Les "grans negociacions" a la Unió Europea: la formació de preferències, les estratègies y l’èxit a les negociacions

Projecte de recerca elaborat a partir d’una estada a la School of politics and international relations, de la University College of Dublin, United Kingdom, entre 2007 i 2009. L’ objectiu del projecte present ha estat contribuir a l’estudi de les negociacions intergovernamentals a la Unió Europea (UE). En primer lloc, s’ha estudiat les estratègies de negociació del estats membres a negociacions intergovernamentals en la UE, per la qual cosa s’ha desenvolupat una tipologia d’estratègies de negociació, diferenciant entre les més agressives (conflictives) i les menys agressives (cooperatives). La conclusió principal ha estat que els actors difereixen en la elecció de les estratègies i que és precisament el poder relatiu dels actors que explica quines estratègies adopten. En segon lloc, s’analitza la ratificació dels resultats a les negociacions intergovernamentals, concentrant-me en l’us dels referèndums. La investigació mostra que els referèndums són sovint usats pels partits polítics com un instrument utilitzat durant les campanyes electorals, posant en dubte la tesis de que l’objectiu principal dels referèndums és influenciar els poder relatiu dels estats membres en negociacions intergovernamentals. Finalment, s’ha estudiat com els actors socials influeixen aquestes negociacions en la UE. La evidencia empírica clarament mostra que la pressió que exerceixen els grups de pressió es sovint subestimada.

Repeated Interaction and the Revelation of the Monitor's Type: A Principal-Monitor-Agent Problem

This paper studies a dynamic principal-monitor-agent relation where a strategic principal delegates the task of monitoring the effort of a strategic agent to a third party. The latter we call the monitor, whose type is initially unknown. Through repeated interaction the agent might learn his type. We show that this process damages the principal's payoffs. Compensation is assumed exogenous, limiting to a great extent the provision of incentives. We go around this difficulty by introducing costly replacement strategies, i.e. the principal replaces the monitor, thus disrupting the agent's learning. We found that even when replacement costs are null, if the revealed monitor is strictly preferred by both parties, there is a loss in efficiency due to the impossibility of bene…tting from it. Nonetheless, these strategies can partially recover the principal's losses. Additionally, we establish upper and lower bounds on the payoffs that the principal and the agent can achieve. Finally we characterize the equilibrium strategies under public and private monitoring (with communication) for different cost and impatience levels.

Escola i diversitat lingüística i cultural: desafiaments i oportunitats. El paper d'un Servei Educatiu de Zona com a agent d'innovació i canvi

Davant dels nous reptes educatius que planteja l’augment de la diversitat lingüística i cultural al conjunt del Sistema Educatiu Català, el present treball descriu els resultats i experiències obtinguts en les tres primeres fases d’un projecte de recerca centrat en la identificació d’indicadors vàlids que permetin dissenyar i implementar estratègies educatives inclusives adequades per atendre la diversitat lingüística i cultural present als nostres centres. La part central de la memòria descriu les primeres dades d’un estudi quantitatiu , realitzat en diferents moments del període d’escolarització (Pàrvuls 5 anys , segon i sisè de Primària i segon d’ESO) a quatre centres públics de Vilafranca del Penedès a finals del curs 2009-2010 , sobre el coneixement de català i de castellà i les possibles influències que en aquest hi juguen els factors de diversitat lingüística i cultural. El segon bloc d’aquest projecte presenta un seguit d’experiències i propostes d’assessorament centrades en el procés de sensibilització inicial sobre les implicacions educatives a nivell d’aula i de centre de la diversitat lingüística i cultural. També es presenta, com a annex final, un recull dels principals materials emprats en aquest procés d’intervenció en centre. A la part final del treball, s’hi desenvolupa una reflexió sobre les condicions que poden afavorir la implementació d’aquestes estratègies a nivell de centre i de sistema educatiu; i sobre el paper que , en aquests processos de canvi i millora educativa , hi podrien jugar els Serveis Educatius de Zona del Departament d’Ensenyament de la Generalitat de Catalunya.

A Negotiation Style Recommender Based on Computational Ecology in Open Negotiation Environments

The system described herein represents the first example of a recommender system in digital ecosystems where agents negotiate services on behalf of small companies. The small companies compete not only with price or quality, but with a wider service-by-service composition by subcontracting with other companies. The final result of these offerings depends on negotiations at the scale of millions of small companies. This scale requires new platforms for supporting digital business ecosystems, as well as related services like open-id, trust management, monitors and recommenders. This is done in the Open Negotiation Environment (ONE), which is an open-source platform that allows agents, on behalf of small companies, to negotiate and use the ecosystem services, and enables the development of new agent technologies. The methods and tools of cyber engineering are necessary to build up Open Negotiation Environments that are stable, a basic condition for predictable business and reliable business environments. Aiming to build stable digital business ecosystems by means of improved collective intelligence, we introduce a model of negotiation style dynamics from the point of view of computational ecology. This model inspires an ecosystem monitor as well as a novel negotiation style recommender. The ecosystem monitor provides hints to the negotiation style recommender to achieve greater stability of an open negotiation environment in a digital business ecosystem. The greater stability provides the small companies with higher predictability, and therefore better business results. The negotiation style recommender is implemented with a simulated annealing algorithm at a constant temperature, and its impact is shown by applying it to a real case of an open negotiation environment populated by Italian companies

Consumption, investment and life insurance strategies with heterogeneous discounting

[cat] En aquest treball s'analitza l'efecte que comporta l'introducció de preferències inconsistents temporalment sobre les decisions òptimes de consum, inversió i compra d'assegurança de vida. En concret, es pretén recollir la creixent importància que un individu dóna a la herència que deixa i a la riquesa disponible per a la seva jubilació al llarg de la seva vida laboral. Amb aquesta finalitat, es parteix d'un model estocàstic en temps continu amb temps final aleatori, i s'introdueix el descompte heterogeni, considerant un agent amb una distribució de vida residual coneguda. Per tal d'obtenir solucions consistents temporalment es resol una equació de programació dinàmica no estàndard. Per al cas de funcions d'utilitat del tipus CRRA i CARA es troben solucions explícites. Finalment, els resultats obtinguts s'il·lustren numèricament.

Consumption, investment and life insurance strategies with heterogeneous discounting

[cat] En aquest treball s'analitza l'efecte que comporta l'introducció de preferències inconsistents temporalment sobre les decisions òptimes de consum, inversió i compra d'assegurança de vida. En concret, es pretén recollir la creixent importància que un individu dóna a la herència que deixa i a la riquesa disponible per a la seva jubilació al llarg de la seva vida laboral. Amb aquesta finalitat, es parteix d'un model estocàstic en temps continu amb temps final aleatori, i s'introdueix el descompte heterogeni, considerant un agent amb una distribució de vida residual coneguda. Per tal d'obtenir solucions consistents temporalment es resol una equació de programació dinàmica no estàndard. Per al cas de funcions d'utilitat del tipus CRRA i CARA es troben solucions explícites. Finalment, els resultats obtinguts s'il·lustren numèricament.

Collaboration strategies and technological innovation: a contractual perspective of the relationship between firms and techonological centers

In this paper, a theoretical framework for analyzing the selection of governance structures for implementing collaboration agreements between firms and Technological Centers is presented and empirically discussed. This framework includes Transaction Costs and Property Rights’ theoretical assumptions, though complemented with several proposals coming from the Transactional Value Theory. This last theory is used for adding some dynamism in the governance structure selection. As empirical evidence of this theoretical explanation, we analyse four real experiences of collaboration between firms and one Technological Center. These experiences are aimed to represent the typology of relationships which Technological Centers usually face. Among others, a key interesting result is obtained: R&D collaboration activities do not need to always be organized through hierarchical solutions. In those cases where future expected benefits and/or reputation issues could play an important role, the traditional more static theories could not fully explain the selected governance structure for managing the R&D relationship. As a consequence, these results justify further research about the adequacy of the theoretical framework presented in this paper in other contexts, for example, R&D collaborations between firms and/or between Universities or Public Research Centers and firms.

Consumers' behavior and the Bertrand paradox: an ACE approach

We analyze the classical Bertrand model when consumers exhibit some strategic behavior in deciding from which seller they will buy. We use two related but different tools. Both consider a probabilistic learning (or evolutionary) mechanism, and in the two of them consumers' behavior in uences the competition between the sellers. The results obtained show that, in general, developing some sort of loyalty is a good strategy for the buyers as it works in their best interest. First, we consider a learning procedure described by a deterministic dynamic system and, using strong simplifying assumptions, we can produce a description of the process behavior. Second, we use nite automata to represent the strategies played by the agents and an adaptive process based on genetic algorithms to simulate the stochastic process of learning. By doing so we can relax some of the strong assumptions used in the rst approach and still obtain the same basic results. It is suggested that the limitations of the rst approach (analytical) provide a good motivation for the second approach (Agent-Based). Indeed, although both approaches address the same problem, the use of Agent-Based computational techniques allows us to relax hypothesis and overcome the limitations of the analytical approach.

Implementation of the ordinal shapley value for a three-agent economy

We propose a simple mechanism that implements the Ordinal Shapley Value (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein [2005]) for economies with three or less agents.

The Instrumental voter goes to the news-agent: demand for information, election closeness, and the media

This paper studies the impact of instrumental voting on information demand and mass media behaviour during electoral campaigns. If voters act instrumentally then information demand should increase with the closeness of an election. Mass media are modeled as profit-maximizing firms that take into account information demand, the value of customers to advertisers and the marginal cost of customers. Information supply should be larger in electoral constituencies where the contest is expected to be closer, there is a higher population density, and customers are on average more profitable for advertisers. The impact of electorate size is theoretically undetermined. These conclusions are then tested with comfortable results on data from the 1997 general election in Britain.

Can genetic algorithms explain experimental anomalies? An application to common property resources

It is common to find in experimental data persistent oscillations in the aggregate outcomes and high levels of heterogeneity in individual behavior. Furthermore, it is not unusual to find significant deviations from aggregate Nash equilibrium predictions. In this paper, we employ an evolutionary model with boundedly rational agents to explain these findings. We use data from common property resource experiments (Casari and Plott, 2003). Instead of positing individual-specific utility functions, we model decision makers as selfish and identical. Agent interaction is simulated using an individual learning genetic algorithm, where agents have constraints in their working memory, a limited ability to maximize, and experiment with new strategies. We show that the model replicates most of the patterns that can be found in common property resource experiments.

The principal-agent matching market

We propose a model based on competitive markets in order to analyze an economy with several principals and agents. We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterize the set of stable outcomes of this principal-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to implement the set of stable outcomes is proposed. Finally, we put forward examples of principal-agent economies where the results fit into.

Selecting negotiation processes with Health Care

We address the question of how a third-party payer (e.g. an insurer) decides what providers to contract with. Three different mechanisms are studied and their properties compared. A first mechanism consists in the third-party payer setting up a bargaining procedure with both providers jointly and simultaneously. A second mechanism envisages the outcome of the same simultaneous bargaining but independently with every provider. Finally, the last mechanism is of different nature. It is the so-called "any willing provider" where the third-party payer announces a contract and every provider freely decides to sign it or not. The main finding is that the decision of the third-party payer depends on the surplus to be shared. When it is relatively high the third-party payer prefers the any willing provider system. When, on the contrary, the surplus is relatively low, the third-party payer will select one of the other two systems accor ing to how bargaining power is distributed.

Negotiation advantages of professional associations in health care

In several instances, third-party payers negotiate prices of health care services with providers. We show that a third-party payer may prefer to deal with a professional association than with the sub-set constituted by the more efficient providers, and then apply the same price to all providers. The reason for it is the increase in the bargaining position of providers. The more efficient providers are also the ones with higher profits in the event of negotiation failure. This allows them to ext act a higher surplus from the third-party payer.