Leadership and overcoming coordination failure with asymmetric costs

We study how the heterogeneity of agents affects the extent to which changes in financial incentives can pull a group out of a situation of coordination failure. We focus on the connections between cost asymmetries and leadership. Experimental subjects interact in groups of four in a series of weak-link games. The treatment variable is the distribution of high and low effort cost across subjects. We present data for one, two and three low-cost subjects as well as control sessions with symmetric costs. The overall pattern of coordination improvement is common across treatments. Early coordination improvements depend on the distribution of high and low effort costs across subjects, but these differences disappear with time. We find that initial leadership in overcoming coordination failure is not driven by low-cost subjects but by subjects with the most frequent cost. This conformity effect can be due to a kind of group identity or to the cognitive simplicity of acting with identical others.

Development of a population-based cost-effectiveness model of chronic graft versus host disease in Spain

Chronic graft-versus-host disease (cGvHD) is the leading cause of late nonrelapse mortality (transplant-related mortality) after hematopoietic stem cell transplant. Given that there are a wide range of treatment options for cGvHD, assessment of the associated costs and efficacy can help clinicians and health care providers allocate health care resources more efficiently. OBJECTIVE: The purpose of this study was to assess the cost-effectiveness of extracorporeal photopheresis (ECP) compared with rituximab (Rmb) and with imatinib (Imt) in patients with cGvHD at 5 years from the perspective of the Spanish National Health System. METHODS: The model assessed the incremental cost-effectiveness/utility ratio of ECP versus Rmb or Imt for 1000 hypothetical patients by using microsimulation cost-effectiveness techniques. Model probabilities were obtained from the literature. Treatment pathways and adverse events were evaluated taking clinical opinion and published reports into consideration. Local data on costs (2010 Euros) and health care resources utilization were validated by the clinical authors. Probabilistic sensitivity analyses were used to assess the robustness of the model. RESULTS: The greater efficacy of ECP resulted in a gain of 0.011 to 0.024 quality-adjusted life-year in the first year and 0.062 to 0.094 at year 5 compared with Rmb or Imt. The results showed that the higher acquisition cost of ECP versus Imt was compensated for at 9 months by greater efficacy; this higher cost was partially compensated for ( 517) by year 5 versus Rmb. After 9 months, ECP was dominant (cheaper and more effective) compared with Imt. The incremental cost-effectiveness ratio of ECP versus Rmb was 29,646 per life-year gained and 24,442 per quality-adjusted life-year gained at year 2.5. Probabilistic sensitivity analysis confirmed the results. The main study limitation was that to assess relative treatment effects, only small studies were available for indirect comparison. CONCLUSION: ECP as a third-line therapy for cGvHD is a more cost-effective strategy than Rmb or Imt.

Price rivalry in airline markets: A study of a successful strategy of a network carrier against a low-cost carrier

Competition in airline markets may be tough. In this context, network carriers have two alternative strategies to compete with low-cost carriers. First, they may establish a low-cost subsidiary. Second, they may try to reduce costs using the main brand. This paper examines a successful strategy of the first type implemented by Iberia in the Spanish domestic market. Our analysis of data and the estimation of a pricing equation show that Iberia has been able to charge lower prices than rivals with its low-cost subsidiary. The pricing policy of the Spanish network carrier has been particularly aggressive in less dense routes and shorter routes.

Lessons of peace in Aceh: administrative decentralization and political freedom as a strategy of pacification in Aceh

This working paper shows the evolution of the Aceh conflict until its peaceful resolution in 2005. The key factors in the success of this peace process have been the confluence of several factors related to the internal and external dynamics of the country, including the new political leadership, the decreasing role of the military power, the international support and the meeting of the objectives of both groups, and so on. The end of the conflict in Aceh shows that the administrative decentralization and the promotion of the political participation of the main actors involved have made possible the development of a solid alternative to the arms strategy of conflict resolution used for years in Indonesia.

The Political cost of reforms

This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politicians perceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters. To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknown and investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians make too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannot be fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may, under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study how political rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistent with a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection. They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economic uncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.

The political cost of reforms

This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politiciansperceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters.To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknownand investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politiciansmake too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannotbe fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary tothe conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may,under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study howpolitical rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistentwith a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection.They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economicuncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.

Endogenous price leadership

We consider a linear price setting duopoly game with di®erentiatedproducts and determine endogenously which of the players will lead andwhich will follow. While the follower role is most attractive for each firm, we show that waiting is more risky for the low cost firm so that,consequently, risk dominance considerations, as in Harsanyi and Selten(1988), allow the conclusion that only the high cost firm will choose towait. Hence, the low cost firm will emerge as the endogenous price leader.

Endogenous price leadership

We consider a linear price setting duopoly game with differentiated products and determine endogenously which of the players will lead and which will follow. While the follower role is most attractive for each firm, we show that waiting is more risky for the low cost firm so that, consequently, risk dominance considerations, as in Harsanyi and Selten (1988), allow the conclusion that only the highcost firm will choose to wait. Hence, the low cost firm will emerge as the endogenous price leader.

Competition and cost overruns. Optimal misspecification of procurement contracts

Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in the initial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design specification in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspecification. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design specification and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project s design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design s specification level is seen to affect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design specification and shows that the sponsor s optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design specification so as to make significant cost overruns likely. Since no such misspecification occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.

Endogenous Stackelberg leadership

We consider a linear quantity setting duopoly game and analyzewhich of the players will commit when both players have the possibility todo so. To that end, we study a 2-stage game in which each player caneither commit to a quantity in stage 1 or wait till stage 2. We show thatcommitting is more risky for the high cost firm and that, consequently,risk dominance considerations, as in Harsanyi and Selten (1988), allowthe conclusion that only the low cost firm will choose to commit.Hence, the low cost firm will emerge as the endogenous Stackelberg leader.

Competition and cost overruns in procurement

Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in theinitial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design speciffication in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspeciffication. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design speciffication and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project's design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design's speciffication level is seen to affect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design speciffication and shows that the sponsor's optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design speciffication so as to make signifficant cost overrunslikely. Since no such misspeciffication occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.

Measuring conduct and cost parameters in the Spanish air transport market

This paper estimates a model of airline competition for the Spanish air transport market. I test the explanatory power of alternative oligopoly models with capacity constraints. In addition, I analyse the degree of density economies. Results show that Spanish airlines conduct follows a price-leadership scheme so that it is less competitive than the Cournot solution. I also find evidence that thin routes can be considered as natural monopolies

Measuring conduct and cost parameters in the Spanish air transport market

This paper estimates a model of airline competition for the Spanish air transport market. I test the explanatory power of alternative oligopoly models with capacity constraints. In addition, I analyse the degree of density economies. Results show that Spanish airlines conduct follows a price-leadership scheme so that it is less competitive than the Cournot solution. I also find evidence that thin routes can be considered as natural monopolies

Cost-effectiveness of early detection of breast cancer in Catalonia (Spain)

Background: Breast cancer (BC) causes more deaths than any other cancer among women in Catalonia. Early detection has contributed to the observed decline in BC mortality. However, there is debate on the optimal screening strategy. We performed an economic evaluation of 20 screening strategies taking into account the cost over time of screening and subsequent medical costs, including diagnostic confirmation, initial treatment, follow-up and advanced care. Methods: We used a probabilistic model to estimate the effect and costs over time of each scenario. The effect was measured as years of life (YL), quality-adjusted life years (QALY), and lives extended (LE). Costs of screening and treatment were obtained from the Early Detection Program and hospital databases of the IMAS-Hospital del Mar in Barcelona. The incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) was used to compare the relative costs and outcomes of different scenarios. Results: Strategies that start at ages 40 or 45 and end at 69 predominate when the effect is measured as YL or QALYs. Biennial strategies 50-69, 45-69 or annual 45-69, 40-69 and 40-74 were selected as cost-effective for both effect measures (YL or QALYs). The ICER increases considerably when moving from biennial to annual scenarios. Moving from no screening to biennial 50-69 years represented an ICER of 4,469€ per QALY. Conclusions: A reduced number of screening strategies have been selected for consideration by researchers, decision makers and policy planners. Mathematical models are useful to assess the impact and costs of BC screening in a specific geographical area.

The Cost of ownership in the governance of interfirm collaborations

This paper investigates the selection of governance forms in interfirm collaborations taking into account the predictions from transaction costs and property rights theories. Transaction costs arguments are often used to justify the introduction of hierarchical controls in collaborations, but the ownership dimension of going from “contracts” to “hierarchies” has been ignored in the past and with it the so called “costs of ownership”. The theoretical results, tested with a sample of collaborations in which participate Spanish firms, indicate that the cost of ownership may offset the benefits of hierarchical controls and therefore limit their diffusion. Evidence is also reported of possible complementarities between reputation effects and forms of ownership that go together with hierarchical controls (i.e. joint ventures), in contrast with the generally assumed substitutability between the two.