Crime and punishment: Further results

I consider a general specification of criminals' objective functionand argue that, when the general non-expected utility theory issubstituted for the traditional expected utility theory, thehigh-fine-low-probability result (Becker, 1968) only holds underspecific and strong restrictions.

The economics of organized crime and optimal law enforcement

This paper extends the optimal law enforcement literature to organized crime.We model the criminal organization as a vertical structure where the principal extracts some rents from the agents through extortion. Depending on the principal's information set, threats may or may not be credible. As long as threats are credible, the principal is able to fully extract rents.In that case, the results obtained by applying standard theory of optimal law enforcement are robust: we argue for a tougher policy. However, when threats are not credible, the principal is not able to fully extract rents and there is violence. Moreover, we show that it is not necessarily true that a tougher law enforcement policy should be chosen when in presence of organized crime.

The role of moral values in the economic analysis of crime: A general equilibrium approach

In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium model of crime and show thatlaw enforcement has different roles depending on the equilibrium characterization and the value of social norms. When an economy has a unique stable equilibrium where a fraction of the population is productive and the remaining predates, the government can choose an optimal law enforcement policy to maximize a welfare function evaluated at the steady state. If such steady state is not unique, law enforcement is still relevant but in a completely different way because the steady state that prevails depends on the initial proportions of productive and predator individuals in the economy. The relative importance of these proportions can be changed through law enforcement policy.

Optimal magnitude and probability of fines

The economic literature on crime and punishment focuses on the trade-off between probability and severity of punishment, and suggests that detection probability and fines are substitutes. In this paper it is shown that, in presence of substantial underdeterrence caused by costly detection and punishment, these instruments may become complements. When offenders are poor, the deterrent value of monetary sanctions is low. Thus, the government does not invest a lot in detection. If offenders are rich, however, the deterrent value of monetary sanctions is high, so it is more profitable to prosecute them.

La percepció social entorn al delicte i els condicionants que operen en aquesta percepció al municipi de Sant Joan de Vilatorrada

L'objectiu general d'aquesta investigació social és aprofundir en el coneixement de la percepció social entorn al delicte, així com en els condicionants que operen en aquesta percepció al municipi de Sant Joan de Vilatorrada. S'incidirà en el coneixement d'aquesta percepció a partir de la por al delicte i la inseguretat ciutadana, dos fenòmens similars, però no exactament iguals. I els condicionants responen als factors que tenen una influència sobre la por al delicte i la inseguretat ciutadana. D'aquests factors se n'han detectat 34, i només s'estudiaran els nou més rellevants amb la finalitat de saber quin d'ells és el més influent. Tal com s'ha comentat, l'àmbit d'estudi és la població de Sant Joan de Vilatorrada, tot justificant-se pel fet de permetre incorporar el factor de tenir un centre penitenciari al mateix municipi en el qual es resideix. La metodologia escollida és la quantitativa, tot utilitzant la tècnica de l'enquesta. Per altra banda, la mostra és de 2.030 subjectes, tenint present que s'ha obtingut a partir d'una fórmula destinada a calcular les poblacions finites. Finalment, s'han presentat quatre limitacions de l'estudi, tot optant per aportar diverses solucions.

Are traffic violators criminals? Searching for answers in experiences of European countries

The connection between road traffic safety and criminal behavior has recently become a topic of interest in the literature, although little emphasis placed on the relationship with road accidents. Evidence worldwide shows that people who commit other offences characteristic of antisocial attitudes, are more prone to suffer road traffic accidents and infringe traffic laws. Here we examine the records of the 28 current member states of the European Union over the period 1999 - 2010. Our aim is to test the hypothesis that crime rates (and specifically, motor vehicle-related crimes) may be considered as predictors of fatal road traffic accidents. If they may, this could justify, at least prima facie, the tendency in several countries to consider traffic offences as crimes in their penal codes and to toughen the punishment imposed on those who commit them. We also analyze the effect of the severity of the legal system applied to traffic offences. Our results reveal that road traffic fatality rates are higher in countries whose inhabitants have more aggressive behavior, while the rates are lower in countries with more severe penal systems.

Are traffic violators criminals? Searching for answers in experiences of European countries

The connection between road traffic safety and criminal behavior has recently become a topic of interest in the literature, although little emphasis placed on the relationship with road accidents. Evidence worldwide shows that people who commit other offences characteristic of antisocial attitudes, are more prone to suffer road traffic accidents and infringe traffic laws. Here we examine the records of the 28 current member states of the European Union over the period 1999 - 2010. Our aim is to test the hypothesis that crime rates (and specifically, motor vehicle-related crimes) may be considered as predictors of fatal road traffic accidents. If they may, this could justify, at least prima facie, the tendency in several countries to consider traffic offences as crimes in their penal codes and to toughen the punishment imposed on those who commit them. We also analyze the effect of the severity of the legal system applied to traffic offences. Our results reveal that road traffic fatality rates are higher in countries whose inhabitants have more aggressive behavior, while the rates are lower in countries with more severe penal systems.

Confirmatory factor analysis of an inventory of perception of insecurity and fear of crime

This paper focuses on the study of the factorial structure of an inventory to estimate the subjective perception of insecurity and fear of crime. Made from the review of the literature on the subject and the results obtained in previous works, this factor structure shows that this attitude towards insecurity and fear of crime is identified through a number of latent factors which are schematically summarized in (a) personal safety, (b) the perception of personal and social control, (c) the presence of threatening people or situations, (d) the processes of identity and space appropriation, (e) satisfaction with the environment, and (f) the environmental and the use of space. Such factors are relevant dimensions to analyze the phenomenon. Method: A sample of 571 participants in a neighborhood of Barcelona was evaluated with the proposed inventory, which yielded data from the distributions of all the items provided. The administration was conducted by researchers specially trained for it and the results were analyzed by using standard procedures in the confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) from the hypothesized theoretical structure. The analysis was performed by decatypes according to the different response scales prepared in the inventory and their ordinal nature, and by estimating the polychoric correlation coefficients. The results show an acceptable fit of the proposed model, an appropriate behavior of the residuals and statistically significant estimates of the factor loadings. This would indicate the goodness of the proposed factor structure.

Transfers, social safety nets and economic growth

The role of social safety nets in the form of redistributional transfersand wage subsidies is analyzed using a simple model of criminal behavior. Itis argued that public welfare programs act as a crime--preventing ordisruption--preventing devices because they tend to increase the opportunitycost of engaging in crime or disruptive activities. It is shown that, in thepresence of a leisure choice, wage subsidies may be better than pure transfers. Using a simple growth model, it is shown that it is not optimal for the governmentto try to fully eliminate crime. The optimal size of the public welfare programis found and it is argued that public welfare should be financed with income(not lump--sum) taxes, despite the fact that income taxes are distortionary.The intuition for this result is that income taxes act as a user fee oncongested public goods and transfers can be thought of as {\it productive}public goods {\it subject to congestion}. Finally, using a cross-section of 75 countries, the partial correlation betweentransfers and growth is shown to be significantly positive.

Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization

In this paper, we take an organizational view of organized crime. In particular, we study the organizational consequences of product illegality attending at the following characteristics: (i) contracts are not enforceable in court, (ii) all participants are subject to the risk of being punished, (iii) employees present a major threat to the entrepreneur having the most detailed knowledge concerning participation, (iv) separation between ownership and management is difficult because record-keeping and auditing augments criminal evidence.

Dynamic optimal law enforcement with learning

We incorporate the process of enforcement learning by assuming that the agency's current marginal cost is a decreasing function of its past experience of detecting and convicting. The agency accumulates data and information (on criminals, on opportunities of crime) enhancing the ability to apprehend in the future at a lower marginal cost.We focus on the impact of enforcement learning on optimal stationary compliance rules. In particular, we show that the optimal stationary fine could be less-than-maximal and the optimal stationary probability of detection could be higher-than-otherwise.

Identifying the socioeconomic determinants of crime in Spanish provinces

In this paper we study, having as theoretical reference the economic model of crime (Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1973), which are the socioeconomic and demographic determinants of crime in Spain paying attention on the role of provincial peculiarities. We estimate a crime equation using a panel dataset of Spanish provinces (NUTS3) for the period 1993 to 1999 employing the GMMsystem estimator. Empirical results suggest that lagged crime rate and clear-up rate are correlated to all typologies of crime rate considered. Property crimes are better explained by socioeconomic variables (GDP per capita, GDP growth rate and percentage of population with high school and university degree), while demographic factors reveal important and significant influences, in particular for crimes against the person. These results are obtained using an instrumental variable approach that takes advantage of the dynamic properties of our dataset to control for both measurement errors in crime data and joint endogeneity of the explanatory variables

Identifying the socioeconomic determinants of crime in Spanish provinces

In this paper we study, having as theoretical reference the economic model of crime (Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1973), which are the socioeconomic and demographic determinants of crime in Spain paying attention on the role of provincial peculiarities. We estimate a crime equation using a panel dataset of Spanish provinces (NUTS3) for the period 1993 to 1999 employing the GMMsystem estimator. Empirical results suggest that lagged crime rate and clear-up rate are correlated to all typologies of crime rate considered. Property crimes are better explained by socioeconomic variables (GDP per capita, GDP growth rate and percentage of population with high school and university degree), while demographic factors reveal important and significant influences, in particular for crimes against the person. These results are obtained using an instrumental variable approach that takes advantage of the dynamic properties of our dataset to control for both measurement errors in crime data and joint endogeneity of the explanatory variables

Economic and social convergence in Colombia

GDP has usually been used as a proxy for human well-being. Nevertheless, other social aspects should also be considered, such as life expectancy, infant mortality, educational enrolment and crime issues. With this paper we investigate not only economic convergence but also social convergence between regions in a developing country, Colombia, in the period 1975-2005. We consider several techniques in our analysis: sigma convergence, stochastic kernel estimations, and also several empirical models to find out the beta convergence parameter (cross section and panel estimates, with and without spatial dependence). The main results confirm that we can talk about convergence in Colombia in key social variables, although not in the classic economic variable, GDP per capita. We have also found that spatial autocorrelation reinforces convergence processes through deepening market and social factors, while isolation condemns regions to nonconvergence.

La responsabilitat penal dels menors. Entre la retribució i la prevenció

Seguint les aportacions de Sutherland al desenvolupament de la teoria de l'associació diferencial, la delinqüència juvenil és producte de l'aprenentatge que els menors realitzen de conductes i valors criminals. La conducta criminal és, doncs, apresa en interacció amb d'altres persones en un grup social íntim. Lluny de semblar una teoria massa simplista en els seus postulats, aquesta engloba una sèrie de factors socials i criminològics que recolzen la meva proposta d'intervenció. Caldria, a parer meu, graduar la intensitat de la resposta penal conforme al procés evolutiu del menor. Així doncs, en l'establiment de les mesures de responsabilitat civil i penal hauríem d'estar amatents al grau de maduresa en el discerniment per part del menor d'allò que està permès i d'allò que ras i curt no es pot fer.