Automatic Prediction of Facial Trait Judgments: Appearance vs. Structural Models

Evaluating other individuals with respect to personality characteristics plays a crucial role in human relations and it is the focus of attention for research in diverse fields such as psychology and interactive computer systems. In psychology, face perception has been recognized as a key component of this evaluation system. Multiple studies suggest that observers use face information to infer personality characteristics. Interactive computer systems are trying to take advantage of these findings and apply them to increase the natural aspect of interaction and to improve the performance of interactive computer systems. Here, we experimentally test whether the automatic prediction of facial trait judgments (e.g. dominance) can be made by using the full appearance information of the face and whether a reduced representation of its structure is sufficient. We evaluate two separate approaches: a holistic representation model using the facial appearance information and a structural model constructed from the relations among facial salient points. State of the art machine learning methods are applied to a) derive a facial trait judgment model from training data and b) predict a facial trait value for any face. Furthermore, we address the issue of whether there are specific structural relations among facial points that predict perception of facial traits. Experimental results over a set of labeled data (9 different trait evaluations) and classification rules (4 rules) suggest that a) prediction of perception of facial traits is learnable by both holistic and structural approaches; b) the most reliable prediction of facial trait judgments is obtained by certain type of holistic descriptions of the face appearance; and c) for some traits such as attractiveness and extroversion, there are relationships between specific structural features and social perceptions.

Trials, tricks and transparency: how disclosure rules affect clinical knowledge

Scandals of selective reporting of clinical trial results by pharmaceutical firms have underlined the need for more transparency in clinical trials. We provide a theoretical framework which reproduces incentives for selective reporting and yields three key implications concerning regulation. First, a compulsory clinical trial registry complemented through a voluntary clinical trial results database can implement full transparency (the existence of all trials as well as their results is known). Second, full transparency comes at a price. It has a deterrence effect on the incentives to conduct clinical trials, as it reduces the firms'gains from trials. Third, in principle, a voluntary clinical trial results database without a compulsory registry is a superior regulatory tool; but we provide some qualified support for additional compulsory registries when medical decision-makers cannot anticipate correctly the drug companies' decisions whether to conduct trials. Keywords: pharmaceutical firms, strategic information transmission, clinical trials, registries, results databases, scientific knowledge JEL classification: D72, I18, L15

Solidarity and uniform rules in bankruptcy problems

The idea of ensuring a guarantee (a minimum amount of the resources) to each agent has recently acquired great relevance, in both social and politi- cal terms. Furthermore, the notion of Solidarity has been treated frequently in redistribution problems to establish that any increment of the resources should be equally distributed taking into account some relevant characteris- tics. In this paper, we combine these two general concepts, guarantee and solidarity, to characterize the uniform rules in bankruptcy problems (Con- strained Equal Awards and Constrained Equal Losses rules). Keywords: Constrained Equal Awards, Constrained Equal Losses, Lower bounds, Bankruptcy problems, Solidarity. JEL classification: C71, D63, D71.

Stratification of the severity of critically ill patients with classification trees

Background: Development of three classification trees (CT) based on the CART (Classification and Regression Trees), CHAID (Chi-Square Automatic Interaction Detection) and C4.5 methodologies for the calculation of probability of hospital mortality; the comparison of the results with the APACHE II, SAPS II and MPM II-24 scores, and with a model based on multiple logistic regression (LR). Methods: Retrospective study of 2864 patients. Random partition (70:30) into a Development Set (DS) n = 1808 and Validation Set (VS) n = 808. Their properties of discrimination are compared with the ROC curve (AUC CI 95%), Percent of correct classification (PCC CI 95%); and the calibration with the Calibration Curve and the Standardized Mortality Ratio (SMR CI 95%). Results: CTs are produced with a different selection of variables and decision rules: CART (5 variables and 8 decision rules), CHAID (7 variables and 15 rules) and C4.5 (6 variables and 10 rules). The common variables were: inotropic therapy, Glasgow, age, (A-a)O2 gradient and antecedent of chronic illness. In VS: all the models achieved acceptable discrimination with AUC above 0.7. CT: CART (0.75(0.71-0.81)), CHAID (0.76(0.72-0.79)) and C4.5 (0.76(0.73-0.80)). PCC: CART (72(69- 75)), CHAID (72(69-75)) and C4.5 (76(73-79)). Calibration (SMR) better in the CT: CART (1.04(0.95-1.31)), CHAID (1.06(0.97-1.15) and C4.5 (1.08(0.98-1.16)). Conclusion: With different methodologies of CTs, trees are generated with different selection of variables and decision rules. The CTs are easy to interpret, and they stratify the risk of hospital mortality. The CTs should be taken into account for the classification of the prognosis of critically ill patients.

Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences

In this paper, we study individual incentives to report preferences truthfully for the special case when individuals have dichotomous preferences on the set of alternatives and preferences are aggregated in form of scoring rules. In particular, we show that (a) the Borda Count coincides with Approval Voting on the dichotomous preference domain, (b) the Borda Count is the only strategy-proof scoring rule on the dichotomous preference domain, and (c) if at least three individuals participate in the election, then the dichotomous preference domain is the unique maximal rich domain under which the Borda Count is strategy-proof.

Choosing how to choose: self-stable majority rules and constitutions

Constitutional arrangements affect the decisions made by a society. We study how this effect leads to preferences of citizens over constitutions; and ultimately how this has a feedback that determines which constitutions can survive in a given society. Constitutions are stylized here, to consist of a voting rule for ordinary business and possibly different voting rule for making changes to the constitution. We deffine an equilibrium notion for constitutions, called self-stability, whereby under the rules of a self-stable constitution, the society would not vote to change the constitution. We argue that only self-stable constitutions will endure. We prove that self-stable constitutions always exist, but that most constitutions (even very prominent ones) may not be self-stable for some societies. We show that constitutions where the voting rule used to amend the constitution is the same as the voting rule used for ordinary business are dangerously simplistic, and there are (many) societies for which no such constitution is self-stable rule. We conclude with a characterization of the set of self-stable constitutions that use majority rule for ordinary business.

Bribe-proof rules in the division problem

The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate another agent to misrepresent his preference and, after an appropriate redistribution of their shares, each obtain a strictly preferred share. We characterize all bribe-proof rules as the class of efficient, strategy-proof, and weak replacement monotonic rules. In addition, we identify the functional form of all bribe-proof and tops-only rules.

Efficient priority rules

We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (houses, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness, and renegotiation-proofness. Such a rule respects an acyclical priority structure and the allocations can be determined using the deferred acceptance algorithm.

Stable condorcet rules

We consider the following allocation problem: A fixed number of public facilities must be located on a line. Society is composed of $N$ agents, who must be allocated to one and only one of these facilities. Agents have single peaked preferences over the possible location of the facilities they are assigned to, and do not care about the location of the rest of facilities. There is no congestion. In this context, we observe that if a public decision is a Condorcet winner, then it satisfies nice properties of internal and external stability. Though in many contexts and for some preference profiles there may be no Condorcet winners, we study the extent to which stability can be made compatible with the requirement of choosing Condorcet winners whenever they exist.

A maximal domain of preferences for tops-only rules in the division problem

The division problem consists of allocating an amount M of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, the uniform rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. Ching and Serizawa (1998) extended this result by showing that the set of single-plateaued preferences is the largest domain, for all possible values of M, admitting a rule (the extended uniform rule) satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency and symmetry. We identify, for each M and n, a maximal domain of preferences under which the extended uniform rule also satisfies the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, continuity, and "tops-onlyness". These domains (called weakly single-plateaued) are strictly larger than the set of single-plateaued preferences. However, their intersection, when M varies from zero to infinity, coincides with the set of single-plateaued preferences.

Learning the ropes and embracing the rules: CFSP institutions as arenas for learning and strategic socialisation

The aim of this article is to analyse those situations in which learning and socialisation take place within the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), in particular, at the level of experts in the Council Working Groups. Learning can explain the institutional development of CFSP and changes in the foreign policies of the Member States. Some scope conditions for learning and channels of institutionalisation are identified. Socialisation, resulting from learning within a group, is perceived as a strategic action by reflective actors. National diplomats, once they arrive in Brussels, learn the new code of conduct of their Working Groups. They are embedded in two environments and faced with two logics: the European one in the Council and the national one in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The empirical evidence supports the argument that neither rational nor sociological approaches alone can account for these processes.

Generic object classification for autonomous robots

Un dels principals problemes de la interacció dels robots autònoms és el coneixement de l'escena. El reconeixement és fonamental per a solucionar aquest problema i permetre als robots interactuar en un escenari no controlat. En aquest document presentem una aplicació pràctica de la captura d'objectes, de la normalització i de la classificació de senyals triangulars i circulars. El sistema s'introdueix en el robot Aibo de Sony per a millorar-ne la interacció. La metodologia presentada s'ha comprobat en simulacions i problemes de categorització reals, com ara la classificació de senyals de trànsit, amb resultats molt prometedors.

A classification, up to hyperbolicity, of groups given by 2 generators and one relator of length 8

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

Foundations for contest success functions

In the literature the outcome of contests is either interpreted as win probabilities or as shares of the prize. With this in mind, we examine two approaches to contest success functions. In the first we analyze the implications of contestants' incomplete information concerning the "type" of the contest administrator. While in the case of two contestants this approach can rationalize prominent contest success functions, we show that it runs into difficulties when there are more agents. Our second approach interprets contest success functions as sharing rules and establishes a connection to bargaining and claims problems which is independent of the number of contestants. Both approaches provide foundations for popular contest success functions and guidelines for the definition of new ones. Keywords: Endogenous Contests, Contest Success Function. JEL Classification: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D74 (Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances).

Optimal feedback control rules sensitive to controlled endogenous risk-aversion

The objective of this paper is to correct and improve the results obtained by Van der Ploeg (1984a, 1984b) and utilized in the theoretical literature related to feedback stochastic optimal control sensitive to constant exogenous risk-aversion (see, Jacobson, 1973, Karp, 1987 and Whittle, 1981, 1989, 1990, among others) or to the classic context of risk-neutral decision-makers (see, Chow, 1973, 1976a, 1976b, 1977, 1978, 1981, 1993). More realistic and attractive, this new approach is placed in the context of a time-varying endogenous risk-aversion which is under the control of the decision-maker. It has strong qualitative implications on the agent's optimal policy during the entire planning horizon.