Understanding and modulating the competitive surface-adsorption of proteins through coarse-grained molecular dynamics simulations

It is now well accepted that cellular responses to materials in a biological medium reflect greatly the adsorbed biomolecular layer, rather than the material itself. Here, we study by molecular dynamics simulations the competitive protein adsorption on a surface (Vroman effect), i.e. the non-monotonic behavior of the amount of protein adsorbed on a surface in contact with plasma as functions of contact time and plasma concentration. We find a complex behavior, with regimes during which small and large proteins are not necessarily competing between them, but are both competing with others in solution ("cooperative" adsorption). We show how the Vroman effect can be understood, controlled and inverted.

Understanding and modulating the competitive surface-adsorption of proteins through coarse-grained molecular dynamics simulations

It is now well accepted that cellular responses to materials in a biological medium reflect greatly the adsorbed biomolecular layer, rather than the material itself. Here, we study by molecular dynamics simulations the competitive protein adsorption on a surface (Vroman effect), i.e. the non-monotonic behavior of the amount of protein adsorbed on a surface in contact with plasma as functions of contact time and plasma concentration. We find a complex behavior, with regimes during which small and large proteins are not necessarily competing between them, but are both competing with others in solution ("cooperative" adsorption). We show how the Vroman effect can be understood, controlled and inverted.

Codes of best practice in competitive markets for managers

We study firms' corporate governance in environments where possibly heterogeneous shareholders compete for possibly heterogeneous managers. A firm, formed by a shareholder and a manager, can sign either an incentive contract or a contract including a Code of Best Practice. A Code allows for a better manager's control but makes manager's decisions hard to react when market conditions change. It tends to be adopted in markets with low volatility and in low-competitive environments. The firms with the best projects tend to adopt the Code when managers are not too heterogeneous while the best managers tend to be hired through incentive contracts when the projects are similar. Although the matching between shareholders and managers is often positively assortative, the shareholders with the best projects might be willing to renounce to hire the best managers, signing contracts including Codes with lower-ability managers.

Experimental exposure of the blue mussel (Mytilus edulis, L.) to the toxic dinoflagellate Alexandrium fundyense: Histopathology, immune responses, and recovery

Mussels (Mytilus edulis) were exposed to cultures of the toxic dinoflagellate Alexandrium fundyense or the non-toxic alga Rhodomonas sp. to evaluate the effects of the harmful alga on the mussels and to study recovery after discontinuation of the A. fundyense exposure. Mussels were exposed for 9 days to the different algae and then all were fed Rhodomonas sp. for 6 more days. Samples of hemolymph for hemocyte analyses and tissues for histology were collected before the exposure and periodically during exposure and recovery periods. Mussels filtered and ingested both microalgal cultures, producing fecal pellets containing degraded, partially degraded, and intact cells of both algae. Mussels exposed to A. fundyense had an inflammatory response consisting of degranulation and diapedesis of hemocytes into the alimentary canal and, as the exposure continued, hemocyte migration into the connective tissue between the gonadal follicles. Evidence of lipid peroxidation, similar to the detoxification pathway described for various xenobiotics, was found; insoluble lipofuchsin granules formed (ceroidosis), and hemocytes carried the granules to the alimentary canal, thus eliminating putative dinoflagellate toxins in feces. As the number of circulating hemocytes in A. fundyense-exposed mussels became depleted, mussels were immunocompromised, and pathological changes followed, i.e., increased prevalences of ceroidosis and trematodes after 9 days of exposure. Moreover, the total number of pathological changes increased from the beginning of the exposure until the last day (day 9). After 6 days of the exposure, mussels in one of the three tanks exposed to A. fundyense mass spawned; these mussels showed more severe effects of the toxic algae than non-spawning mussels exposed to A. fundyense. No significant differences were found between the two treatments during the recovery period, indicating rapid homeostatic processes in tissues and circulating hemocytes.

Authoritarian Responses to Foreign Pressure: Spending, Repression, and Sanctions

This paper explores how international sanctions affect authoritarian rulers’ decisions concerning repression and public spending composition, and how different authoritarian rulers respond to foreign pressure. If sanctions are assumed to increase the price of loyalty to the regime, then rulers whose budgets are not severely constrained by sanctions will tend to increase spending in those categories that most benefit their core support groups. In contrast, when constraints are severe due to reduced aid and trade, dictators are expected to greatly increase their levels of repression. Using data on regime types, public expenditures and spending composition (1970–2000) as well as on repression levels (1976–2001), we show that the empirical patterns conform well to our theoretical expectations. Single-party regimes, when targeted by sanctions, increase spending on subsidies and transfers which largely benefit more substantial sectors of the population and especially the urban classes. Likewise, military regimes increase their expenditures on goods and services, which include military equipment and soldiers’ and officers’ wages. Conversely, personalist regimes reduce spending in all categories, especially capital expenditures, while increasing repression much more than other regime types when targeted by sanctions.

The Multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria

A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multiunit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. We define a competitive equilibrium for this generalized assignment game and prove its existence by using only linear programming. In particular, we show how to compute equilibrium price vectors from the solutions of the dual linear program associated to the primal linear program defined to find optimal assignments. Using only linear programming tools, we also show (i) that the set of competitive equilibria (pairs of price vectors and assignments) has a Cartesian product structure: each equilibrium price vector is part of a competitive equilibrium with all optimal assignments, and vice versa; (ii) that the set of (restricted) equilibrium price vectors has a natural lattice structure; and (iii) how this structure is translated into the set of agents' utilities that are attainable at equilibrium.

On Cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria

We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We first establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and it contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. We then state and prove three limit results for replicated markets. First, the sequence of Cores of replicated markets converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs when the number of replicas tends to infinity. Second, the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. Third, for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payoff that is not a competitive equilibrium payoff.

Teachers' reactions on students' responses: essential for an adequate task monitoring

This research project analyzes the reactions the teacher has on students' responses. Different techniques as discourse markers, types of questions and repair sequences are taken into account, but the author puts a special emphasis on non-verbal communication. To be aware of all these ways of reacting in a class interaction is essential for an adequate task monitoring

Product differentiation, competitive pressure and the effects of innovation on the success and survivability of firms in oligopoly markets

In a recent paper Tishler and Milstein (2009) fi…nd that increased competition may increase aggregate R&D spending while market output decreases. Therefore, they obtain the surprising result that R&D spending is excessive when competition becomes intense. Their result is based on the standard linear demand function for differentiated products introduced by Bowley (1924) where decreased product differentiation is interpreted as more competitive pressure. In this paper I show that at an aggregate level this interpretation is problematic because equilibrium effects are dominated by a demand reduction effect. A slight modifi…cation of the standard demand function eliminates this effect. For the Tishler and Milstein (2009) setting it is shown that then increased competition increases both R&D spending and aggregate market output. Therefore, at least for consumers, more intense competition increases welfare. Journal of Economic Literature Classi…fication Numbers: D43, L1, O3. Keywords: Oligopoly markets, Product differentiation, Competitive pressure.

Innovation or Imitation? The effect of spillovers and competitive pressure on firms' R&D strategy choice

This article provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of a firm's optimal R&D strategy choice. In this paper a firm's R&D strategy is assumed to be endogenous and allowed to depend on both internal firms. characteristics and external factors. Firms choose between two strategies, either they engage in R&D or abstain from own R&D and imitate the outcomes of innovators. In the theoretical model this yields three types of equilibria in which either all firms innovate, some firms innovate and others imitate, or no firm innovates. Firms'equilibrium strategies crucially depend on external factors. We find that the efficiency of intellectual property rights protection positively affects firms'incentives to engage in R&D, while competitive pressure has a negative effect. In addition, smaller firms are found to be more likely to become imitators when the product is homogeneous and the level of spillovers is high. These results are supported by empirical evidence for German .rms from manufacturing and services sectors. Regarding social welfare our results indicate that strengthening intellectual property protection can have an ambiguous effect. In markets characterized by a high rate of innovation a reduction of intellectual property rights protection can discourage innovative performance substantially. However, a reduction of patent protection can also increase social welfare because it may induce imitation. This indicates that policy issues such as the optimal length and breadth of patent protection cannot be resolved without taking into account specific market and firm characteristics. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C35, D43, L13, L22, O31. Keywords: Innovation; imitation; spillovers; product differentiation; market competition; intellectual property rights protection.

CB1 cannabinoid receptor modulates MDMA acute responses and reinforcement

Background: 3, 4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) is a popular recreational drug widely abused by young people. The endocannabinoid system is involved in the addictive processes induced by different drugs of abuse. However, the role of this system in the pharmacological effects of MDMA has not been yet clarified.Methods: Locomotion, body temperature and anxiogenic-like responses were evaluated after acute MDMA administration in CB1 knockout mice. Additionally, MDMA rewarding properties were investigated in the place conditioning and the intravenous self-administration paradigms. Extracellular levels of DA in the nucleus accumbens were also analyzed after a single administration of MDMA by in vivo microdialysis. Results: Acute MDMA administration increased locomotor activity, body temperature and anxiogenic-like responses in wild type mice, but these responses were lower or abolished in knockout animals. MDMA produced similar conditioned place preference and increased dopamine extracellular levels in the nucleus accumbens in both genotypes. Nevertheless, CB1 knockout mice failed to self-administer MDMA at any of the doses used. Conclusions: These results indicate that CB1 cannabinoid receptors play an important role in the acute prototypical effects of MDMA, and are essential in the acquisition of an operant behavior to self-administer this drug.

Incorporating waiting time in competitive location models: formulations and heuristics

In this paper we propose a metaheuristic to solve a new version of the Maximum Capture Problem. In the original MCP, market capture is obtained by lower traveling distances or lower traveling time, in this new version not only the traveling time but also the waiting time will affect the market share. This problem is hard to solve using standard optimization techniques. Metaheuristics are shown to offer accurate results within acceptable computing times.

Hot vs. cold: Sequential responses and preference stability in experimental games

In experiments with two-person sequential games we analyzewhether responses to favorable and unfavorable actions dependon the elicitation procedure. In our hot treatment thesecond player responds to the first player s observed actionwhile in our cold treatment we follow the strategy method and have the second player decide on a contingent action foreach and every possible first player move, without firstobserving this move. Our analysis centers on the degree towhich subjects deviate from the maximization of their pecuniaryrewards, as a response to others actions. Our results show nodifference in behavior between the two treatments. We also findevidence of the stability of subjects preferences with respectto their behavior over time and to the consistency of theirchoices as first and second mover.

Market versus limit orders in an imperfectly competitive security

This paper analyzes the choice between limit and market orders in animperfectly competitive noisy rational expectations economy. There is a uniqueinsider, who takes into account the effect their trading has on prices. If theinsider behaves as a price taker, she will choose market orders if her privateinformation is very precise and she will choose limit orders otherwise. On thecontrary, if the insider recognizes and exploits her ability to affect themarket price, her optimal choice is to place limit orders whatever the precisionof her private information.