Activity patterns and foraging behaviour of Audouin's gulls at the Ebro Delta, NW Mediterranean.

Twenty Audouin´s gulls, Larus audouinii, breeding in the Ebro Delta (NW Mediterranean) were radio-tracked in 1998 to study their foraging behaviour and activity patterns. Some detrimental effects of tagging on the breeding success of the birds were detected, especially when both members of the pair were tagged. The results were actually constrained by the low number of locations due to natural breeding failure and failure in tag emission, as well as the adverse effect of tagging. However, through a combination of aircraft surveys at sea and a fixed station for automatic tracking of the presence of the birds at the colony, novel individual-based information of home ranges and activity patterns was obtained. Trawler fishing activity seemed to influence both the foraging range and habitat use: while trawlers operated, gulls overlapped their fishing grounds with vessels, probably to scavenge on discards. Very few locations were obtained during a trawling moratorium period, although they were all recorded in coastal bays and terrestrial habitats. During the trawling activity period, gulls ranged over a minimum convex polygon area of 2900 km2. Gulls were tracked up to 40 km from the colony, but some individuals were observed beyond 150 km while still breeding. Arrivals and departures from the colony were in accordance with the trawling timetable. However, most birds also showed some nocturnal foraging activity, probably linked to active fishing of clupeoids (following diel migrations) or to the exploitation of purse-seine fishing activity. Foraging trips lasted on average 15 hours: males performed significantly shorter trips than females, which spent more time outside the colony. The proportion of nocturnal time involved in the foraging trips was the same for males and females, but whilst all males initiated their trips both during the day and at night, some females only initiated their trips during the day. Hatching success was found to be related to foraging effort by males. Gulls spent on average ca. 38% of their time budget outside the nesting territory, representing the time devoted mainly to flying, foraging and other activities.

Permutations defining convex permutominoes

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Counting polygon dissections in the projective plane

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Generic optimality conditions for semi-algebraic convex programs

We consider linear optimization over a nonempty convex semi-algebraic feasible region F. Semidefinite programming is an example. If F is compact, then for almost every linear objective there is a unique optimal solution, lying on a unique \active" manifold, around which F is \partly smooth", and the second-order sufficient conditions hold. Perturbing the objective results in smooth variation of the optimal solution. The active manifold consists, locally, of these perturbed optimal solutions; it is independent of the representation of F, and is eventually identified by a variety of iterative algorithms such as proximal and projected gradient schemes. These results extend to unbounded sets F.

On stability of solutions to systems of convex inequalities

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Convex linear combination processes for compositions

Aitchison and Bacon-Shone (1999) considered convex linear combinations ofcompositions. In other words, they investigated compositions of compositions, wherethe mixing composition follows a logistic Normal distribution (or a perturbationprocess) and the compositions being mixed follow a logistic Normal distribution. Inthis paper, I investigate the extension to situations where the mixing compositionvaries with a number of dimensions. Examples would be where the mixingproportions vary with time or distance or a combination of the two. Practicalsituations include a river where the mixing proportions vary along the river, or acrossa lake and possibly with a time trend. This is illustrated with a dataset similar to thatused in the Aitchison and Bacon-Shone paper, which looked at how pollution in aloch depended on the pollution in the three rivers that feed the loch. Here, I explicitlymodel the variation in the linear combination across the loch, assuming that the meanof the logistic Normal distribution depends on the river flows and relative distancefrom the source origins

Refinement criteria for global illumination using convex funcions

In several computer graphics areas, a refinement criterion is often needed to decide whether to goon or to stop sampling a signal. When the sampled values are homogeneous enough, we assume thatthey represent the signal fairly well and we do not need further refinement, otherwise more samples arerequired, possibly with adaptive subdivision of the domain. For this purpose, a criterion which is verysensitive to variability is necessary. In this paper, we present a family of discrimination measures, thef-divergences, meeting this requirement. These convex functions have been well studied and successfullyapplied to image processing and several areas of engineering. Two applications to global illuminationare shown: oracles for hierarchical radiosity and criteria for adaptive refinement in ray-tracing. Weobtain significantly better results than with classic criteria, showing that f-divergences are worth furtherinvestigation in computer graphics. Also a discrimination measure based on entropy of the samples forrefinement in ray-tracing is introduced. The recursive decomposition of entropy provides us with a naturalmethod to deal with the adaptive subdivision of the sampling region

Beyond Smith's rule: An optimal dynamic index, rule for single machine stochastic scheduling with convex holding costs

Most research on single machine scheduling has assumedthe linearity of job holding costs, which is arguablynot appropriate in some applications. This motivates ourstudy of a model for scheduling $n$ classes of stochasticjobs on a single machine, with the objective of minimizingthe total expected holding cost (discounted or undiscounted). We allow general holding cost rates that are separable,nondecreasing and convex on the number of jobs in eachclass. We formulate the problem as a linear program overa certain greedoid polytope, and establish that it issolved optimally by a dynamic (priority) index rule,whichextends the classical Smith's rule (1956) for the linearcase. Unlike Smith's indices, defined for each class, ournew indices are defined for each extended class, consistingof a class and a number of jobs in that class, and yieldan optimal dynamic index rule: work at each time on a jobwhose current extended class has larger index. We furthershow that the indices possess a decomposition property,as they are computed separately for each class, andinterpret them in economic terms as marginal expected cost rate reductions per unit of expected processing time.We establish the results by deploying a methodology recentlyintroduced by us [J. Niño-Mora (1999). "Restless bandits,partial conservation laws, and indexability. "Forthcomingin Advances in Applied Probability Vol. 33 No. 1, 2001],based on the satisfaction by performance measures of partialconservation laws (PCL) (which extend the generalizedconservation laws of Bertsimas and Niño-Mora (1996)):PCL provide a polyhedral framework for establishing theoptimality of index policies with special structure inscheduling problems under admissible objectives, which weapply to the model of concern.

Max-convex decompositions for cooperative TU games

We show that any cooperative TU game is the maximum of a finite collection of convex games. This max-convex decomposition can be refined by using convex games with non-negative dividends for all coalitions of at least two players. As a consequence of the above results we show that the class of modular games is a set of generators of the distributive lattice of all cooperative TU games. Finally, we characterize zero-monotonic games using a strong max-convex decomposition

Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution and convex descompositions of TU games

We study under which conditions the core of a game involved in a convex decomposition of another game turns out to be a stable set of the decomposed game. Some applications and numerical examples, including the remarkable Lucas¿ five player game with a unique stable set different from the core, are reckoning and analyzed.

A Note on Shapley's convex measure games

L. S. Shapley, in his paper 'Cores of Convex Games', introduces Convex Measure Games, those that are induced by a convex function on R, acting over a measure on the coalitions. But in a note he states that if this function is a function of several variables, then convexity for the function does not imply convexity of the game or even superadditivity. We prove that if the function is directionally convex, the game is convex, and conversely, any convex game can be induced by a directionally convex function acting over measures on the coalitions, with as many measures as players

A Note on Shapley's convex measure games

L. S. Shapley, in his paper 'Cores of Convex Games', introduces Convex Measure Games, those that are induced by a convex function on R, acting over a measure on the coalitions. But in a note he states that if this function is a function of several variables, then convexity for the function does not imply convexity of the game or even superadditivity. We prove that if the function is directionally convex, the game is convex, and conversely, any convex game can be induced by a directionally convex function acting over measures on the coalitions, with as many measures as players

Max-convex decompositions for cooperative TU games

We show that any cooperative TU game is the maximum of a finite collection of convex games. This max-convex decomposition can be refined by using convex games with non-negative dividends for all coalitions of at least two players. As a consequence of the above results we show that the class of modular games is a set of generators of the distributive lattice of all cooperative TU games. Finally, we characterize zero-monotonic games using a strong max-convex decomposition

Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution and convex descompositions of TU games

We study under which conditions the core of a game involved in a convex decomposition of another game turns out to be a stable set of the decomposed game. Some applications and numerical examples, including the remarkable Lucas¿ five player game with a unique stable set different from the core, are reckoning and analyzed.