Competition in notch signaling with cis enriches cell fate decisions

Notch signaling is involved in cell fate choices during the embryonic development of Metazoa. Commonly, Notch signaling arises from the binding of the Notch receptor to its ligands in adjacent cells driving cell-to-cell communication. Yet, cell-autonomous control of Notch signaling through both ligand-dependent and ligand-independent mechanisms is known to occur as well. Examples include Notch signaling arising in the absence of ligand binding, and cis-inhibition of Notch signaling by titration of the Notch receptor upon binding to its ligands within a single cell. Increasing experimental evidences support that the binding of the Notch receptor with its ligands within a cell (cis-interactions) can also trigger a cell-autonomous Notch signal (cis-signaling), whose potential effects on cell fate decisions and patterning remain poorly understood. To address this question, herein we mathematically and computationally investigate the cell states arising from the combination of cis-signaling with additional Notch signaling sources, which are either cell-autonomous or involve cell-to-cell communication. Our study shows that cis-signaling can switch from driving cis-activation to effectively perform cis-inhibition and identifies under which conditions this switch occurs. This switch relies on the competition between Notch signaling sources, which share the same receptor but differ in their signaling efficiency. We propose that the role of cis-interactions and their signaling on fine-grained patterning and cell fate decisions is dependent on whether they drive cis-inhibition or cis-activation, which could be controlled during development. Specifically, cis-inhibition and not cis-activation facilitates patterning and enriches it by modulating the ratio of cells in the high-ligand expression state, by enabling additional periodic patterns like stripes and by allowing localized patterning highly sensitive to the precursor state and cell-autonomous bistability. Our study exemplifies the complexity of regulations when multiple signalng sources share the same receptor and provides the tools for their characterization.

Prices versus exams as strategic instruments for competing universities

In this paper we investigate the optimal choice of prices and/or exams by universities in the presence of credit constraints. We first compare the optimal behavior of a public, welfare maximizing, monopoly and a private, profit maximizing, monopoly. Then we model competition between a public and a private institution and investigate the new role of exams/prices in this environment. We find that, under certain circumstances, the public university may have an interest to raise tuition fees from minimum levels if it cares for global welfare. This will be the case provided that (i) the private institution has higher quality and uses only prices to select applicants, or (ii) the private institution has lower quality and uses also exams to select students. When this is the case, there are efficiency grounds for raising public prices

Liderazgo y dirección de empresas en el s. XXI

Peer-reviewed

When decisions of others matter to me: an electrophysiological analysis.

Background: Actions of others may have immediate consequences for oneself. We probed the neural responses associated with the observation of another person"s action using event-related potentials in a modified gambling task. In this task a"performer" bet either a higher or lower number and could win or lose this amount. Three different groups of"observers" were also studied. The first (neutral) group simply observed the performer"s action, which had no consequences for the observers. In the second (parallel) group, wins/losses of the performer were paralleled by similar wins and losses by the observer. In the third (reverse) group, wins of the performer led to a loss of the observer and vice versa. Results: ERPs of the performers showed a mediofrontal feedback related negativity (FRN) to losses. The neutral and parallel observer groups did similarly show an FRN response to the performer"s losses with a topography indistinguishable from that seen in the performers. In the reverse group, however, the FRN occurred for wins of the performer which translated to losses for the observer. Conclusions: Taking into account previous experiments, we suggest that the FRN response in observers is driven by two evaluative processes (a) related to the benefit/loss for oneself and (b) related to the benefit/loss of another person

The Role of Firm Size in Training Provision Decisions: evidence from Spain

The level of training provided by small firms to their employees is below that provided by their larger counterparts. The provision of firm-related training is believed to be associated to certain characteristics of the firm. In this paper we argue that small firms provide fewer training opportunities as they are less likely to be associated with these characteristics than large firms. The suitability of estimating training decisions as a double-decision process is examined here: first, a firm has to decide whether to provide training or not and, second, having decided to do so, the amount of training to provide. The differences in training provision between small and large firms are decomposed in order to analyse the individual contribution of these characteristics to explaining the gap. The results show that small firms face greater obstacles in accessing training and that the main reasons for that are related to their technological activity and the geographical scope of the market in which they operate.

Liderazgo y dirección de empresas en el s. XXI

Peer-reviewed

Imperfectly informed voters and strategic extremism

We analyze a unidimensional model of two-candidate electoral competition where voters have im- perfect information about the candidates' policy proposals, that is, voters cannot observe the exact policy proposals of the candidates but only which candidate offers the most leftist/rightist platform. We assume that candidates are purely office motivated and that one candidate enjoys a valence advan- tage over the other. We characterize the unique Sequential Equilibrium in very-weakly undominated strategies of the game. In this equilibrium the behavior of the two candidates tends to maximum extremism, due to the voters' lack of information. But it may converge or diverge depending on the size of the advantage. For small values of the advantage candidates converge to the extreme policy most preferred by the median and for large values of the advantage candidates strategies diverge: each candidate specializes in a different extreme policy. These results are robust to the introduction of a proportion of well informed voters. In this case the degree of extremism decreases when the voters become more informed.

Estratègies de cura i presa de decisions en persones grans amb dependència ingressades en una unitat geriàtrica d'atenció intermèdia : estudi descriptiu

Aquest estudi té com objectiu observar les relacions entre les estratègies de cura (formal, informal, mixta) que fan servir els cuidadors de persones grans dependents, la seva situació social i les seves motivacions per la decisió respecte a com fan la cura. L’estat del tema destaca el predomini de les cures informals sobre les formals en els models de benestar mediterranis i la rellevància de la interacció entre factors personals socioculturals i les polítiques socials en la presa de decisions individuals sobre la cura de la dependència. La llei de la dependència, de recent implementació a l’Estat espanyol, ha universalitzat l’accés als recursos formals, creant un nou paradigma d’interacció cuidadors-recursos. Es tracta d’un estudi observacional, transversal, descriptiu de tipus mixt quantitatiu/qualitatiu realitzat a partir d’entrevistes individuals als cuidadors de dependents ingressats en una unitat geriàtrica d’atenció intermèdia. Es recullen dades sobre el context sociofamiliar, l’estratègia de cura, l’autopercepció i les motivacions. Els resultats mostren que els cuidadors combinen prestacions econòmiques i serveis (públics i privats) per adaptar al màxim l’estratègia a les condicions del dependent i a les seves pròpies. Tenen la convicció generalitzada que l’atenció cal fer-la al domicili per motius de reciprocitat i respecte a la persona cuidada. El pas a l’atenció residencial és una decisió molt difícil pels cuidadors. La implantació de la llei de la dependència ha normalitzat la relació entre cuidadors i recursos formals, però la burocratització i la insuficiència de l’oferta de serveis no afavoreixen canvis substancials en la provisió de l’ajut, que continua essent majoritàriament informal. La millora en la percepció de continuïtat d’atenció entre el domicili i la residència, i també en la gestió i l’oferta de serveis formals públics es presenten com a reptes de treball importants al nostre país.