Money, Fame and the Allocation of Talent: Brain Drain, the Matthew Effect and the Institution of Science

The earning structure in science is known to be flat relative to the one in the private sector, which could cause a brain drain toward the private sector. In this paper, we assume that agents value both money and fame and study the role of the institution of science in the allocation of talent between the science sector and the private sector. Following works on the Sociology of Science, we model the institution of science as a mechanism distributing fame (i.e. peer recognition). We show that since the intrinsic performance is less noisy signal of talent in the science sector than in the private sector, a good institution of science can mitigate the brain drain. We also find that providing extra monetary incentives through the market might undermine the incentives provided by the institution and thereby worsen the brain drain. Finally, we study the optimal balance between monetary and non-monetary incentives in science.

L'Acadèmia d'Estudiants de medicina : Barcelona, 1845-1850

Amb aquest treball es dona testimoni de l'existència i activitats de l'Acadèmia d'Estudiants de Medicina entre els anys 1845 i 1850, una associació que agrupava els estudiants dels dos últims anys de Medicina. A més a més, els autors fan una descricpció acurada del marc acadèmic per a l'estudi de la medicina en aquella època: el funcionament de la facultat, el nombre de catedràtics, professors i alumnes, les instal·lacions, etc. El treball conté també un registre de les sessions acadèmiques (a raó d'una per setmana) cel·lebrades de les què es guarda referència. Ja per últim, s'inclouen a l'addenda, tres memòries amb tres dissertacions de mans d'Eliseu Forest i Cardona, Antoni de la Creu Roca i Flaquer i Francesc Sunyer i Capdevila.

On the weights of nations: assigning voting weights in a heterogenous union

Consider a voting procedure where countries, states, or districts comprising a union each elect representatives who then participate in later votes at the union level on their behalf. The countries, provinces, and states may vary in their populations and composition. If we wish to maximize the total expected utility of all agents in the union, how to weight the votes of the representatives of the different countries, states or districts at the union level? We provide a simple characterization of the efficient voting rule in terms of the weights assigned to different districts and the voting threshold (how large a qualified majority is needed to induce change versus the status quo). Next, in the context of a model of the correlation structure of agents preferences, we analyze how voting weights relate to the population size of a country. We then analyze the voting weights in Council of the European Union under the Nice Treaty and the recently proposed constitution, and contrast them under different versions of our model.

Choosing how to choose: self-stable majority rules and constitutions

Constitutional arrangements affect the decisions made by a society. We study how this effect leads to preferences of citizens over constitutions; and ultimately how this has a feedback that determines which constitutions can survive in a given society. Constitutions are stylized here, to consist of a voting rule for ordinary business and possibly different voting rule for making changes to the constitution. We deffine an equilibrium notion for constitutions, called self-stability, whereby under the rules of a self-stable constitution, the society would not vote to change the constitution. We argue that only self-stable constitutions will endure. We prove that self-stable constitutions always exist, but that most constitutions (even very prominent ones) may not be self-stable for some societies. We show that constitutions where the voting rule used to amend the constitution is the same as the voting rule used for ordinary business are dangerously simplistic, and there are (many) societies for which no such constitution is self-stable rule. We conclude with a characterization of the set of self-stable constitutions that use majority rule for ordinary business.

Organisational structure, communication and group ethics

This paper investigates experimentally how organisational decision processes affect the moral motivations of actors inside a firm that must forego profits to reduce harming a third party. In a "vertical" treatment, one insider unilaterally sets the harm-reduction strategy; the other can only accept or quit. In a "horizontal" treatment, the insiders decide by consensus. Our 2-by-2 design also controls for communication effects. In our data, communication makes vertical firms more ethical; voice appears to mitigate "responsibility-alleviation" in that subordinates with voice feel responsible for what their firms do. Vertical firms are then more ethical than the horizontal firms for which our bargaining data reveal a dynamic form of responsibility-alleviation and our chat data indicate a strong "insider-outsider" effect.

El Real Conservatorio de Artes (1824-1850): Orígenes y gestación de la ingeniería industrial moderna

El "Conservatorio de Artes" tuvo un origen Ilustrado, emulando a su homónimo parisino, pero nació durante el absolutismo (1824), tras un frustrado intento afrancesado (1810). Absorbió al "Gabinete de Máquinas" y tuvo como primer director a López de Peñalver. Supuso un puente entre la Ilustración y la Ingeniería Industrial decimonónica, sobre todo, a partir de la institucionalización del envío de pensionados a la "École Centrale des Arts et Manufactures" parisina, con cuyo retorno consigue transformarse en "Real Instituto Industrial" (1850). Aparte destaca su proyección social, tanto en su papel de oficina de patentes como en la promoción de exposiciones industriales.

Viajar a través del Cosmos: la medida de la creación de riqueza y la serie histórica del producto interior bruto en España (1850-2008)

Este trabajo responde a la réplica de Leandro Prados de la Escosura acerca de mi estimación de la serie histórica del Producto Interior Bruto de España (R.E.A., 49 (XVII), 2009, págs. 5 a 45). Demuestra que el IPC es el mejor deflactor disponible para reconstruir el PIB antes de la CNE porque mide correctamente las variaciones interanuales del nivel general de precios. Emplea un procedimiento de enlace de la serie histórica de la contabilidad nacional que es consistente con los nuevos sistemas de cuentas nacionales SCN-93 y SEC-95 y coincide con los empleados por todos los organismos económicos internacionales. La actualización del sistema contable, con la inclusión de la economía sumergida y de la producción para uso final propio, ha dejado obsoletas las estimaciones anteriores y exige estimaciones de segunda generación, con la inevitable readaptación de los niveles relativos de las distintas economías.

Let's talk: how communication affects contract design

We study experimentally how the ability to communicate affects the frequency and effectiveness of flexible and inflexible contracts in a bilateral trade context where sellers can adjust trade quality after observing a post-contractual cost shock and a discretionary buyer transfer. In the absence of communication, we find that rigid contracts are more frequent and lead to higher earnings for both buyer and seller. By contrast, in the presence of communication, flexible contracts are much more frequent and considerably more productive, both for buyers and sellers. Also, both buyer and seller earn considerably more from flexible with communication than rigid without communication. Our results show quite strongly that communication, a normal feature in contracting, can remove the potential cost of flexibility (disagreements caused by conflicting perceptions). We offer an explanation based on social norms.

De viles rurals a indrets de la regió metropolitana de Barcelona: transformacions històriques del paisatge a la Vall del Congost (Figaró-Montmany, l’Ametlla del Vallès i la Garriga, 1850-2010)

El projecte ha assolit la majoria d’objectius, ajustats a la reducció d'una quarta part de l'import concedit: 1) caracteritzar la transformació del paisatge agro-forestal i urbà a dos municipis de la vall del Congost, La Garriga i Figaró-Montmany, reconstruint amb SIG els mapes d'ús del sòl de 1854, 1949, 1956 i 2005, obtenint per intersecció de cobertes les matrius dels canvis d'ús; i 2) avaluar amb l’índex de connectivitat ecològica l'impacte ambiental d'aquells canvis des del punt de vista de la biodiversitat i la resiliència del paisatges, amb un especial èmfasi en la reforestació induïda per l'abandonament rural i la pèrdua de paisatges en mosaic, en un àmbit més gran pel període 1956-1993-2005. Aquests resultats han permès preparar varis articles per publicar en co-autoría a revistes com Landscape History, Environment and History o Landscape and Urban Planning. Ja és a punt de poder-se lliurar el primer amb el títol de "Looking backwards into a Mediterranean edge environment: Landscape changes and ecological connectivity in El Congost Valley (province of Barcelona, Catalonia) 1850-2005", incloent dos objectius esmentats a la memòria: identificar les principals forces motores d'aquells canvis en el paisatge relacionant els usos del sòl amb les formes d'ordenació del territori, caracteritzar-ne les forces rectores econòmico-socials i el paper jugat per la protecció del Parc Natural del Montseny i els Cingles de Bertí. Els resultats també permetran abordar en el futur altres aspectes, com per exemple estimar el potencial energètic de la biomassa local tot cercant que el seu aprofitament generi sinèrgies territorials positives per a l'ecologia del paisatge amb la recuperació d’una ramaderia extensiva i una agricultura ecològica que facin possible la restauració dels paisatges en mosaic. L'estudi ha pogut incorporar un aspecte inicialment no previst, el cens d'orquídies mediterrànies a Figaró-Montmany elaborat pel naturalista Paul Wilcox

Poor, Hungry and Stupid: Numeracy and the Impact of High Food Prices in Industrializing Britain, 1780-1850

This paper argues that low levels of nutrition impaired cognitive development in industrializing England, and that welfare transfers mitigated the adverse effects of high food prices. Age heaping is used as an indicator of numeracy, as derived from census data. For the cohorts from 1780-1850, we analyse the effect of high grain prices during the Napoleonic Wars. We show that numeracy declined markedly for those born during the war years, especially when wheat was dear. Crucially, where the Old Poor Law provided for generous relief payments, the adverse impact of high prices for foodstuffs was mitigated. Finally, we show some tentative evidence that Englishmen born in areas with low income support selected into occupations with lower cognitive requirements.

Does privatising public service provision reduce accountability?

This paper studies how privatising service provision (shifting control rights and contractualobligations to providers) affects accountability. There are two main effects. (1) Privatisation demotivates governments from investigating and responding to public demands, since providers then hold up service adaptations. (2) Privatisation demotivates the public from mobilising to pressure for service adaptations, since providers then indirectly holdup the public by inflating the government s cost of implementing these adaptations. So, when choosing governance mode, politicians may be biased towards privatising as a way to escape public attention; relatedly, privatising utilities may reduce public pressure and increase consumer prices.

The optimal length of contracts with application to outsourcing

This paper resolves three empirical puzzles in outsourcing by formalizing the adaptationcost of long-term performance contracts. Side-trading with a new partner alongside a long-term contract (to exploit an adaptation-requiring investment) is usually less effective than switching to the new partner when the contract expires. So long-term contracts that prevent holdup of specific investments may induce holdup of adaptation investments. Contract length therefore trades of specific and adaptation investments. Length should increase with the importance and specificity of self-investments, and decrease with the importance of adaptation investments for which side-trading is ineffective. My general model also shows how optimal length falls with cross-investments and wasteful investments.

Specificity revisited: The role of cross-investments

Previous analysis has shown that traders may opt for specific technologies with nojoint productivity advantage as a way to commit themselves to trading jointly, butonly when long-term contracting is infeasible. This paper proves that speciÞcity canalso be optimal (by relaxing the budget-balance constraint) in settings with long-termcontracting. Traders will opt for specificity when one trader makes a cross-investmentand either (1) this cross-investment has a direct externality on the other trader, (2) bothparties invest, or (3) private information is present. The specificity (e.g. from non-salvageable investments, specific assets and technologies, narrow business strategies,and exclusivity restrictions) is equally effective regardless of which trader's alternativetrade payoff is reduced. Specificity supports long-term contracts in a broad rangeof settings - both with and without renegotiation. The theory also offers a novelperspective on franchising and vertical integration.

Social preferences: Some simple tests and a new model

Departures from pure self interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of "social preferences". We conduct experiments on simple two-person and three-person games with binary choices that test these theories more directly than the array of games conventionally considered. Our experiments show strong support for the prevalence of "quasi-maximin" preferences: People sacrifice to increase the payoffs for all recipients, but especially for the lowest-payoff recipients. People are also motivated by reciprocity: While people are reluctant to sacrifice to reciprocate good or bad behavior beyond what they would sacrifice for neutral parties, they withdraw willingness to sacrifice to achieve a fair outcome when others are themselves unwilling to sacrifice. Some participants are averse to getting different payoffs than others, but based on our experiments and reinterpretation of previous experiments we argue that behavior that has been presented as "difference aversion" in recent papers is actually a combination of reciprocal and quasi-maximin motivations. We formulate a model in which each player is willing to sacrifice to allocate the quasi-maximin allocation only to those players also believed to be pursuing the quasi-maximin allocation, and may sacrifice to punish unfair players.