An hybrid methodology for RL-based behavior coordination in a target following mission with an AUV

Proposes a behavior-based scheme for high-level control of autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs). Two main characteristics can be highlighted in the control scheme. Behavior coordination is done through a hybrid methodology, which takes in advantages of the robustness and modularity in competitive approaches, as well as optimized trajectories

A behavior-based scheme using reinforcement learning for autonomous underwater vehicles

This paper presents a hybrid behavior-based scheme using reinforcement learning for high-level control of autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs). Two main features of the presented approach are hybrid behavior coordination and semi on-line neural-Q_learning (SONQL). Hybrid behavior coordination takes advantages of robustness and modularity in the competitive approach as well as efficient trajectories in the cooperative approach. SONQL, a new continuous approach of the Q_learning algorithm with a multilayer neural network is used to learn behavior state/action mapping online. Experimental results show the feasibility of the presented approach for AUVs

Observability and overcoming coordination failure in organizations

Many organizations suffer poor performance because its members fail to coordinate on efficient patterns of behavior. In previous research, we have shown that financial incentives can be used to find a way out of such performance traps. Here we examine the sensitivity of this result to the ability of people to observe others' choices. Our experiments are set in a corporate environment where subjects' payoffs depend on coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by the employees of an experimental firm is a weak-link game. Treatments vary along two dimensions. First, subjects either start with low financial incentives for coordination, which typically leads to coordination failure, and then are switched to higher incentives or start with high incentives, which typically yield effective coordination, and are switched to low incentives. Second, as the key treatment variable, subjects either observe the effort levels chosen by all employees in their experimenta

A change would do you good . . . An experimental study on how to overcome coordination failure in organizations

Many organizations suffer poor performance because individuals within the organization fail to coordinate on efficient patterns of behavior. Using controlled laboratory experiments, we study how financial incentives can be used to find a way out of such performance traps. Our experiments are set in a corporate environment where subjects' payoffs depend on coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by employees is a weak-link game. In an initial phase, the benefits of coordination are low relative to the cost of increased effort. Play in this initial phase typically converges to an inefficient outcome with employees failing to coordinate at high effort levels. The experimental design then explores the effects of varying the financial incentives to coordinate at a higher effort level. We find that an increase in the benefits of coordination leads to improved coordination, but, surprisingly, large increases have no more impact than small increases. Once subj

Stable coalition structures with fixed decision scheme

This paper studies the stability of a finite local public goods economy in horizontal differentiation, where a jurisdiction's choice of the public good is given by an exogenous decision scheme. In this paper, we characterize the class of decision schemes that ensure the existence of an equilibrium with free mobility (that we call Tiebout equilibrium) for monotone distribution of players. This class contains all the decision schemes whose choice lies between the Rawlsian decision scheme and the median voter with mid-distance of the two median voters when there are ties. We show that for non-monotone distribution, there is no decision scheme that can ensure the stability of coalitions. In the last part of the paper, we prove the non-emptiness of the core of this coalition formation game

Leadership and overcoming coordination failure with asymmetric costs

We study how the heterogeneity of agents affects the extent to which changes in financial incentives can pull a group out of a situation of coordination failure. We focus on the connections between cost asymmetries and leadership. Experimental subjects interact in groups of four in a series of weak-link games. The treatment variable is the distribution of high and low effort cost across subjects. We present data for one, two and three low-cost subjects as well as control sessions with symmetric costs. The overall pattern of coordination improvement is common across treatments. Early coordination improvements depend on the distribution of high and low effort costs across subjects, but these differences disappear with time. We find that initial leadership in overcoming coordination failure is not driven by low-cost subjects but by subjects with the most frequent cost. This conformity effect can be due to a kind of group identity or to the cognitive simplicity of acting with identical others.

Convergence of the mass-transport steepest descent scheme for the sub-critical Patlak-Keller-Segel model

Variational steepest descent approximation schemes for the modified Patlak-Keller-Segel equation with a logarithmic interaction kernel in any dimension are considered. We prove the convergence of the suitably interpolated in time implicit Euler scheme, defined in terms of the Euclidean Wasserstein distance, associated to this equation for sub-critical masses. As a consequence, we recover the recent result about the global in time existence of weak-solutions to the modified Patlak-Keller-Segel equation for the logarithmic interaction kernel in any dimension in the sub-critical case. Moreover, we show how this method performs numerically in one dimension. In this particular case, this numerical scheme corresponds to a standard implicit Euler method for the pseudo-inverse of the cumulative distribution function. We demonstrate its capabilities to reproduce easily without the need of mesh-refinement the blow-up of solutions for super-critical masses.

Tax Coordination Between Regions in Spain. The Role of the Courts

Overview of the Tax Coordination of the Regions in Spain from the point of view of the role of the Courts in developing the present system

Tax Coordination Between Regions in Spain - Role of the Courts

Análisis de la jurisprudencia constitucional española sobre la distribución de competencias tributarias entre los distintos niveles de gobierno.

A quality-based cost distribution charging scheme for QoS multicast networks

This paper presents a new charging scheme for cost distribution along a point-to-multipoint connection when destination nodes are responsible for the cost. The scheme focus on QoS considerations and a complete range of choices is presented. These choices go from a safe scheme for the network operator to a fair scheme to the customer. The in-between cases are also covered. Specific and general problems, like the incidence of users disconnecting dynamically is also discussed. The aim of this scheme is to encourage the users to disperse the resource demand instead of having a large number of direct connections to the source of the data, which would result in a higher than necessary bandwidth use from the source. This would benefit the overall performance of the network. The implementation of this task must balance between the necessity to offer a competitive service and the risk of not recovering such service cost for the network operator. Throughout this paper reference to multicast charging is made without making any reference to any specific category of service. The proposed scheme is also evaluated with the criteria set proposed in the European ATM charging project CANCAN

Hybrid coordination of reinforcement learning-based behaviors for AUV control

This paper proposes a hybrid coordination method for behavior-based control architectures. The hybrid method takes advantages of the robustness and modularity in competitive approaches as well as optimized trajectories in cooperative ones. This paper shows the feasibility of applying this hybrid method with a 3D-navigation to an autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV). The behaviors are learnt online by means of reinforcement learning. A continuous Q-learning implemented with a feed-forward neural network is employed. Realistic simulations were carried out. The results obtained show the good performance of the hybrid method on behavior coordination as well as the convergence of the behaviors

Medium access control messaging scheme for cognitive radio networks

Los sistemas de radio cognitivos son una solución a la deficiente distribución del espectro inalámbrico de frecuencias. Usando acceso dinámico al medio, los usuarios secundarios pueden comunicarse en canales de frecuencia disponibles, mientras los usuarios asignados no están usando dichos canales. Un buen sistema de mensajería de control es necesario para que los usuarios secundarios no interfieran con los usuarios primarios en las redes de radio cognitivas. Para redes en donde los usuarios son heterogéneos en frecuencia, es decir, no poseen los mismos canales de frecuencia para comunicarse, el grupo de canales utilizado para transmitir información de control debe elegirse cuidadosamente. Por esta razón, en esta tesis se estudian las ideas básicas de los esquemas de mensajería de control usados en las redes de radio cognitivas y se presenta un esquema adecuado para un control adecuado para usuarios heterogéneos en canales de frecuencia. Para ello, primero se presenta una nueva taxonomía para clasificar las estrategias de mensajería de control, identificando las principales características que debe cumplir un esquema de control para sistemas heterogéneos en frecuencia. Luego, se revisan diversas técnicas matemáticas para escoger el mínimo número de canales por los cuales se transmite la información de control. Después, se introduce un modelo de un esquema de mensajería de control que use el mínimo número de canales y que utilice las características de los sistemas heterogéneos en frecuencia. Por último, se comparan diversos esquemas de mensajería de control en términos de la eficiencia de transmisión.

L2−estimates for the DG IIPG-0 scheme

We discuss the optimality in L2 of a variant of the Incomplete Discontinuous Galerkin Interior Penalty method (IIPG) for second order linear elliptic problems. We prove optimal estimate, in two and three dimensions, for the lowest order case under suitable regularity assumptions on the data and on the mesh. We also provide numerical evidence, in one dimension, of the necessity of the regularity assumptions.

On the computational security of a distributed key distribution scheme

In a distributed key distribution scheme, a set of servers helps a set of users in a group to securely obtain a common key. Security means that an adversary who corrupts some servers and some users has no information about the key of a noncorrupted group. In this work, we formalize the security analysis of one such scheme which was not considered in the original proposal. We prove the scheme is secure in the random oracle model, assuming that the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is hard to solve. We also detail a possible modification of that scheme and the one in which allows us to prove the security of the schemes without assuming that a specific hash function behaves as a random oracle. As usual, this improvement in the security of the schemes is at the cost of an efficiency loss.

Communication, Coordination, and Efficiency in Evolutionary One-population Models

We analyze the role of commitment in pre-play communication for ensuring efficient evolutionarily stable outcomes in coordination games. All players are a priori identical as they are drawn from the same population. In games where efficient outcomes can be reached by players coordinating on the same action we find commitment to be necessary to enforce efficiency. In games where efficienct outcomes only result from play of different actions, communication without commitment is most effective although efficiency can no longer be guaranteed. Only when there are many messages then inefficient outcomes are negligible as their basins of attraction become very small.