Cooperation and game theory, free software or the #15m movement: Two examples for universities

Closing talk of the Open Access Week 2011 at the UOC, by Josep Jover. Why do altruistic strategies beat selfish ones in the spheres of both free software and the #15m movement? The #15m movement, like software but unlike tangible goods, cannot be owned. It can be used (by joining it) by an indeterminate number of people without depriving anyone else of the chance to do the same. And that turns everything on its head: how universities manage information and what their mission is in this new society. In the immediate future, universities will be valued not for the information they harbour, which will always be richer and more extensive beyond their walls, but rather for their capacity to create critical masses, whether of knowledge research, skill-building, or networks of peers... universities must implement the new model or risk becoming obsolete.

Complementarities between mathematical and computational modeling: the case of the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma

We study the properties of the well known Replicator Dynamics when applied to a finitely repeated version of the Prisoners' Dilemma game. We characterize the behavior of such dynamics under strongly simplifying assumptions (i.e. only 3 strategies are available) and show that the basin of attraction of defection shrinks as the number of repetitions increases. After discussing the difficulties involved in trying to relax the 'strongly simplifying assumptions' above, we approach the same model by means of simulations based on genetic algorithms. The resulting simulations describe a behavior of the system very close to the one predicted by the replicator dynamics without imposing any of the assumptions of the mathematical model. Our main conclusion is that mathematical and computational models are good complements for research in social sciences. Indeed, while computational models are extremely useful to extend the scope of the analysis to complex scenarios hard to analyze mathematically, formal models can be useful to verify and to explain the outcomes of computational models.

Bringing game theory to hypothesis testing: Establishing finite sample bounds on inference

Small sample properties are of fundamental interest when only limited data is avail-able. Exact inference is limited by constraints imposed by speci.c nonrandomizedtests and of course also by lack of more data. These e¤ects can be separated as we propose to evaluate a test by comparing its type II error to the minimal type II error among all tests for the given sample. Game theory is used to establish this minimal type II error, the associated randomized test is characterized as part of a Nash equilibrium of a .ctitious game against nature.We use this method to investigate sequential tests for the di¤erence between twomeans when outcomes are constrained to belong to a given bounded set. Tests ofinequality and of noninferiority are included. We .nd that inference in terms oftype II error based on a balanced sample cannot be improved by sequential sampling or even by observing counter factual evidence providing there is a reasonable gap between the hypotheses.

Search and bargaining in large markets with homogeneous traders

We study pair-wise decentralized trade in dynamic markets with homogeneous, non-atomic, buyers and sellers that wish to exchange one unit. Pairs of traders are randomly matched and bargaining a price under rules that offer the freedom to quit the match at any time. Market equilbria, prices and trades over time, are characterized. The asymptotic behavior of prices and trades as frictions (search costs and impatience) vanish, and the conditions for (non) convergence to walrasian prices are explored. As a side product of independent interest, we present a self-contained theory of non-cooperative bargaining with two-sided, time-varying, outside options.

Dynamic matching and bargaining: the role of deadlines

We consider a dynamic model where traders in each period are matched randomly into pairs who then bargain about the division of a fixed surplus. When agreement is reached the traders leave the market. Traders who do not come to an agreement return next period in which they will be matched again, as long as their deadline has not expired yet. New traders enter exogenously in each period. We assume that traders within a pair know each other's deadline. We define and characterize the stationary equilibrium configurations. Traders with longer deadlines fare better than traders with short deadlines. It is shown that the heterogeneity of deadlines may cause delay. It is then shown that a centralized mechanism that controls the matching protocol, but does not interfere with the bargaining, eliminates all delay. Even though this efficient centralized mechanism is not as good for traders with long deadlines, it is shown that in a model where all traders can choose which mechanism to

X-ray diffraction, thermal analysis, and Raman scattering study of K2BeF4 and comparation to other member of the (beta)-K2SO4 family with ferroelectric -paraelectric transition

Thermal analysis, powder diffraction, and Raman scattering as a function of the temperature were carried out on K2BeF4. Moreover, the crystal structure was determined at 293 K from powder diffraction. The compound shows a transition from Pna21 to Pnam space group at 921 K with a transition enthalpy of 5 kJ/mol. The transition is assumed to be first order because the compound shows metastability. Structurally and spectroscopically the transition is similar to those observed in (NH4)2SO4, which suggests that the low-temperature phase is ferroelectric. In order to confirm it, the spontaneous polarization has been computed using an ionic model.

X-ray diffraction, thermal analysis, and Raman scattering study of K2BeF4 and comparation to other member of the (beta)-K2SO4 family with ferroelectric -paraelectric transition

Thermal analysis, powder diffraction, and Raman scattering as a function of the temperature were carried out on K2BeF4. Moreover, the crystal structure was determined at 293 K from powder diffraction. The compound shows a transition from Pna21 to Pnam space group at 921 K with a transition enthalpy of 5 kJ/mol. The transition is assumed to be first order because the compound shows metastability. Structurally and spectroscopically the transition is similar to those observed in (NH4)2SO4, which suggests that the low-temperature phase is ferroelectric. In order to confirm it, the spontaneous polarization has been computed using an ionic model.

The optimum quantity of money: Theory and evidence

In this paper we propose a simple and general model for computing the Ramsey optimal inflation tax, which includes several models from the previous literature as special cases. We show that it cannot be claimed that the Friedman rule is always optimal (or always non--optimal) on theoretical grounds. The Friedman rule is optimal or not, depending on conditions related to the shape of various relevant functions. One contribution of this paper is to relate these conditions to {\it measurable} variables such as the interest rate or the consumption elasticity of money demand. We find that it tends to be optimal to tax money when there are economies of scale in the demand for money (the scale elasticity is smaller than one) and/or when money is required for the payment of consumption or wage taxes. We find that it tends to be optimal to tax money more heavily when the interest elasticity of money demand is small. We present empirical evidence on the parameters that determine the optimal inflation tax. Calibrating the model to a variety of empirical studies yields a optimal nominal interest rate of less than 1\%/year, although that finding is sensitive to the calibration.

Exact and approximate stepdown methods for multiple hypothesis testing

Consider the problem of testing k hypotheses simultaneously. In this paper,we discuss finite and large sample theory of stepdown methods that providecontrol of the familywise error rate (FWE). In order to improve upon theBonferroni method or Holm's (1979) stepdown method, Westfall and Young(1993) make eective use of resampling to construct stepdown methods thatimplicitly estimate the dependence structure of the test statistics. However,their methods depend on an assumption called subset pivotality. The goalof this paper is to construct general stepdown methods that do not requiresuch an assumption. In order to accomplish this, we take a close look atwhat makes stepdown procedures work, and a key component is a monotonicityrequirement of critical values. By imposing such monotonicity on estimatedcritical values (which is not an assumption on the model but an assumptionon the method), it is demonstrated that the problem of constructing a validmultiple test procedure which controls the FWE can be reduced to the problemof contructing a single test which controls the usual probability of a Type 1error. This reduction allows us to draw upon an enormous resamplingliterature as a general means of test contruction.

Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores (revised version)

We prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition of payoff-dependent balancedness, based on transfer rate mappings. We also define a new equilibrium condition on transfer rates and we prove the existence of core payoff vectors satisfying this condition. The additional requirement of transfer rate equilibrium refines the core concept and allows the selection of specific core payoff vectors. Lastly, the class of parametrized cooperative games is introduced. This new setting and its associated equilibrium-core solution extend the usual cooperative game framework and core solution to situations depending on an exogenous environment. A non-emptiness result for the equilibrium-core is also provided in the context of a parametrized cooperative game. Our proofs borrow mathematical tools and geometric constructions from general equilibrium theory with non convexities. Applications to extant results taken from game theory and economic theory are given.

The illusion of control, the structures of prizes and the demand for football pools in Spain

Using data for all the fixtures for the seasons from 1972-73 to 2002-03, we estimate a dynamic model of demand for football pools in Spain paying attention to whether their main economic explanatory variable is the effective price of a ticket or the jackpot. Additionally, we evaluate the importance of the composition of the list of games in terms of whether First Division matches are included or not. Results show that the jackpot model is preferred to the effective price model, having important implications in terms of how the structure of the game should be changed in order to increase demand.

A mathematical excursion: From the three-door problem to a Cantor-type perfect set

We start with a generalization of the well-known three-door problem:the n-door problem. The solution of this new problem leads us toa beautiful representation system for real numbers in (0,1] as alternated series, known in the literature as Pierce expansions. A closer look to Pierce expansions will take us to some metrical properties of sets defined through the Pierce expansions of its elements. Finally, these metrical properties will enable us to present 'strange' sets, similar to the classical Cantor set.

Scaled and adjusted restricted tests in multi-sample analysis of moment structures

We extend to score, Wald and difference test statistics the scaled and adjusted corrections to goodness-of-fit test statistics developed in Satorra and Bentler (1988a,b). The theory is framed in the general context of multisample analysis of moment structures, under general conditions on the distribution of observable variables. Computational issues, as well as the relation of the scaled and corrected statistics to the asymptotic robust ones, is discussed. A Monte Carlo study illustrates thecomparative performance in finite samples of corrected score test statistics.

On equilibria in duopolies with finite strategy spaces

We will call a game a reachable (pure strategy) equilibria game if startingfrom any strategy by any player, by a sequence of best-response moves weare able to reach a (pure strategy) equilibrium. We give a characterizationof all finite strategy space duopolies with reachable equilibria. Wedescribe some applications of the sufficient conditions of the characterization.

On the impact of fundamentals, liquidity and coordination on market stability

We develop a coordination game to model interactions betweenfundamentals and liquidity during unstable periods in financial markets.We then propose a flexible econometric framework for estimationof the model and analysis of its quantitative implications. The specificempirical application is carry trades in the yen dollar market, includingthe turmoil of 1998. We find a generally very deep market, withlow information disparities amongst agents. We observe occasionallyepisodes of market fragility, or turmoil with up by the escalator, downby the elevator patterns in prices. The key role of strategic behaviorin the econometric model is also confirmed.