How important are tobacco prices in the propensity to start and quit smoking? An analysis of smoking histories from the Spanish National Health Survey

This paper analyses the effect of tobacco prices on the propensity tostart and quit smoking using a pool of the 1993, 1995 and 1997 editionsof the Spanish National Health Surveys. The estimates for severalparametric models of the hazard rate for starting and quitting suggestthat i) The public health measures applied as of 1992 have had asignificative effect on both reducing the hazard of starting andincreasing the hazard of quitting, ii) Prices have a very weak effect onthe hazard of starting in the male population and no significant effectin the female population, iii) The price floor of cigarrettes, proxiedby the average price of a pack of black cigarrettes, has a significanteffect on the quitting hazard which is robust across specifications andapplies to both men and women. The implied price elasticity of the timeup to quitting is situated around -1.4.

Search and bargaining in large markets with homogeneous traders

We study pair-wise decentralized trade in dynamic markets with homogeneous, non-atomic, buyers and sellers that wish to exchange one unit. Pairs of traders are randomly matched and bargaining a price under rules that offer the freedom to quit the match at any time. Market equilbria, prices and trades over time, are characterized. The asymptotic behavior of prices and trades as frictions (search costs and impatience) vanish, and the conditions for (non) convergence to walrasian prices are explored. As a side product of independent interest, we present a self-contained theory of non-cooperative bargaining with two-sided, time-varying, outside options.

Organisational structure, communication and group ethics

This paper investigates experimentally how organisational decision processes affect the moral motivations of actors inside a firm that must forego profits to reduce harming a third party. In a "vertical" treatment, one insider unilaterally sets the harm-reduction strategy; the other can only accept or quit. In a "horizontal" treatment, the insiders decide by consensus. Our 2-by-2 design also controls for communication effects. In our data, communication makes vertical firms more ethical; voice appears to mitigate "responsibility-alleviation" in that subordinates with voice feel responsible for what their firms do. Vertical firms are then more ethical than the horizontal firms for which our bargaining data reveal a dynamic form of responsibility-alleviation and our chat data indicate a strong "insider-outsider" effect.

How binding are legal limits? Transitions from temporary to permanent work in Spain

This paper studies the duration pattern of xed-term contracts and the determinantsof their conversion into permanent ones in Spain, where the share of xed-termemployment is the highest in Europe. We estimate a duration model for temporaryemployment, with competing risks of terminating into permanent employment versusalternative states, and exible duration dependence. We nd that conversion rates aregenerally below 10%. Our estimated conversion rates roughly increase with tenure,with a pronounced spike at the legal limit, when there is no legal way to retain theworker on a temporary contract. We argue that estimated di¤erences in conversionrates across categories of workers can stem from di¤erences in worker outside optionsand thus the power to credibly threat to quit temporary jobs.