Structural unemployment

Structural unemployment is due to mismatch between available jobs and workers.We formalize this concept in a simple model of a segmented labor market with searchfrictions within segments. Worker mobility, job mobility and wage bargaining costsacross segments generate structural unemployment. We estimate the contribution ofthese costs to fluctuations in US unemployment, operationalizing segments as statesor industries. Most structural unemployment is due to wage bargaining costs, whichare large but nevertheless contribute little to unemployment fluctuations. Structuralunemployment is as cyclical as overall unemployment and no more persistent, bothin the current and in previous recessions.

The effects of employment uncertainty and wealth shocks on the labor supply and claiming behavior of older American workers

Unemployment rates in developed countries have recently reached levels not seenin a generation, and workers of all ages are facing increasing probabilities of losingtheir jobs and considerable losses in accumulated assets. These events likely increasethe reliance that most older workers will have on public social insurance programs,exactly at a time that public finances are suffering from a large drop in contributions.Our paper explicitly accounts for employment uncertainty and unexpectedwealth shocks, something that has been relatively overlooked in the literature, butthat has grown in importance in recent years. Using administrative and householdlevel data we empirically characterize a life-cycle model of retirement and claimingdecisions in terms of the employment, wage, health, and mortality uncertainty facedby individuals. Our benchmark model explains with great accuracy the strikinglyhigh proportion of individuals who claim benefits exactly at the Early RetirementAge, while still explaining the increased claiming hazard at the Normal RetirementAge. We also discuss some policy experiments and their interplay with employmentuncertainty. Additionally, we analyze the effects of negative wealth shocks on thelabor supply and claiming decisions of older Americans. Our results can explainwhy early claiming has remained very high in the last years even as the early retirementpenalties have increased substantially compared with previous periods, andwhy labor force participation has remained quite high for older workers even in themidst of the worse employment crisis in decades.

Gender gaps in performance: Evidence from young lawyers

This paper documents and studies the gender gap in performance among associatelawyers in the United States. Unlike most high-skilled professions, the legal professionhas widely-used objective methods to measure and reward lawyers' productivity: thenumber of hours billed to clients and the amount of new-client revenue generated. Wefind clear evidence of a gender gap in annual performance with respect to bothmeasures. Male lawyers bill ten-percent more hours and bring in more than double thenew-client revenue. We show that the differential impact across genders in the presenceof young children and the differences in aspirations to become a law-firm partneraccount for a large part of the difference in performance. These performance gaps haveimportant consequences for gender gaps in earnings. While individual and firmcharacteristics explain up to 50 percent of earnings gap, the inclusion of performancemeasures explains most of the remainder.

The role of awareness, information gathering and processing in school choice

This paper studies the determinants of school choice, focusing on the role of information. Weconsider how parents' search efforts and their capacity to process information (i.e., tocorrectly assess schools) affect the quality of the schools they choose for their children. Usinga novel dataset, we are able to identify parents' awareness of schools in their neighborhoodand measure their capacity to rank the quality of the school with respect to the officialrankings. We find that parents education and wealth are important factors in determiningtheir level of school awareness and information gathering. Moreover, these search effortshave important consequences in terms of the quality of school choice.

Predictability of drug expenditures: An application using morbidity data

The growth of pharmaceutical expenditure and its prediction is a major concern for policy makers and health care managers. This paper explores different predictive models to estimate future drug expenses, using demographic and morbidity individual information from an integrated healthcare delivery organization in Catalonia for years 2002 and 2003. The morbidity information consists of codified health encounters grouped through the Clinical Risk Groups (CRGs). We estimate pharmaceutical costs using several model specifications, and CRGs as risk adjusters, providing an alternative way of obtaining high predictive power comparable to other estimations of drug expenditures in the literature. These results have clear implications for the use of risk adjustment and CRGs in setting the premiums for pharmaceutical benefits.

How important is the intensive margin of labor adjustment?

Using new quarterly data for hours worked in OECD countries, Ohanian and Raffo (2011) argue that in many OECD countries, particularly in Europe, hours per worker are quantitatively important as an intensive margin of labor adjustment, possibly because labor market frictions are higher than in the US. I argue that this conclusion is not supported by the data. Using the same data on hours worked, I find evidence that labor market frictions are higher in Europe than in the US, like Ohanian and Raffo, but also that these frictions seem to affect the intensive margin at least as much as the extensive margin of labor adjustment.

The effects of structural reforms on productivity and profitability enhancing reallocation: Evidence from Colombia

Estimates for the U.S. suggest that at least in some sectors productivity enhancing reallocationis the dominant factor in accounting for producitivity growth. An open question, particularlyrelevant for developing countries, is whether reallocation is always productivity enhancing. Itmay be that imperfect competition or other barriers to competitive environments imply that thereallocation process is not fully e?cient in these countries. Using a unique plant-levellongitudinal dataset for Colombia for the period 1982-1998, we explore these issues byexamining the interaction between market allocation, and productivity and profitability.Moreover, given the important trade, labor and financial market reforms in Colombia during theearly 1990's, we explore whether and how the contribution of reallocation changed over theperiod of study. Our data permit measurement of plant-level quantities and prices. Takingadvantage of the rich structure of our price data, we propose a sequential mehodology to estimateproductivity and demand shocks at the plant level. First, we estimate total factor productivity(TFP) with plant-level physical output data, where we use downstream demand to instrumentinputs. We then turn to estimating demand shocks and mark-ups with plant-level price data, usingTFP to instrument for output in the inversedemand equation. We examine the evolution of thedistributions of TFP and demand shocks in response to the market reforms in the 1990's. We findthat market reforms are associated with rising overall productivity that is largely driven byreallocation away from low- and towards highproductivity businesses. In addition, we find thatthe allocation of activity across businesses is less driven by demand factors after reforms. Wefind that the increase in aggregate productivity post-reform is entirely accounted for by theimproved allocation of activity.

How accurate are surveyed preferences for public policies? Evidence from a unique institutional setup

Opinion polls are widely used to capture public sentiments on a varietyof issues. If citizens are unwilling to reveal certain policy preferences toothers, opinion polls may fail to characterize population preferences accurately.The innovation of this paper is to use unique data to measurebiases in opinion polls for a broad range of policies. I combine data on184 referenda held in Switzerland between 1987 and 2007, with postballotsurveys that ask for each proposal how the citizens voted. Thedifference between stated preferences in the survey and revealed preferences at the ballot box provides a direct measure of bias in opinion polls.I find that these biases vary by policy areas, with the largest ones occurring in policies on immigration, international integration, and votesinvolving liberal/conservative attitudes. Also, citizens show a tendencyto respond in accordance to the majority.

Research joint ventures in an international economy

D'Aspremont and Jacquemin's (1988) model is extended to studyalternative configurations of research agreements in a two--country integratedworld economy. Under unambiguous conditions on spillovers we show that:1) Allowing national firms to cooperate in R\&D confers them an advantageover foreign rivals, an effect similar to R\&D subsidies. 2) In a policygame, each government would allow national cooperative agreements. 3) Contraryto other trade policies which lead to a ``prisoners' dilemma'' result,welfare in both countries increases when they both allow R\&D cooperation.4) Welfare is even higher if a generalized (international) coalition isformed.

Turnout, political preferences and information: Experimental evidence from Perú

Electoral institutions that encourage citizens to vote are widely used around the world. Yet littleis known about the effects of such institutions on voter participation and the composition of the electorate.In this paper, I combine a field experiment with a change in Peruvian voting laws to identify theeffect of monetary (dis-)incentives on voting. Using the random variation in the fine for abstention andan objective measure of turnout at the individual level, I estimate the elasticity of voting with respectto cost to be -0.21. Consistent with the theoretical model presented, the reduction in turnout inducedby the reduction in the fine is driven by voters who (i) are in the center of the political spectrum, (ii)are less interested in politics, and (iii) hold less political information. However, voters who respondto changes in the cost of abstention do not have different preferences for policies than those who voteregardless of the cost. Further, involvement in politics, as measured by the decision to acquire politicalinformation, seems to be independent of the level of the fine. Additional results indicate that thereduction in the fine does not affect the incidence of vote buying, but increases the price paid for avote.

Do Spanish informal caregivers come to the rescue of dependent people with formal care unmet needs?

This paper analyses the effect of unmet formal care needs on informal caregiving hours in Spain using the two wavesof the Informal Support Survey (1994, 2004). Testing for double sample selection from formal care receipt and theemergence of unmet needs provides evidence that the omission of either variable would causes underestimation of thenumber of informal caregiving hours. After controlling for these two factors the number of hours of care increaseswith both the degree of dependency and unmet needs. More importantly, in the presence of unmet needs, the numberof informal caregiving hours increases when some formal care is received. This result refutes the substitution modeland supports complementarity or task specificity between both types of care. For a given combination of formal careand unmet needs, informal caregiving hours increased between 1994 and 2004. Finally, in the model for 2004, theselection term associated with the unmet needs equation is larger than that of the formal care equation, suggestingthat using the number of formal care recipients as a quality indicator may be confounding, if we do not complete thisinformation with other quality indicators.

Interviews and adverse selection

Interviewing in professional labor markets is a costly process for firms. Moreover, poor screening can have a persistent negative impact on firms bottom lines and candidates careers. In a simple dynamic model where firms can pay a cost to interview applicants who have private information about their own ability, potentially large inefficiencies arise from information-based unemployment, where able workers are rejected by firms because of their lack of offers in previous interviews. This effect may make the market less efficient than random matching. We show that the first best can be achieved using either a mechanism with transfers or one without transfers.