The Instrumental voter goes to the news-agent: demand for information, election closeness, and the media

This paper studies the impact of instrumental voting on information demand and mass media behaviour during electoral campaigns. If voters act instrumentally then information demand should increase with the closeness of an election. Mass media are modeled as profit-maximizing firms that take into account information demand, the value of customers to advertisers and the marginal cost of customers. Information supply should be larger in electoral constituencies where the contest is expected to be closer, there is a higher population density, and customers are on average more profitable for advertisers. The impact of electorate size is theoretically undetermined. These conclusions are then tested with comfortable results on data from the 1997 general election in Britain.

The 2004 election in Spain: terrorism, accountability, and voting

In this paper the electoral consequences of the Islamist terrorist attacks on March 11, 2004 are analysed. According to a quantitative analysis based on a post-electoral survey, we show the causal mechanisms that transform voters’ reactions to the bombings into a particular electoral behaviour and estimate their relevance in the electoral results on March 14, 2004

The Disadvantage of winning an election

This paper analyzes the problem that an incumbent faces during the legislature when deciding how to react to popular initiatives or policy proposals coming from different sources. We argue that this potential source of electoral disadvantage that the incumbent obtains after being elected can jeopardize the reelection possibilities of the incumbent. We analyze the decision of the incumbent when facing reelection and we characterize the conditions under which the advantages that the incumbent obtains can overcome the disadvantages. Finally, we use the results of this analysis to discuss some implications of the use of mechanisms of direct democracy like referenda and popular assemblies on electoral competition.

Power laws and scaling of rain events and dry spells in the Catalonia region

We analyze the statistics of rain-event sizes, rain-event durations, and dry-spell durations in a network of 20 rain gauges scattered in an area situated close to the NW Mediterranean coast. Power-law distributions emerge clearly for the dryspell durations, with an exponent around 1.50 ± 0.05, although for event sizes and durations the power-law ranges are rather limited, in some cases. Deviations from power-law behavior are attributed to finite-size effects. A scaling analysis helps to elucidate the situation, providing support for the existence of scale invariance in these distributions. It is remarkable that rain data of not very high resolution yield findings in agreement with self-organized critical phenomena.

Government Spending and Re-election

Does additional government spending improve the electoral chances of incumbent political parties? This paper provides the first quasi-experimental evidence on this question. Our research design exploits discontinuities in federal funding to local governments in Brazil around several population cutoffs over the period 1982-1985. We find that extra fiscal transfers resulted in a 20% increase in local government spending per capita, and an increase of about 10 percentage points in the re-election probability of local incumbent parties. We also find positive effects of the government spending on education outcomes and earnings, which we interpret as indirect evidence of public service improvements. Together, our results provide evidence that electoral rewards encourage incumbents to spend part of additional revenues on public services valued by voters, a finding in line with agency models of electoral accountability.

Financial Repression in a Natural Experiment: Loan Allocation and the Change in the Usury Laws in 1714

If financial deepening aids economic growth, then financial repression should be harmful. We use a natural experiment – the change in the English usury laws in 1714 – to analyze the effects of interest rate restrictions. We use a sample of individual loan transactions to demonstrate how the reduction of the legal maximum rate of interest affected the supply and demand for credit. Average loan size and minimum loan size increased strongly, and access to credit worsened for those with little ‘social capital.’ While we have no direct evidence that loans were misallocated, the discontinuity in loan receipts makes this highly likely. We conclude that financial repression can undermine the positive effects of financial deepening.

Associationism and electoral participation: A multilevel study of 2000 Spanish general election

This work presents an application of the multilevel analysis techniques tothe study of the abstention in the 2000 Spanish general election. Theinterest of the study is both, substantive and methodological. From thesubstantive point of view the article intends to explain the causes ofabstention and analyze the impact of associationism on it. From themethodological point of view it is intended to analyze the interaction betweenindividual and context with a modelisation that takes into account thehierarchical structure of data. The multilevel study of this paper validatesthe one level results obtained in previous analysis of the abstention andshows that only a fraction of the differences in abstention are explained bythe individual characteristics of the electors. Another important fraction ofthese differences is due to the political and social characteristics of thecontext. Relating to associationism, the data suggest that individualparticipation in associations decrease the probability of abstention. However,better indicators are needed in order to catch more properly the effect ofassociationism in electoral behaviour.

Government spending and re-election: Quasi-experimental evidence from Brazilian municipalities

Does additional government spending improve the electoral chances of incumbent politicalparties? This paper provides the first quasi-experimental evidence on this question. Our researchdesign exploits discontinuities in federal funding to local governments in Brazil around severalpopulation cutoffs over the period 1982-1985. We show that extra fiscal transfers resulted in a20% increase in local government spending per capita, and an increase of about 10 percentagepoints in the re-election probability of local incumbent parties. In the context of an agency modelof electoral accountability, as well as existing results indicating that the revenue jumps studiedhere had positive impacts on education outcomes and earnings, these results suggest that expectedelectoral rewards encouraged incumbents to spend additional funds in ways that were valued byvoters.

Restless bandits, partial conservation laws and indexability

We show that if performance measures in a stochastic scheduling problem satisfy a set of so-called partial conservation laws (PCL), which extend previously studied generalized conservation laws (GCL), then the problem is solved optimally by a priority-index policy for an appropriate range of linear performance objectives, where the optimal indices are computed by a one-pass adaptive-greedy algorithm, based on Klimov's. We further apply this framework to investigate the indexability property of restless bandits introduced by Whittle, obtaining the following results: (1) we identify a class of restless bandits (PCL-indexable) which are indexable; membership in this class is tested through a single run of the adaptive-greedy algorithm, which also computes the Whittle indices when the test is positive; this provides a tractable sufficient condition for indexability; (2) we further indentify the class of GCL-indexable bandits, which includes classical bandits, having the property that they are indexable under any linear reward objective. The analysis is based on the so-called achievable region method, as the results follow fromnew linear programming formulations for the problems investigated.

The effect of divorce laws on divorce rates in Europe

This paper analyzes a panel of 18 European countries spanning from 1950 to 2003 toexamine the extent to which the legal reforms leading to easier divorce that took placeduring the second half of the 20th century have contributed to the increase in divorce rates across Europe. We use a quasi-experimental set-up and exploit the different timing of the reforms in divorce laws across countries. We account for unobserved country-specificfactors by introducing country fixed effects, and we include country-specific trends tocontrol for time-varying factors at the country level that may be correlated with divorcerates and divorce laws, such as changing social norms or slow moving demographictrends. We find that the reforms were followed by significant increases in divorce rates.Overall, we estimate that the introduction of no-fault, unilateral divorce increased thedivorce rate by about 1, a sizeable effect given the average rate of 4.2 divorces per 1,000married people in 2002.

Ambiguity in election games

We construct a model in which the ambiguity of candidates allows them toincrease the number of voters to whom they appeal when voters have intense preferences for one of the alternatives available. An ambiguous candidate may offer voters with different preferences the hope that their most preferred alternative will be implemented. We find conditions under which ambiguous strategies are chosen in equilibrium. These conditions include the case in which there is an outcome that is a majority winner against all other outcomes but is not the most preferred outcome for a majority of voters. It is shown that if the number of candidates or parties increases, ambiguity will not be possible in equilibrium, but a larger set of possible policies increases the chance that at least one candidate will choose to be ambiguous in equilibrium.

Interest rate restrictions in a natural experiment: loan allocation and the change in the usury laws in 1714

This article studies the effects of interest rate restrictions on loan allocation. The British governmenttightened the usury laws in 1714, reducing the maximum permissible interest rate from 6% to5%. A sample of individual loan transactions reveals that average loan size and minimum loan sizeincreased strongly, while access to credit worsened for those with little social capital. Collateralisedcredits, which had accounted for a declining share of total lending, returned to their former role ofprominence. Our results suggest that the usury laws distorted credit markets significantly; we findno evidence that they offered a form of Pareto-improving social insurance.

Solid phase crystallization under continuous heating: kinetic and microstructure scaling laws

The kinetics and microstructure of solid-phase crystallization under continuous heating conditions and random distribution of nuclei are analyzed. An Arrhenius temperature dependence is assumed for both nucleation and growth rates. Under these circumstances, the system has a scaling law such that the behavior of the scaled system is independent of the heating rate. Hence, the kinetics and microstructure obtained at different heating rates differ only in time and length scaling factors. Concerning the kinetics, it is shown that the extended volume evolves with time according to αex = [exp(κCt′)]m+1, where t′ is the dimensionless time. This scaled solution not only represents a significant simplification of the system description, it also provides new tools for its analysis. For instance, it has been possible to find an analytical dependence of the final average grain size on kinetic parameters. Concerning the microstructure, the existence of a length scaling factor has allowed the grain-size distribution to be numerically calculated as a function of the kinetic parameters

Proceso electoral y prosopografía de los diputados de las Cortes Extraordinarias de Cádiz (1810-1813)

En el presente trabajo analizamos el proceso de elección de los diputados españoles en las Cortes Extraordinarias de Cádiz (1810-1813), la sociología de estos parlamentarios y su asistencia en el Parlamento. Después de efectuar el análisis observamos en primer lugar que hubo cuatro modalidades de elección de los diputados y que, una vez escogidos, nunca se cubrieron todos los puestos de diputado otorgados. En segundo lugar, detectamos que los diputados elegidos por los diversos entes que participaron en el proceso electoral fueron en su mayoría de condición social acomodada y representativos de la sociedad española, sobresaliendo en número el grupo de diputados eclesiásticos, de leyes y funcionarios.