Spanning tests in return and stochastic discount factor mean-variance frontiers: A unifying approach

We propose new spanning tests that assess if the initial and additional assets share theeconomically meaningful cost and mean representing portfolios. We prove their asymptoticequivalence to existing tests under local alternatives. We also show that unlike two-step oriterated procedures, single-step methods such as continuously updated GMM yield numericallyidentical overidentifyng restrictions tests, so there is arguably a single spanning test.To prove these results, we extend optimal GMM inference to deal with singularities in thelong run second moment matrix of the influence functions. Finally, we test for spanningusing size and book-to-market sorted US stock portfolios.

Measuring time-varying economic fears with consumption-based stochastic discount factors

This paper analyzes empirically the volatility of consumption-based stochastic discount factors as a measure of implicit economic fears by studying its relationship with future economic and stock market cycles. Time-varying economic fears seem to be well captured by the volatility of stochastic discount factors. In particular, the volatility of recursive utility-based stochastic discount factor with contemporaneous growth explains between 9 and 34 percent of future changes in industrial production at short and long horizons respectively. They also explain ex-ante uncertainty and risk aversion. However, future stock market cycles are better explained by a similar stochastic discount factor with long-run consumption growth. This specification of the stochastic discount factor presents higher volatility and lower pricing errors than the specification with contemporaneous consumption growth.

Tacit collusion and capacity withholding in repeated uniform price auctions

This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price rules of determining the uniform price, we show that when each firm sets a price-quantity pair specifying the firm's minimum acceptable price and the maximum quantity the firm is willing to sell at this price, there exists a range of discount factors for which the monopoly outcome with equal sharing is sustainable in the uniform price auction, but not in the corresponding discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this out-come. We extend these results to the case where firms may set bids that are arbitrary step functions of price-quantity pairs with any finite number of price steps. Surprisingly, under the Maximum Accepted Price rule, firms need employ no more than two price steps to minimize the value of the discount factor

Repeated games played in a network

Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted game is modelled by letting the players form a connected and undirected network. Players observe their immediate neighbors' behavior only, but communicate over time the repeated game's history truthfully throughout the network. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of discount factors strictly below 1, the set of sequential equilibria and the corresponding payoff set may be reduced. A general class of games is analyzed without imposing restrictions on the dimensionality of the payoff space. This and the bilateral communication structure allow for limited results under strategic communication only. As a by-product this model produces a network result; namely, the level of cooperation in this setup depends on the network's diameter, and not on its clustering coefficient as in other models.

The Appraisal of projects with environmental impacts. Efficiency and Sustainability

It is usually assumed that the appraisal of the impacts experienced by present generations does not entail any difficulty. However, this is not true. Moreover, there is not a widely accepted methodology for taking these impacts into account. Some of the controversial issues are: the appropriate value for the discount rate, the choice of the units for expressing the impacts, physical or monetary units -income, consumption or investment- and the valuation of tangible and intangible goods. When approaching the problem of very long term impacts, there is also the problem of valuing the impacts experienced by future generations, through e.g., the use of an intergenerational discount rate. However, if this were the case, the present generation perspective would prevail, as if all the property rights on the resources were owned by them. Therefore, the sustainability requirement should also be incorporated into the analysis. We will analyze these problems in this article and show some possible solutions.

The Design and efficiency of loyalty rewards

The goal of this paper is to reexamine the optimal design and efficiency of loyalty rewards in markets for final consumption goods. While the literature has emphasized the role of loyalty rewards as endogenous switching costs (which distort the efficient allocation of consumers), in this paper I analyze the ability of alternative designs to foster consumer participation and increase total surplus. First, the efficiency of loyalty rewards depend on their specific design. A commitment to the price of repeat purchases can involve substantial efficiency gains by reducing price-cost margins. However, discount policies imply higher future regular prices and are likely to reduce total surplus. Second, firms may prefer to set up inefficient rewards (discounts), especially in those circumstances where a commitment to the price of repeat purchases triggers Coasian dynamics.

Public Monitoring with Uncertainty in the Time Repetitions

This paper study repeated games where the time repetitions of the stage game are not known or controlled by the players. We call this feature random monitoring. Kawamori's (2004) shows that perfect random monitoring is always better than the canonical case. Surprisingly, when the monitoring is public, the result is less clear-cut and does not generalize in a straightforward way. Unless the public signals are sufficiently informative about player's actions and/or players are patient enough. In addition to a discount effect, that tends to consistently favor the provision of incentives, we found an information effect, associated with the time uncertainty on the distribution of public signals. Whether payoff improvements are or not possible, depends crucially on the direction and strength of these effects. JEL: C73, D82, D86. KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Random Public Monitoring, Moral Hazard, Stochastic Processes.

The Limits of Discrete Time Repeated Games:Some Notes and Comments

This paper studies the limits of discrete time repeated games with public monitoring. We solve and characterize the Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991) problem. We found that for the "bad" ("good") news model the lower (higher) magnitude events suggest cooperation, i.e., zero punishment probability, while the highrt (lower) magnitude events suggest defection, i.e., punishment with probability one. Public correlation is used to connect these two sets of signals and to make the enforceability to bind. The dynamic and limit behavior of the punishment probabilities for variations in ... (the discount rate) and ... (the time interval) are characterized, as well as the limit payo¤s for all these scenarios (We also introduce uncertainty in the time domain). The obtained ... limits are to the best of my knowledge, new. The obtained ... limits coincide with Fudenberg and Levine (2007) and Fudenberg and Olszewski (2011), with the exception that we clearly state the precise informational conditions that cause the limit to converge from above, to converge from below or to degenerate. JEL: C73, D82, D86. KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Random Pub- lic Monitoring, Moral Hazard, Stochastic Processes.

Investment, duration, and exit strategies for corporate and independent venture capital-backed start-ups

We propose a model of investment, duration, and exit strategies for start-ups backed by venture capital (VC) funds that accounts for the high level of uncertainty, the asymmetry of information between insiders and outsiders, and the discount rate. Our analysis predicts that start-ups backed by corporate VC funds remain for a longer period of time before exiting and receive larger investment amounts than those financed by independent VC funds. Although a longer duration leads to a higher likelihood of an exit through an acquisition, a larger investment increases the probability of an IPO exit. These predictions find strong empirical support.

Alternation and Cooperation in a Two-party System: Implications for Resource-Based Developing Economies

This paper studies cooperation in a political system dominated by two opportunistic parties competing in a resource-based economy. Since a binding agreement as an external solution might be difficult to enforce due to the close association between the incumbent party and the government, the paper explores the extent to which co-operation between political parties that alternate in office can rely on self-enforcing strategies to provide an internal solution. We show that, for appropriate values of the probability of re-election and the discount factor cooperation in maintaining the value of a state variable is possible, but fragile. Another result is that, in such political framework, debt decisions contain an externality element linked to electoral incentives that creates a bias towards excessive borrowing.

A unifying approach to the empirical evaluation of asset pricing models

Two main approaches are commonly used to empirically evaluate linear factor pricingmodels: regression and SDF methods, with centred and uncentred versions of the latter.We show that unlike standard two-step or iterated GMM procedures, single-step estimatorssuch as continuously updated GMM yield numerically identical values for prices of risk,pricing errors, Jensen s alphas and overidentifying restrictions tests irrespective of the modelvalidity. Therefore, there is arguably a single approach regardless of the factors being tradedor not, or the use of excess or gross returns. We illustrate our results by revisiting Lustigand Verdelhan s (2007) empirical analysis of currency returns.

A dynamic choice model of hybrid behavior in the attribute-space

This paper presents a dynamic choice model in the attributespace considering rational consumers that discount the future. In lightof the evidence of several state-dependence patterns, the model isfurther extended by considering a utility function that allows for thedifferent types of behavior described in the literature: pure inertia,pure variety seeking and hybrid. The model presents a stationaryconsumption pattern that can be inertial, where the consumer only buysone product, or a variety-seeking one, where the consumer buys severalproducts simultane-ously. Under the inverted-U marginal utilityassumption, the consumer behaves inertial among the existing brands forseveral periods, and eventually, once the stationary levels areapproached, the consumer turns to a variety-seeking behavior. An empiricalanalysis is run using a scanner database for fabric softener andsignificant evidence of hybrid behavior for most attributes is found,which supports the functional form considered in the theory.

On the relevance of modeling volatility for pricing purposes

This paper presents a two-factor (Vasicek-CIR) model of the term structure of interest rates and develops its pricing and empirical properties. We assume that default free discount bond prices are determined by the time to maturity and two factors, the long-term interest rate and the spread. Assuming a certain process for both factors, a general bond pricing equation is derived and a closed-form expression for bond prices is obtained. Empirical evidence of the model's performance in comparisson with a double Vasicek model is presented. The main conclusion is that the modeling of the volatility in the long-term rate process can help (in a large amount) to fit the observed data can improve - in a reasonable quantity - the prediction of the future movements in the medium- and long-term interest rates. However, for shorter maturities, it is shown that the pricing errors are, basically, negligible and it is not so clear which is the best model to be used.

On the receiver pays principle

This paper extends the theory of network competition betweentelecommunications operators by allowing receivers to derive a surplusfrom receiving calls (call externality) and to affect the volume ofcommunications by hanging up (receiver sovereignty). We investigate theextent to which receiver charges can lead to an internalization of thecalling externality. When the receiver charge and the termination(access) charge are both regulated, there exists an e±cient equilibrium.Effciency requires a termination discount. When reception charges aremarket determined, it is optimal for each operator to set the prices foremission and reception at their off-net costs. For an appropriately chosentermination charge, the symmetric equilibrium is again effcient. Lastly,we show that network-based price discrimination creates strong incentivesfor connectivity breakdowns, even between equal networks.

Risk management under a two-factor model of the term structure of interest rates

This paper presents several applications to interest rate risk managementbased on a two-factor continuous-time model of the term structure of interestrates previously presented in Moreno (1996). This model assumes that defaultfree discount bond prices are determined by the time to maturity and twofactors, the long-term interest rate and the spread (difference between thelong-term rate and the short-term (instantaneous) riskless rate). Several newmeasures of ``generalized duration" are presented and applied in differentsituations in order to manage market risk and yield curve risk. By means ofthese measures, we are able to compute the hedging ratios that allows us toimmunize a bond portfolio by means of options on bonds. Focusing on thehedging problem, it is shown that these new measures allow us to immunize abond portfolio against changes (parallel and/or in the slope) in the yieldcurve. Finally, a proposal of solution of the limitations of conventionalduration by means of these new measures is presented and illustratednumerically.