The Decision on Turkish EU accession in December 2002: The logic of anarchy, collective action problems and rhetorical action

Studies of the EU accession of the East and Central European Countries have stressed the importance of neo-liberal institutionalism as an explanation for Member State preferences. In this paper it is argued that Member States’ preferences over Turkish EU accession are better explained by power politics and neo-realism. It seems therefore that Turkey’s way to the EU follows another path than the East and Central Countries. Turkish accession raises the question of the EU’s role in a uni-polar world order – whether the EU should develop into an independent actor on the world stage or not. However, when it comes to the interaction among the Member States in order to decide on when to open accession negotiations with Turkey the constitutive values of the EU seriously modify the outcome that pure power politics would have let to.

Turkey's accession to the EU: interests, ideas and path dependence

The paper is divided into four sections. The first offers a critical assessment of explanations of both rationalist and constructivist approaches currently dominating European studies and assesses the notion of path dependence. The second and third sections analyse the role of both material interests and polity ideas in EU enlargement to Turkey, and conclude that explanations exclusively based on either strategic calculations or values and identities have significant shortcomings. The fourth section examines the institutional path of Turkey's candidacy to show how the course of action begun at Helsinki restricted the range of possible and legitimate options three years later in Copenhagen.

Emissions distribution in post-Kyoto international negotiations: a policy

An abundant scientific literature about climate change economics points out that the future participation of developing countries in international environmental policies will depend on their amount of pay offs inside and outside specific agreements. These studies are aimed at analyzing coalitions stability typically through a game theoretical approach. Though these contributions represent a corner stone in the research field investigating future plausible international coalitions and the reasons behind the difficulties incurred over time to implement emissions stabilizing actions, they cannot disentangle satisfactorily the role that equality play in inducing poor regions to tackle global warming. If we focus on the Stern Review findings stressing that climate change will generate heavy damages and policy actions will be costly in a finite time horizon, we understand why there is a great incentive to free ride in order to exploit benefits from emissions reduction efforts of others. The reluctance of poor countries in joining international agreements is mainly supported by historical responsibility of rich regions in generating atmospheric carbon concentration, whereas rich countries claim that emissions stabilizing policies will be effective only when developing countries will join them.Scholars recently outline that a perceived fairness in the distribution of emissions would facilitate a wide spread participation in international agreements. In this paper we overview the literature about distributional aspects of emissions by focusing on those contributions investigating past trends of emissions distribution through empirical data and future trajectories through simulations obtained by integrated assessment models. We will explain methodologies used to elaborate data and the link between real data and those coming from simulations. Results from this strand of research will be interpreted in order to discuss future negotiations for post Kyoto agreements that will be the focus of the next. Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen at the end of 2009. A particular attention will be devoted to the role that technological change will play in affecting the distribution of emissions over time and to how spillovers and experience diffusion could influence equality issues and future outcomes of policy negotiations.

Addressing the net balances problem as a prerequisite for EU budget reform: a proposal

Conflict among member states regarding the distribution of net financial burdens has been allowed to contaminate the entire design of the EU budget with very negative consequences in terms of equity, efficiency and transparency. To get around this problem and pave the way for a substantive budget reform, we propose to decouple distributional negotiations from the rest of the budget process by linking member state net balances in a rigid manner to relative prosperity. This would be achieved through the introduction of a system of compensating horizontal transfers that would take to its logical conclusion the Commission's proposal for a generalized compensation mechanism. We discuss the impact of the proposed scheme on member states? incentives and illustrate its financial implications using revenue and expenditure projections for 2013 that are based on the current Financial Perspectives and Own Resources Decision.

Why the EU does not Have an Independent Competition Agency: French Interests and Transaction Costs in Early European Integration

A major achievement of new institutionalism in economics and political science is the formalisation of the idea that certain policies are more efficient when administered by a politically independent organisation. Based on this insight, several policy actors and scholars criticise the European Community for relying too much on a multi-task, collegial, and politicised organisation, the European Commission. This raises important questions, some constitutional (who should be able to change the corresponding procedural rules?) and some political-economic (is Europe truly committed to free and competitive markets?). Though acknowledging the relevance of legal and normative arguments, this paper contributes to the debate with a positive political-scientific perspective. Based on the view that institutional equilibria raise the question of equilibrium institutions, it shows that collegiality was (a) an equilibrium institution during the Paris negotiations of 1950-51; and (b) an institutional equilibrium for the following 50 years. The conclusion points to some recent changes in the way that European competition policy is implemented, and discusses how these affect the “constitutional” principle of collegial European governance.

Bargaining one-dimensional policies and the efficiency of super majority rules

We consider negotiations selecting one-dimensional policies. Individuals have single-peaked preferences, and they are impatient. Decisions arise from a bargaining game with random proposers and (super) majority approval, ranging from the simple majority up to unanimity. The existence and uniqueness of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium is established, and its explicit characterization provided. We supply an explicit formula to determine the unique alternative that prevails, as impatience vanishes, for each majority. As an application, we examine the efficiency of majority rules. For symmetric distributions of peaks unanimity is the unanimously preferred majority rule. For asymmetric populations rules maximizing social surplus are characterized.

The Evolution of the Climate Change Regime: Beyond a North-South Divide?

This research primarily analyses relevant climate bargaining dynamics that have been informed by a North-South impasse. This working paper argues that the first stage of negotiations for a climate convention indeed witnessed a North-South divide which became institutionalized in the Framework Convention on Climate Change. However, in subsequent negotiation rounds the key loci of bargaining struggles was centered between developed countries, in which relevant North-South cooperation dynamics were also present. Finally, this paper assesses the unfinished post-Kyoto bargaining process in which two trends are already being observed: both the emergence of a new geopolitics between the United States and major developing countries, and a fragmentation process within the South, in which the Copenhagen Accord itself has begun to institutionalize such fragmentation.

Módulo documentación máquinas recreativas SAP

El negocio de las máquinas recreativas está regulado por cada una de las Administraciones Públicas de cada Comunidad Autónoma. Por ello, es obligatorio la generación de documentación que acompaña a cada una de las máquinas que están siendo explotadas. Este proyecto describe el desarrollo de un módulo, dentro del ERP SAP R/3, para la generación de esta documentación a partir de las necesidades expresadas por el Departamento de Documentación, Trámites y Gestiones de CIRSA.

Simultaneous Nash bargaining with consistent beliefs

We propose and analyze a new solution concept, the R solution, for three-person, transferable utility, cooperative games. In the spirit of the Nash Bargaining Solution, our concept is founded on the predicted outcomes of simultaneous, two-party negotiations that would be the alternative to the grand coalition. These possibly probabilistic predictions are based on consistent beliefs. We analyze the properties of the R solution and compare it with the Shapley value and other concepts. The R solution exists and is unique. It belongs to the bargaining set and to the core whenever the latter is not empty. In fact, when the grand coalition can simply execute one of the three possible bilateral trades, the R solution is the most egalitarian selection of the bargaining set. Finally, we discuss how the R solution changes important conclusions of several well known Industrial Organization models.

How The 1996 Hotel Majestic agreement may explain a future PP/CiU relationship in Madrid

Some historians have argued that 1996 marked a ‘second transition’ for Spain because of the return to power of the political right in Madrid and that the relationship and eventual pact between the Partido Popular (PP) and Convergència i Unió (CiU) meant that the state could finally escape the ghosts of its Francoist past. For this research, face-to-face interviews were conducted with Catalan Members of Parliament who served under either José María Aznar or Jordi Pujol in Madrid or Barcelona. Drawing upon both interviews and other evidence, including the analysis of election results and the 1996 Hotel Majestic Agreement, the research seeks to provide a better understanding of the previous relationships between the PP and CiU and their leaders in order to understand what lessons might be learnt that would contribute to anticipating and explaining possible future negotiations between the two parties. This is attempted by first examining the potential costs and benefits of political pacts between centre (Madrid) and periphery (Barcelona). Secondly, due to many interviewees making reference to Salvador Espriu’s work La Pell de Brau, the three routes of Espriu’s Catalan nationalism are put into the context of the political pacts. Finally, the likelihood of future agreements between PP and CiU are hypothesized, not only how those agreements may (or may not) come about, but also, what might the result of those negotiations be. Ultimately, it is concluded that the benefits of the Hotel Majestic Agreement outweighed the costs, thus leaving the door open for future negotiations, even if some of those interviewed disagreed.

Les "grans negociacions" a la Unió Europea: la formació de preferències, les estratègies y l’èxit a les negociacions

Projecte de recerca elaborat a partir d’una estada a la School of politics and international relations, de la University College of Dublin, United Kingdom, entre 2007 i 2009. L’ objectiu del projecte present ha estat contribuir a l’estudi de les negociacions intergovernamentals a la Unió Europea (UE). En primer lloc, s’ha estudiat les estratègies de negociació del estats membres a negociacions intergovernamentals en la UE, per la qual cosa s’ha desenvolupat una tipologia d’estratègies de negociació, diferenciant entre les més agressives (conflictives) i les menys agressives (cooperatives). La conclusió principal ha estat que els actors difereixen en la elecció de les estratègies i que és precisament el poder relatiu dels actors que explica quines estratègies adopten. En segon lloc, s’analitza la ratificació dels resultats a les negociacions intergovernamentals, concentrant-me en l’us dels referèndums. La investigació mostra que els referèndums són sovint usats pels partits polítics com un instrument utilitzat durant les campanyes electorals, posant en dubte la tesis de que l’objectiu principal dels referèndums és influenciar els poder relatiu dels estats membres en negociacions intergovernamentals. Finalment, s’ha estudiat com els actors socials influeixen aquestes negociacions en la UE. La evidencia empírica clarament mostra que la pressió que exerceixen els grups de pressió es sovint subestimada.

Towards economic and monetary union: changing trends in payment systems for new european members

The objective of this paper is preciselyto study the evolution of payment systems within the accession countries between 1996 and 2003 and compare them with those of the E.U. and the Eurozone countries

La importància dels aspectes culturals en les relacions empresarials a la Xina : implicacions per a les empreses espanyoles

La diferència cultural existent entre Espanya i la Xina és gairebé abismal. No es tracta tan sols del llenguatge, sinó que la conducta social d'espanyols i xinesos segueixen camins ben diferents. Quan ens centrem en el món empresarial, observem que la cultura dels negocis també pateix aquestes diferències, les quals, si no se saben salvar poden desembocar en negociacions fallides. El que es pretén en aquest treball de recerca és oferir una primera visió global (encara que una mica superficialment) d'aquesta cultura dels negocis xinesa per tal de facilitar d'acostament d'aquests dos països en l'àmbit comercial.

A Negotiation Style Recommender Based on Computational Ecology in Open Negotiation Environments

The system described herein represents the first example of a recommender system in digital ecosystems where agents negotiate services on behalf of small companies. The small companies compete not only with price or quality, but with a wider service-by-service composition by subcontracting with other companies. The final result of these offerings depends on negotiations at the scale of millions of small companies. This scale requires new platforms for supporting digital business ecosystems, as well as related services like open-id, trust management, monitors and recommenders. This is done in the Open Negotiation Environment (ONE), which is an open-source platform that allows agents, on behalf of small companies, to negotiate and use the ecosystem services, and enables the development of new agent technologies. The methods and tools of cyber engineering are necessary to build up Open Negotiation Environments that are stable, a basic condition for predictable business and reliable business environments. Aiming to build stable digital business ecosystems by means of improved collective intelligence, we introduce a model of negotiation style dynamics from the point of view of computational ecology. This model inspires an ecosystem monitor as well as a novel negotiation style recommender. The ecosystem monitor provides hints to the negotiation style recommender to achieve greater stability of an open negotiation environment in a digital business ecosystem. The greater stability provides the small companies with higher predictability, and therefore better business results. The negotiation style recommender is implemented with a simulated annealing algorithm at a constant temperature, and its impact is shown by applying it to a real case of an open negotiation environment populated by Italian companies

Fusion of the human gene for the polyubiquitination co-effector UEV-1 with Kua, a newly identified gene

UEV proteins are enzymatically inactive variants of the E2 ubiquitin-conjugating enzymes that regulate noncanonical elongation of ubiquitin chains. In Saccharomyces cerevisiae, UEV is part of the RAD6-mediated error-free DNA repair pathway. In mammalian cells, UEV proteins can modulate c-FOS transcription and the G2-M transition of the cell cycle. Here we show that the UEV genes from phylogenetically distant organisms present a remarkable conservation in their exon–intron structure. We also show that the human UEV1 gene is fused with the previously unknown gene Kua. In Caenorhabditis elegans and Drosophila melanogaster, Kua and UEV are in separated loci, and are expressed as independent transcripts and proteins. In humans, Kua and UEV1 are adjacent genes, expressed either as separate transcripts encoding independent Kua and UEV1 proteins, or as a hybrid Kua–UEV transcript, encoding a two-domain protein. Kua proteins represent a novel class of conserved proteins with juxtamembrane histidine-rich motifs. Experiments with epitope-tagged proteins show that UEV1A is a nuclear protein, whereas both Kua and Kua–UEV localize to cytoplasmic structures, indicating that the Kua domain determines the cytoplasmic localization of Kua–UEV. Therefore, the addition of a Kua domain to UEV in the fused Kua–UEV protein confers new biological properties to this regulator of variant polyubiquitination.[Kua cDNAs isolated by RT-PCR and described in this paper have been deposited in the GenBank data library under accession nos. AF1155120 (H. sapiens) and AF152361 (D. melanogaster). Genomic clones containing UEV genes: S. cerevisiae, YGL087c (accession no. Z72609); S. pombe, c338 (accession no. AL023781); P. falciparum, MAL3P2 (accession no. AL034558); A. thaliana, F26F24 (accession no. AC005292); C. elegans, F39B2 (accession no. Z92834); D. melanogaster, AC014908; and H. sapiens, 1185N5 (accession no. AL034423). Accession numbers for Kua cDNAs in GenBank dbEST: M. musculus, AA7853; T. cruzi, AI612534. Other Kua-containing sequences: A. thaliana genomic clones F10M23 (accession no. AL035440), F19K23 (accession no. AC000375), and T20K9 (accession no. AC004786).