Stochastic optimal bid to electricity markets with environmental risk constraints

There are many factors that influence the day-ahead market bidding strategies of a generation company (GenCo) in the current energy market framework. Environmental policy issues have become more and more important for fossil-fuelled power plants and they have to be considered in their management, giving rise to emission limitations. This work allows to investigate the influence of both the allowances and emission reduction plan, and the incorporation of the derivatives medium-term commitments in the optimal generation bidding strategy to the day-ahead electricity market. Two different technologies have been considered: the coal thermal units, high-emission technology, and the combined cycle gas turbine units, low-emission technology. The Iberian Electricity Market and the Spanish National Emissions and Allocation Plans are the framework to deal with the environmental issues in the day-ahead market bidding strategies. To address emission limitations, some of the standard risk management methodologies developed for financial markets, such as Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR), have been extended. This study offers to electricity generation utilities a mathematical model to determinate the individual optimal generation bid to the wholesale electricity market, for each one of their generation units that maximizes the long-run profits of the utility abiding by the Iberian Electricity Market rules, the environmental restrictions set by the EU Emission Trading Scheme, as well as the restrictions set by the Spanish National Emissions Reduction Plan. The economic implications for a GenCo of including the environmental restrictions of these National Plans are analyzed and the most remarkable results will be presented.

Collaboration strategies and technological innovation: a contractual perspective of the relationship between firms and techonological centers

In this paper, a theoretical framework for analyzing the selection of governance structures for implementing collaboration agreements between firms and Technological Centers is presented and empirically discussed. This framework includes Transaction Costs and Property Rights’ theoretical assumptions, though complemented with several proposals coming from the Transactional Value Theory. This last theory is used for adding some dynamism in the governance structure selection. As empirical evidence of this theoretical explanation, we analyse four real experiences of collaboration between firms and one Technological Center. These experiences are aimed to represent the typology of relationships which Technological Centers usually face. Among others, a key interesting result is obtained: R&D collaboration activities do not need to always be organized through hierarchical solutions. In those cases where future expected benefits and/or reputation issues could play an important role, the traditional more static theories could not fully explain the selected governance structure for managing the R&D relationship. As a consequence, these results justify further research about the adequacy of the theoretical framework presented in this paper in other contexts, for example, R&D collaborations between firms and/or between Universities or Public Research Centers and firms.

Efficient bidding with externalities

We implement a family of efficient proposals to share benefits generated in environments with externalities. These proposals extend the Shapley value to games with externalities and are parametrized through the method by which the externalities are averaged. We construct two slightly different mechanisms: one for environments with negative externalities and the other for positive externalities. We show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of these mechanisms coincide with the sharing proposals.

Bidding at sequential first-price auctions with(out) supply uncertainty: a laboratory analysis

We report on a series of experiments that test the effects of an uncertain supply on the formation of bids and prices in sequential first-price auctions with private-independent values and unit-demands. Supply is assumed uncertain when buyers do not know the exact number of units to be sold (i.e., the length of the sequence). Although we observe a non-monotone behavior when supply is certain and an important overbidding, the data qualitatively support our price trend predictions and the risk neutral Nash equilibrium model of bidding for the last stage of a sequence, whether supply is certain or not. Our study shows that behavior in these markets changes significantly with the presence of an uncertain supply, and that it can be explained by assuming that bidders formulate pessimistic beliefs about the occurrence of another stage.

Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in general economic environments

In this paper, we consider two classes of economic environments. In the first type, agents are faced with the task of providing local public goods that will benefit some or all of them. In the second type, economic activity takes place via formation of links. Agents need both to both form a network and decide how to share the output generated. For both scenarios, we suggest a bidding mechanism whereby agents bid for the right to decide upon the organization of the economic activity. The subgame perfect equilibria of this game generate efficient outcomes.

In whose backyard? A generalized bidding approach

We analyze situations in which a group of agents (and possibly a designer) have to reach a decision that will affect all the agents. Examples of such scenarios are the location of a nuclear reactor or the siting of a major sport event. To address the problem of reaching a decision, we propose a one-stage multi-bidding mechanism where agents compete for the project by submitting bids. All Nash equilibria of this mechanism are efficient. Moreover, the payoffs attained in equilibrium by the agents satisfy intuitively appealing lower bounds..

Firm strategies in R&D: cooperation and participation in R&D programs

This paper presents empirical evidence on firms’ decisions to cooperate in R&D and the extent to which government sponsored R&D programs increase cooperation. Using a sample of firms from the Spanish innovation survey we jointly estimate the determinants of firm participation in R&D programs and of choice of cooperation partners. We find that (i) firms participating in national and European programs have different profiles, suggesting program complementarity; (ii) private-private and publicprivate cooperation are associated on average with firms with different characteristics, and (iii) national R&D programs seem to have a positive effect on all types of cooperation, but especially on public-private partnerships.

Market effects of foreign exchange coordinated intervention

In this article we develop a theoretical microstructure model of coordinated central bank intervention based on asymmetric information. We study the economic implications of coordination on some measures of market quality and show that the model predicts higher volatility and more significant exchange rate changes when central banks coordinate compared to when they intervene unilaterally. Both these predictions are in line with empirical evidence. Keywords: coordinated foreign exchange intervention, market microstructure. JEL Classification: D82, E58, F31, G14

Cooperative strategies for imperfect CSI scenarios based on distributed Alamouti

Les comunicacions cooperatives estan guanyant un gran interès en les comunicacions modernes degut a que permeten millorar la transmissió dʼinformació entre un emissor i un receptor utilitzant una sèrie de terminals situats entre ells. Aquest projecte és un estudi complet del sistemes cooperatius, analitzant el seu rendiment i comparant lʼús dʼun sol dʼaquests terminals amb lʼús del codi Alamouti, que utilitza dos terminals. Primer hi ha una introducció als sistemes cooperatius i a la teoria de la informació. Després hem estudiat un sistema cooperatiu amb la teoria de la informació com a base, en termes de probabilitat de fallada del sistema, i posteriorment lʼhem adaptat a un sistema cooperatiu real utilitzant una modulació QPSK, estudiant la seva probabilitat dʼerror de paquet. Finalment es proposen diversos protocols que permeten millorar el rendiment del sistema cooperatiu estudiat.

Nash equilibrium strategies in discrete-time finite-horizon dynamic games with risk-and effort-averse players

The objective of this paper is to re-examine the risk-and effort attitude in the context of strategic dynamic interactions stated as a discrete-time finite-horizon Nash game. The analysis is based on the assumption that players are endogenously risk-and effort-averse. Each player is characterized by distinct risk-and effort-aversion types that are unknown to his opponent. The goal of the game is the optimal risk-and effort-sharing between the players. It generally depends on the individual strategies adopted and, implicitly, on the the players' types or characteristics.

Teacher strategies to elicit knowledge from students in the CLIL classroom: the purpose of questions in controlled patterns of teacher-student interaction

This Master Dissertation comprises two parts: a personal reflection and an empirical study. The personal reflection reviews the process of professionalization undergone by its author throughout the Master. The empirical study tackles teacher strategies to elicit knowledge from students in the CLIL classroom and more specifically the purpose of questions in controlled patterns of teacher-student interaction. The theories of relevant authors such as Vigotsky, Mercer and Tsui are used as a framework to analyze the data presented. The analysis shows the different strategies to elicit knowledge used by the teacher and the appropriateness of her questions in the analyzed interaction

Strategies of use of a specific immunoglobulin-rich egg yolk powder in weaning piglets

Two experiments were performed to determine the best strategy of use of the product TRACTcare® 4P (ITPSA) (TC, specific immunoglobulin-rich egg yolk powder within an energetic fatty acid matrix) in piglets from weaning and for 6 weeks, in diets without or with inclusion of antibiotics. Each trial was performed with 144 piglets in 24 pens, in a completely randomized design blocked by initial body weight. Feeds were formulated according to animal requirements in two periods. In the first trial no antibiotics were included in the feeds and no room disinfection from previous trial was performed; treatments were: 1) Negative control (NC); 2) NC+TC on top of the feed within the hopper for the first 3 days on trial (30 g/pig×day), and eventually if diarrhea appeared (TCOT); 3) NC+TC ad libitum provided in an extra hopper within the pen (TCAL); and 4) NC+TC at 5 g/kg added to the feed in the mixer (TC5). In the second trial, treatments were: 1) Positive control: basal diet that included 250 mg/kg amoxiciline (BD)+100 mg/kg colistine (AC); 2) BD+2 g/kg TC (TC2A); 3) BD+5 g/kg TC (TC5A); and 4) BD+8 g/kg TC (TC8A). In diets without antibiotics, the product TC at 5 g/kg in the feed numerically improved BW by 8% compared to Control animals, while G:F was almost identical between both groups. When antibiotics were used in the feed, replacement of colistin at 100 mg/kg for TC at 2 g/kg in feed numerically improved the performance compared to Positive control animals (for the whole trial period ADG 8% better: 390 g vs. 361 g; G:F 1% better: 0.748 kg/kg vs. 0.742 kg/kg), possibly due to the stimulation of feed consumption at weaning. In both trials, the lower number of dead and culled animals from TC5 and TC2A together with higher BW represented an advantage over Control treatments of 6% to 10% animals more and 15% to 17% total BW more at the end of the trial.

Staffing strategies in SME's: determinants of external recruitment and internal promotion

The purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants of use internal or external labour market to fill a firm vacancy in SME’s taking into account the differences existing among blue and white collar jobs. Following different theories we can identify three main reasons for use internal candidates rather than external ones‐ firm specific knowledge, adverse selection problems and motivation‐. However, there are others factors that might affect this choice but the last theories don’t take into account. In this paper we try to shed some light on what are these other factors that may affect firm decision to use internal or external labour market. Particularly we analyses the relationship among new technologies, innovation activity and firm location on the staffing strategy. The results shows difference behaviour on the decision to fill a vacancy using internal or external labour markets between manufacturing and service firms, and this decision depends not only on firm internal characteristics, like technological complexity or innovation activity, but also on firm location. The results also support the hypothesis of ports of entry especially in the manufacturing sector.