Safety of intramuscular influenza vaccine in patients receiving oral anticoagulation therapy: a single blinded multi-centre randomized controlled clinical trial

Influenza vaccines are recommended for administration by the intramuscular route. However, many physicians use the subcutaneous route for patients receiving an oral anticoagulant because this route is thought to induce fewer hemorrhagic side effects. Our aim is to assess the safety of intramuscular administration of influenza vaccine in patients on oral anticoagulation therapy. Methods: Design: Randomised, controlled, single blinded, multi-centre clinical trial. Setting: 4 primary care practices in Barcelona, Spain. Participants: 229 patients on oral anticoagulation therapy eligible for influenza vaccine during the 20032004 season. Interventions: intramuscular administration of influença vaccine in the experimental group (129 patients) compared to subcutaneous administration in the control group (100 patients). Primary outcome: change in the circumference of the arm at the site of injection at 24 hours. Secondary outcomes: appearance of local reactions and pain at 24 hours and at 10 days; change in INR (International Normalized Ratio) at 24 hours and at 10 days. Analysis was by intention to treat using the 95% confidence intervals of the proportions or mean differences. Results: Baseline variables in the two groups were similar. No major side effects or major haemorrhage during the follow-up period were reported. No significant differences were observed in the primary outcome between the two groups. The appearance of local adverse reactions was more frequent in the subcutaneous administration group (37,4% vs. 17,4%, 95% confidence interval of the difference 8,2% to 31,8%). Conclusion: This study shows that the intramuscular administration route of influenza vaccine in patients on anticoagulant therapy does not have more side effects than the subcutaneous administration route

Screening of highly modular sugar-based ligand libraries in the enantioselective C-C coupling reactions

Projecte de recerca elaborat a partir d’una estada a la University of Nottingham, Gran Bretanya, entre març i abril del 2007. Aquest treball s’ha centrat en l’aplicació de compostos derivats de la D-(+)-glucosa, de la D-(+)-fructosa i la D-galactosa com a lligands de catalitzadors homogenis quirals en dos reaccions asimètriques: addició 1,2 a aldehids catalitzada per níquel i addició 1,4 conjugada catalitzada per coure.(veure figura adjunta al final del document). En primer lloc, s’ha estudiat l’aplicació dels compostos L1-L6 a les reaccions d’addició 1,2 a aldehids catalitzades per níquel. S’ha observat que la selectivitat del procés depèn principalment del grup funcional unit a l’esquelet del lligand, de les propietats estèriques del substituent en la funció oxazolina i de l’estructura del substrat. S’ha obtingut fins a un 59% d’excés enantiomèric utilitzant el precursor de catalitzador que conté el lligand L3a. En segon lloc, aquest treball descriu l’aplicació de les tres famílies de compostos (L1-L11) com a lligands en la reacció d’addició 1,4 catalitzada per coure de compostos organometàl•lics a diferents enones amb diferents propietats estèriques. L’ús de les llibreries de compostos fosfit-oxazolina (L1-L5) i fosfit-fosforamidit (L6) han proporcionat bones enantioselectivitats (fins a 80%) en l’addició de reactius de trialquilalumini a diferents enones. En canvi, la llibreria de compostos monofosfit (L7-L11) ha mostrat bones activitats però enantioselectivitats fins a 57%.

Divergent Reactions to Globalization: Labor Unions and the Nafta and the EU Enlargement Process

The 1990s witnessed the launching of two ambitious trade regionalization plans, the Nafta and EU enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe. In contrast to previous projects for the creation or expansion of regional trade blocs, these two projects concerned states at dramatically different levels of economic development: The Nafta involved the very wealthy economies of Canada and the USA and the significantly poorer economy of Mexico, whereas EU enlargement involved the very wealthy economy of the 15 member-state European Union and the significantly poorer economies of former Communist states in Central and Eastern Europe. Ultimately, the Nafta and EU enlargement are responses to the challenges of globalization. Paradoxically, however, they have been met with radically different societal reactions in the wealthy partners that participated in the launching of these processes. This paper focuses on the reaction by labor unions on both sides of the Atlantic. I conclude that while labor relations and welfare institutions constrained the trade policy choices made by labor unions in the United States and Europe, they do not tell the whole story. It would seem that United States labor unions were more sensitive to the potential risks for workers associated to the liberalization of trade than were their European counterparts.

Teachers' reactions on students' responses: essential for an adequate task monitoring

This research project analyzes the reactions the teacher has on students' responses. Different techniques as discourse markers, types of questions and repair sequences are taken into account, but the author puts a special emphasis on non-verbal communication. To be aware of all these ways of reacting in a class interaction is essential for an adequate task monitoring

Endogenous Credit Cycles and Financial Dampening in an Adverse Selection Economy

We propose an adverse selection framework in which the financial sector has a dual role. It amplifies or dampens exogenous shocks and also generates endogenous fluctuations. We fully characterize constrained optimal contracts in a setting in which entrepreneurs need to borrow and are privately informed about the quality of their projects. Our characterization is novel in analyzing pooling and separating allocations in a context of multi-dimensional screening: specifically, the amounts of investment undertaken and of entrepreneurial net worth are used to screen projects. We then embed these results in a dynamic competitive economy. First, we show how endogenous regime switches in financial contracts may generate fluctuations in an economy that exhibits no dynamics under full information. Unlike previous models of endogenous cycles, our result does not rely on entrepreneurial net worth being counter-cyclical or inconsequential for determining investment. Secondly, the model shows the different implications of adverse selection as opposed to pure moral hazard. In particular, and contrary to standard results in the macroeconomic literature, the financial system may dampen exogenous shocks in the presence of adverse selection.

Adverse Selection, Credit, and Efficiency: the Case of the Missing Market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our envi- ronment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow from banks. As is generally the case in economies with adverse selection, the competitive equilibrium of our economy is shown to be ine¢ cient. Under adverse selection, the choices made by one type of agents limit what can be o¤ered to other types in an incentive-compatible manner. This gives rise to an externality, which cannot be internalized in a competitive equilibrium. We show that, in this type of environment, the ine¢ ciency associated to adverse selection is the consequence of one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added (say, a .security market.), in which entrepreneurs can obtain funds beyond those o¤ered by banks, we show that the e¢ cient allocation is an equilibrium of the economy. In such an equilibrium, all entrepreneurs borrow at a pooling rate in the security market. When they apply to bank loans, though, only entrepreneurs with good projects pledge these additional funds as collateral. This equilibrium thus simultaneously entails cross- subsidization and separation between di¤erent types of entrepreneurs.

Adverse selection, credit, and efficiency: the case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitive equilibrium is typically inefficient. We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurs with additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of these additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it does not condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the markets for monitored loans.

Optimal Contracts, Adverse Selection, and Social Preferences: An Experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

A Model of Collateral, Investment, and Adverse Selection

This paper characterizes the relationship between entrepreneurial wealth and aggregate investment under adverse selection. Its main finding is that such a relationship need not be monotonic. In particular, three results emerge from the analysis: (i) pooling equilibria, in which investment is independent of entrepreneurial wealth, are more likely to arise when entrepreneurial wealth is relatively low; (ii) separating equilibria, in which investment is increasing in entrepreneurial wealth, are most likely to arise when entrepreneurial wealth is relatively high and; (iii) for a given interest rate, an increase in entrepreneurial wealth may generate a discontinuous fall in investment.

Interviews and adverse selection

Interviewing in professional labor markets is a costly process for firms. Moreover, poor screening can have a persistent negative impact on firms bottom lines and candidates careers. In a simple dynamic model where firms can pay a cost to interview applicants who have private information about their own ability, potentially large inefficiencies arise from information-based unemployment, where able workers are rejected by firms because of their lack of offers in previous interviews. This effect may make the market less efficient than random matching. We show that the first best can be achieved using either a mechanism with transfers or one without transfers.

The role of title insurance under recording and registration

This article outlines a transaction cost theory of title insurance andanalyses the role it plays in countries with recording and registrationof land titles. Title insurance indemnifies real estate right holdersfor losses caused by pre-existing title defects that are unknown whenthe policy is issued. It emerged to complement the errors and omissions insurance of professionals examining title quality. Poor organizationof public records led title insurers in the USA to integrate titleexamination and settlement services. Their residual claimant statusmotivates insurers to screen, cure and avoid title defects. Firmsintroducing title insurance abroad produce little information on titlequality, however. Their policies are instead issued on a casualty basis,complementing and enforcing the professional liability of conveyancers.Future development in markets with land registration is uncertainbecause of adverse selection, competitive reactions from establishedconveyancers and the ability of larger banks to self-insure title risks.

Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need toborrow from banks. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitiveequilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added to provide entrepreneurs withadditional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of thisadditional market is that it must be non-exclusive, in the sense that entrepreneurs must be ableto simultaneously borrow from many different lenders operating in it. This makes it possible toattain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new market while separating them in themarket for bank loans.

Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects needto borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, thecompetitive equilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurswith additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic ofthese additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it doesnot condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attainefficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the marketsfor monitored loans.

Hiring and firing costs, adverse selection and long-term unemployment

In this paper, we present a matching model with adverse selection that explains why flows into and out of unemployment are much lower in Europe compared to North America, while employment-to-employment flows are similar in the two continents. In the model,firms use discretion in terms of whom to fire and, thus, low quality workers are more likely to be dismissed than high quality workers. Moreover, as hiring and firing costs increase, firms find it more costly to hire a bad worker and, thus, they prefer to hire out of the pool of employed job seekers rather than out of the pool of the unemployed, who are more likely to turn out to be 'lemons'. We use microdata for Spain and the U.S. and find that the ratio of the job finding probability of the unemployed to the job finding probability of employed job seekers was smaller in Spain than in the U.S. Furthermore, using U.S. data, we find that the discrimination of the unemployed increased over the 1980's in those states that raised firing costs by introducing exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine.