthe effects for older workers are not always significant. On the otherhand, transitions from permanent employment to non-employment increasedonly for older men, suggesting that the reform had little effect ondismissals.