A model of collateral, investment and adverse selection

This paper characterizes the relationship between entrepreneurial wealth and aggregate investmentunder adverse selection. Its main finding is that such a relationship need not bemonotonic. In particular, three results emerge from the analysis: (i) pooling equilibria, in whichinvestment is independent of entrepreneurial wealth, are more likely to arise when entrepreneurialwealth is relatively low; (ii) separating equilibria, in which investment is increasing inentrepreneurial wealth, are most likely to arise when entrepreneurial wealth is relatively highand; (iii) for a given interest rate, an increase in entrepreneurial wealth may generate a discontinuousfall in investment.

Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information

This paper studies the equilibrating process of several implementationmechanisms using naive adaptive dynamics. We show that the dynamics convergeand are stable, for the canonical mechanism of implementation in Nash equilibrium.In this way we cast some doubt on the criticism of ``complexity'' commonlyused against this mechanism. For mechanisms that use more refined equilibrium concepts,the dynamics converge but are not stable. Some papers in the literatureon implementation with refined equilibrium concepts have claimed that themechanisms they propose are ``simple'' and implement ``everything'' (incontrast with the canonical mechanism). The fact that some of these ``simple''mechanisms have unstable equilibria suggests that these statements shouldbe interpreted with some caution.

Effects of convection on the removal of the multiplicity of stable states in one-dimensional vertical models

Here I develop a model of a radiative-convective atmosphere with both radiative and convective schemes highly simplified. The atmospheric absorption of radiation at selective wavelengths makes use of constant mass absorption coefficients in finite width spectral bands. The convective regime is introduced by using a prescribed lapse rate in the troposphere. The main novelty of the radiative-convective model developed here is that it is solved without using any angular approximation for the radiation field. The solution obtained in the purely radiation mode (i. e. with convection ignored) leads to multiple equilibria of stable states, being very similar to some results recently found in simple models of planetary atmospheres. However, the introduction of convective processes removes the multiple equilibria of stable states. This shows the importance of taking convective processes into account even for qualitative analyses of planetary atmosphere

On the role of non-equilibrium focal points as coordination devices

Considering a pure coordination game with a large number of equivalentequilibria, we argue, first, that a focal point that is itself not a Nash equilibriumand is Pareto dominated by all Nash equilibria, may attract the players'choices. Second, we argue that such a non-equilibrium focal point may act asan equilibrium selection device that the players use to coordinate on a closelyrelated small subset of Nash equilibria. We present theoretical as well asexperimental support for these two new roles of focal points as coordinationdevices.

Heterogeneous discounting in consumption-investment problems. Time consistent solutions

[cat] En aquest treball s'analitza un model estocàstic en temps continu en el que l'agent decisor descompta les utilitats instantànies i la funció final amb taxes de preferència temporal constants però diferents. En aquest context es poden modelitzar problemes en els quals, quan el temps s'acosta al moment final, la valoració de la funció final incrementa en comparació amb les utilitats instantànies. Aquest tipus d'asimetria no es pot descriure ni amb un descompte estàndard ni amb un variable. Per tal d'obtenir solucions consistents temporalment es deriva l'equació de programació dinàmica estocàstica, les solucions de la qual són equilibris Markovians. Per a aquest tipus de preferències temporals, s'estudia el model clàssic de consum i inversió (Merton, 1971) per a les funcions d'utilitat del tipus CRRA i CARA, comparant els equilibris Markovians amb les solucions inconsistents temporalment. Finalment es discuteix la introducció del temps final aleatori.

Heterogeneous discounting in consumption-investment problems. Time consistent solutions

[cat] En aquest treball s'analitza un model estocàstic en temps continu en el que l'agent decisor descompta les utilitats instantànies i la funció final amb taxes de preferència temporal constants però diferents. En aquest context es poden modelitzar problemes en els quals, quan el temps s'acosta al moment final, la valoració de la funció final incrementa en comparació amb les utilitats instantànies. Aquest tipus d'asimetria no es pot descriure ni amb un descompte estàndard ni amb un variable. Per tal d'obtenir solucions consistents temporalment es deriva l'equació de programació dinàmica estocàstica, les solucions de la qual són equilibris Markovians. Per a aquest tipus de preferències temporals, s'estudia el model clàssic de consum i inversió (Merton, 1971) per a les funcions d'utilitat del tipus CRRA i CARA, comparant els equilibris Markovians amb les solucions inconsistents temporalment. Finalment es discuteix la introducció del temps final aleatori.

Heterogeneity, selection and labor market disparities

We study the incentives to acquire skill in a model where heterogeneous firmsand workers interact in a labor market characterized by matching frictions and costlyscreening. When effort in acquiring skill raises both the mean and the variance of theresulting ability distribution, multiple equilibria may arise. In the high-effort equilibrium, heterogeneity in ability is sufficiently large to induce firms to select the bestworkers, thereby confirming the belief that effort is important for finding good jobs.In the low-effort equilibrium, ability is not sufficiently dispersed to justify screening,thereby confirming the belief that effort is not so important. The model has implications for wage inequality, the distribution of firm characteristics, sorting patternsbetween firms and workers, and unemployment rates that can help explaining observedcross-country variation in socio-economic and labor market outcomes.

Regional income inequality in Italy in the long run (1871–2001). Patterns and determinants

The chapter presents up-to-date estimates of Italy’s regional GDP, with the present borders, in ten-year benchmarks from 1871 to 2001, and proposes a new interpretative hypothesis based on long-lasting socio-institutional differences. The inverted U-shape of income inequality is confirmed: rising divergence until the midtwentieth century, then convergence. However, the latter was limited to the centrenorth: Italy was divided into three parts by the time regional inequality peaked, in 1951, and appears to have been split into two halves by 2001. As a consequence of the falling back of the south, from 1871 to 2001 we record σ-divergence across Italy’s regions, i.e. an increase in dispersion, and sluggish β-convergence. Geographical factors and the market size played a minor role: against them are both the evidence that most of the differences in GDP are due to employment rather than to productivity and the observed GDP patterns of many regions. The gradual converging of regional GDPs towards two equilibria instead follows social and institutional differences − in the political and economic institutions and in the levels of human and social capital – which originated in pre-unification states and did not die (but in part even increased) in postunification Italy.

Equilibrium points and central configurations for the Lennard-Jones 2-and 3-body problems

Abstract. In this paper we study the relative equilibria and their stability for a system of three point particles moving under the action of a Lennard{Jones potential. A central con guration is a special position of the particles where the position and acceleration vectors of each particle are proportional, and the constant of proportionality is the same for all particles. Since the Lennard{Jones potential depends only on the mutual distances among the particles, it is invariant under rotations. In a rotating frame the orbits coming from central con gurations become equilibrium points, the relative equilibria. Due to the form of the potential, the relative equilibria depend on the size of the system, that is, depend strongly of the momentum of inertia I. In this work we characterize the relative equilibria, we nd the bifurcation values of I for which the number of relative equilibria is changing, we also analyze the stability of the relative equilibria.

One-seller assignment markets with multi-unit demands

We consider one-seller assignment markets with multi-unit demands and prove that the associated game is buyers-submodular. Therefore the core is non-empty and it has a lattice structure which contains the allocation where every buyer receives his marginal contribution. We prove that in this kind of market, every pairwise-stable outcome is associated to a competitive equilibrium and viceversa. We study conditions under which the buyers-optimal and the seller-optimal core allocations are competitive equilibrium payoff vectors. Moreover, we characterize the markets for which the core coincidences with the set of competitive equilibria payoff vectors. When agents behave strategically, we introduce a procedure that implements the buyers-optimal core allocation as the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome.