Assessing technology-based spin-offs from university support units

This paper takes a regional studies approach to assess spin-offs from a university-based technology transfer network. We first detect the regional objectives, inputs and outputs needed to assess spin-offs from support programmes. We then provide evidence on regional mechanisms for firm creation. We analyse spin-offs created at Catalan universities and find that many efficient spin-offs have formal technology transfer agreements, and emerge from technology-oriented universities. We also find that higher innovation levels and experience from the parent university are associated with higher efficiency, which is positively related to future fundamental profitability. Finally, we propose regional policy making and research directions.

Efficient Peer Selection in P2P JXTA-Based Platforms

Peer-reviewed

Efficient bidding with externalities

We implement a family of efficient proposals to share benefits generated in environments with externalities. These proposals extend the Shapley value to games with externalities and are parametrized through the method by which the externalities are averaged. We construct two slightly different mechanisms: one for environments with negative externalities and the other for positive externalities. We show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of these mechanisms coincide with the sharing proposals.

Labour market frictions, social policies, and barriers to technology adoption

Barriers to technological changes have recently been shown to be a key element in explaining differences in output per worker across countries. This study examines the role that labour market features and institutions have in explaining barriers to technology adoption. I build a model that includes labour market frictions, capital market imperfections and heterogeneity in workers' skills. I found that the unemployment rate together with the welfare losses that workers experiment after displacement are key factors in explaining the existence of barriers to technology adoption. Moreover, I found that none of these factors alone is sufficient to build these barriers. The theory also suggests that welfare policies like the unemployment insurance system may enhance these kinds of barriers while policies like a severance payment system financed by an income tax seem to be more effective in eliminating them.

Fair and efficient student placement with couples

We study situations of allocating positions or jobs to students or workers based on priorities. An example is the assignment of medical students to hospital residencies on the basis of one or several entrance exams. For markets without couples, e.g., for ``undergraduate student placement,'' acyclicity is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a fair and efficient placement mechanism (Ergin, 2002). We show that in the presence of couples, which introduces complementarities into the students' preferences, acyclicity is still necessary, but not sufficient (Theorem 4.1). A second necessary condition (Theorem 4.2) is ``priority-togetherness'' of couples. A priority structure that satisfies both necessary conditions is called pt-acyclic. For student placement problems where all quotas are equal to one we characterize pt-acyclicity (Lemma 5.1) and show that it is a sufficient condition for the existence of a fair and efficient placement mechanism (Theorem 5.1). If in addition to pt-acyclicity we require ``reallocation-'' and ``vacancy-fairness'' for couples, the so-called dictator-bidictator placement mechanism is the unique fair and efficient placement mechanism (Theorem 5.2). Finally, for general student placement problems, we show that pt-acyclicity may not be sufficient for the existence of a fair and efficient placement mechanism (Examples 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6). We identify a sufficient condition such that the so-called sequential placement mechanism produces a fair and efficient allocation (Theorem 5.3).

Sharing the surplus: a just and efficient proposal for environments with externalities

Economic activities, both on the macro and micro level, often entail wide-spread externalities. This in turn leads to disputes regarding the compensation levels to the various parties affected. We propose a general, yet simple, method of deciding upon the distribution of the gains (costs) of cooperation in the presence of externalities. This method is shown to be the unique one satisfying several desirable properties. Furthermore, we illustrate the use of this method to resolve the sharing of benefits generated by international climate control agreements.

Forming efficient networks

In this paper, we suggest a simple sequential mechanism whose subgame perfect equilibria give rise to efficient networks. Moreover, the payoffs received by the agents coincide with their Shapley value in an appropriately defined cooperative game.

Optimal technology policy: subsidies versus monitoring

We analyze the optimal technology policy to solve a free-riding problem between the members of a RJV. We assume that when intervening the Government suffers an additional adverse selection problem because it is not able to distinguish the value of the potential innovation. Although subsidies and monitoring may be equivalent policy tools to solve firms' free-riding problem, they imply different social losses if the Government is not able to perfectly distinguish the value of the potential innovation. The supremacy of monitoring tools over subsidies is proved to depend on which type of information the Government is able to obtain about firms' R&D performance.

Efficient priority rules

We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (houses, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness, and renegotiation-proofness. Such a rule respects an acyclical priority structure and the allocations can be determined using the deferred acceptance algorithm.

Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in general economic environments

In this paper, we consider two classes of economic environments. In the first type, agents are faced with the task of providing local public goods that will benefit some or all of them. In the second type, economic activity takes place via formation of links. Agents need both to both form a network and decide how to share the output generated. For both scenarios, we suggest a bidding mechanism whereby agents bid for the right to decide upon the organization of the economic activity. The subgame perfect equilibria of this game generate efficient outcomes.

Resum de la tasca realitzada al Center Biomedical Engineering (CBE) del Massachussets Institute of Technology (MIT). Juliol-Agost 2005

Estudi elaborat a partir d’una estada al Center Biomedical Engineering (CBE) del Massachussets Institute of Technology (MIT), durant els mesos de juliol i agost del 2005. S’investiga una metodologia amb l’objectiu d’obtenir biomaterials que puguin actuar de bastida en la interfície os/cartílag, afavorint la diferenciació i creixement cel·lular de cartílag ossificat que pugui actuar d’unió entre l’articulació i l’os. S’experimenta una metodologia per a establir quins són els péptids afavoridors de la formació de teixit ossi utilitzats en materials d’hidroxiapatita. Es conclou que la tecnologia desenvolupada permet disposar d’una plataforma per assajar l’estudi del signaling sobre cèl·lules embrionàries, que permeti desenvolupar materials amb més capacitat diferenciadora.

Research work in Tokyo Institute of Technology

Research carried out in Tokyo Institute of Technology. The objective is to determine the influence of Interfacial Transition Zone (ITZ) around Lightweight aggregate in concrete on Chloride ion diffusivity. The ITZ of conventional concretes is the weakest point of concrete. The accumulating water on ITZ zone forms the most permeable area inside the concrete. Hence ITZ paves the way for chloride ion diffusion. The quality of ITZ depends on type and quality of aggregates used, water-cement ratio and also the method used for the production of concrete. It has been used two types of lightweight aggregates will be used, Chinese and Japanese, with different absorption capacities. The idea is to produce concrete with same effective water - cement ratio, using the same aggregates in two different conditions, dry and saturated, and compare the chloride ion diffusivity in these concretes (by diffusion test). A comparison of ITZ thickness of these concretes by SEM and EDAX-maps is also proposed. The chloride ion diffusion of concretes produced with the same effective water – cement ratio and same aggregates (dry and ssd) will depend, mainly, on ITZ.