26 resultados para Archivo General de Indias.
em Consorci de Serveis Universitaris de Catalunya (CSUC), Spain
Resumo:
En los últimos años, se ha llevado a cabo un considerable esfuerzo de análisis y catalogación de la ingente cantidad de mapas militares, planos, croquis y vistas panorámicas realizados durante la Guerra Civil española, pero aún quedan múltiples aspectos por investigar. En este artículo, analizamos la formación cartográfica del general Vicente Rojo -el jefe del Estado Mayor del Ejército de Tierra republicano-, las relaciones de Rojo con la cartografía durante la Guerra Civil y la cartografía militar contenida en su archivo personal, que se custodia en el Archivo Histórico Nacional de Madrid. Dicha cartografía posee un gran valor cartográfico y militar, porque fue utilizada por el Estado Mayor del Ejército de Tierra republicano durante el período en que Rojo estuvo al frente del mismo, y porque contiene una serie de documentos cartográficos manuscritos inéditos de gran importancia para comprender el desarrollo de algunas de las operaciones bélicas principales.
Resumo:
El uso de la informática ha influido directamente en el aumento considerable de la producción de documentos en formato papel y digital. Durante el curso 2005-2006 el archivo de la Universidad de Vic inició la primera fase de implantación del programa mediante la descripción de los expedientes de estudiantes titulados durante el período 1997-2005.
Resumo:
El uso de la informática ha influido directamente en el aumento considerable de la producción de documentos en formato papel y digital. Durante el curso 2005-2006 el archivo de la Universidad de Vic inició la primera fase de implantación del programa mediante la descripción de los expedientes de estudiantes titulados durante el período 1997-2005.
Resumo:
This paper develops a comprehensive framework for the quantitative analysis of the private and fiscal returns to schooling and of the effect of public policies on private incentives to invest in education. This framework is applied to 14 member states of the European Union. For each of these countries, we construct estimates of the private return to an additional year of schooling for an individual of average attainment, taking into account the effects of education on wages and employment probabilities after allowing for academic failure rates, the direct and opportunity costs of schooling, and the impact of personal taxes, social security contributions and unemployment and pension benefits on net incomes. We also construct a set of effective tax and subsidy rates that measure the effects of different public policies on the private returns to education, and measures of the fiscal returns to schooling that capture the long-term effects of a marginal increase in attainment on public finances under c
Resumo:
We study markets where the characteristics or decisions of certain agents are relevant but not known to their trading partners. Assuming exclusive transactions, the environment is described as a continuum economy with indivisible commodities. We characterize incentive efficient allocations as solutions to linear programming problems and appeal to duality theory to demonstrate the generic existence of external effects in these markets. Because under certain conditions such effects may generate non-convexities, randomization emerges as a theoretic possibility. In characterizing market equilibria we show that, consistently with the personalized nature of transactions, prices are generally non-linear in the underlying consumption. On the other hand, external effects may have critical implications for market efficiency. With adverse selection, in fact, cross-subsidization across agents with different private information may be necessary for optimality, and so, the market need not even achieve an incentive efficient allocation. In contrast, for the case of a single commodity, we find that when informational asymmetries arise after the trading period (e.g. moral hazard; ex post hidden types) external effects are fully internalized at a market equilibrium.
Resumo:
In this paper, we consider two classes of economic environments. In the first type, agents are faced with the task of providing local public goods that will benefit some or all of them. In the second type, economic activity takes place via formation of links. Agents need both to both form a network and decide how to share the output generated. For both scenarios, we suggest a bidding mechanism whereby agents bid for the right to decide upon the organization of the economic activity. The subgame perfect equilibria of this game generate efficient outcomes.
Resumo:
Investigación llevada a cabo a partir de una estancia en el Archivo Vaticano Secreto (Asv) y en el Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu (Arsi) de Roma. En ellos se ha consultado la biografía del Padre Juan de Alloza, sacerdote de la Compañía de Jesús que vivió en la Lima del siglo XVII, escrita por el mismo por encargo de su orden religiosa. A través de ella se pretende analizar la construcción de la identidad criolla en el Perú colonial de la época.
Resumo:
Identifying key sectors or key locations in an interconnected economy is of paramount importance for improving policy planning and directing economic strategy. Hence the relevance of categorizing them and hence the corresponding need of evaluating their potential synergies in terms of their global economic thrust. We explain in this paper that standard measures based on gross outputs do not and cannot capture the relevant impact due to self- imposed modeling limitations. In fact, common gross output measures will be systematically downward biased. We argue that an economy wide Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) approach provides a modeling platform that overcomes these limitations since it provides (i) a more comprehensive measure of linkages and (ii) an alternate way of accounting for links' relevance that is in consonance with standard macromagnitudes in the National Income and Product Accounts.
Resumo:
We show that L2-bounded singular integrals in metric spaces with respect to general measures and kernels converge weakly. This implies a kind of average convergence almost everywhere. For measures with zero density we prove the almost everywhere existence of principal values.
Resumo:
This paper develops a comprehensive framework for the quantitative analysis of the private and fiscal returns to schooling and of the effect of public policies on private incentives to invest in education. This framework is applied to 14 member states of the European Union. For each of these countries, we construct estimates of the private return to an additional year of schooling for an individual of average attainment, taking into account the effects of education on wages and employment probabilities after allowing for academic failure rates, the direct and opportunity costs of schooling, and the impact of personal taxes, social security contributions and unemployment and pension benefits on net incomes. We also construct a set of effective tax and subsidy rates that measure the effects of different public policies on the private returns to education, and measures of the fiscal returns to schooling that capture the long-term effects of a marginal increase in attainment on public finances under conditions that approximate general equilibrium.
Resumo:
We present a solution to the problem of defining a counterpart in Algebraic Set Theory of the construction of internal sheaves in Topos Theory. Our approach is general in that we consider sheaves as determined by Lawvere-Tierney coverages, rather than by Grothen-dieck coverages, and assume only a weakening of the axioms for small maps originally introduced by Joyal and Moerdijk, thus subsuming the existing topos-theoretic results.
Resumo:
Unilateral migration policies impose externalities on other countries. In order to try to internalize these externalities, countries sign bilateral migration agreements. One element of these agreements is the emphasis on enforcing migration policies: immigrant-receiving countries agree to allow more immigrants from their emigrant-sending partner if they cooperate in enforcing their migration policy at the border. I present a simple theoretical model that justifies this behavior in a two-country setting with welfare maximizing governments. These governments establish migration quotas that need to be enforced at a cost. I prove that uncoordinated migration policies are inefficient. Both countries can improve welfare by exchanging a more "generous" migration quota for expenditure on enforcement policy. Contrary to what could be expected, this result does not depend on the enforcement technology that both countries employ.