L'Impacte dels diaris gratuïts sobre els diaris de pagament

Com a manera d’analitzar l’efecte de les innovacions que contínuamentexperimenta el món actual, hem cregut interessant analitzar l’impacte deldiaris gratuïts o premsa gratuïta sobre els diaris de pagament o premsatradicional, ja que creiem que, tot i que tan sols representa un petit canvien un àmbit molt concret com és el de la premsa, pot significar un mirall enel que fixar-se per altres sectors d’àmbit tradicionalment privat.Avui dia, des de fa ja uns anys, quan agafes el metro o l’autobús cada matíper anar al treball o a la universitat veiem que gairebé tothom té und’aquests diaris gratuïts a la mà (Qué!, Metro, 20 Minutos, ADN...) que elshi acaben de donar a l’entrada de l’estació. Veient això s’ens van plantejaruna sèrie de preguntes: la gent que llegeix diaris gratuïts, llegeix també lapremsa tradicional? L’aparició dels diaris gratuïts, ha fet reduir el nombre delectors de premsa de pagament? El que volem esbrinar és si aquests noustipus de diaris són una amenaça o més aviat són complementaris als diarisde pagament. La pregunta que volem respondre és: Quin ha estat l’impactedels diaris gratuïts sobre els diaris de pagament.Al llarg del treball veurem que l’entrada al mercat d’aquest nou tipus depremsa no ha suposat una amenaça pels diaris tradicionals, com potsemblar en un principi. Podrem comprovar que pel que fa al nombre delectors l’impacte és gairebé nul, és a dir, és veritat que els diaris depagament han patit un estancament en quant a nombre de lectors però noha afectat quasi bé gens als beneficis d’aquests. Tambè veurem, que és enel terreny de la publicitat on realment competeixen els dos tipus de diarisaixí com tambè, que la situació és diferent al nostre entorn respecte a laresta del món.

Government Spending and Re-election

Does additional government spending improve the electoral chances of incumbent political parties? This paper provides the first quasi-experimental evidence on this question. Our research design exploits discontinuities in federal funding to local governments in Brazil around several population cutoffs over the period 1982-1985. We find that extra fiscal transfers resulted in a 20% increase in local government spending per capita, and an increase of about 10 percentage points in the re-election probability of local incumbent parties. We also find positive effects of the government spending on education outcomes and earnings, which we interpret as indirect evidence of public service improvements. Together, our results provide evidence that electoral rewards encourage incumbents to spend part of additional revenues on public services valued by voters, a finding in line with agency models of electoral accountability.

What do outside experts bring to a committee? Evidence from the Bank of England

We test whether outside experts have information not available to insiders by usingthe voting record of the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee. Memberswith more private information should vote more often against conventional wisdom,which we measure as the average belief of market economists about future interest rates. We find evidence that external members indeed have information notavailable to internals, but also use a quasi-natural experiment to show they mayexaggerate their expertise to obtain reappointment. This implies that an optimalcommittee, even outside monetary policy, should potentially include outsiders, butneeds to manage career concerns.

Price increase and stability with new entries in Cournot markets

It is widely accepted in the literature about the classicalCournot oligopoly model that the loss of quasi competitiveness is linked,in the long run as new firms enter the market, to instability of the equilibrium. In this paper, though, we present a model in which a stableunique symmetric equilibrium is reached for any number of oligopolistsas industry price increases with each new entry. Consequently, the suspicion that non quasi competitiveness implies, in the long run, instabilityis proved false.

The impact of interest-rate subsidies on long-term household debt: Evidence from a large program

The responsiveness of long-term household debt to the interest rate is acrucial parameter for assessing the effectiveness of public policies aimedat promoting specific types of saving. This paper estimates the effect ofa reform of Credito Bonificado, a large program in Portugal that subsidizedmortgage interest rates, on long-term household debt. The reform establisheda ceiling in the price of the house that could be financed through theprogram, and provides plausibly exogenous variation in incentives. Usinga unique dataset of matched household survey data and administrative recordsof debt, we document a large decrease in the probability of signing a newloan after the removal of the subsidy.

The role of institutions in the contractual process

Human beings increase their productivity by specializingtheir resources and exchanging their products. Theorganization of exchange is costly, however, becausespecialized activities need coordination and incentiveshave to be aligned. This work first describes how theseexchanges are organized in an institutional environment.It then focuses on the dual effect of this environment-as with any other specialized resource, institutions maybe used for expropriation purposes. They enjoyspecialization advantages in safeguarding exchange butthey also make possible new forms of opportunism,causing new costs of exchange. Three perverse tendenciesare identified:In the legal field, there is a surplus ofmandatory rules and, at the same time, a deficit in default rules. Second, courts activity is biased againstthe quasi-judicial role of the parties and the market. Third, Market enforcement is based on reputationalassets that are badly exposed to opportunism.

The effect of divorce laws on divorce rates in Europe

This paper analyzes a panel of 18 European countries spanning from 1950 to 2003 toexamine the extent to which the legal reforms leading to easier divorce that took placeduring the second half of the 20th century have contributed to the increase in divorce rates across Europe. We use a quasi-experimental set-up and exploit the different timing of the reforms in divorce laws across countries. We account for unobserved country-specificfactors by introducing country fixed effects, and we include country-specific trends tocontrol for time-varying factors at the country level that may be correlated with divorcerates and divorce laws, such as changing social norms or slow moving demographictrends. We find that the reforms were followed by significant increases in divorce rates.Overall, we estimate that the introduction of no-fault, unilateral divorce increased thedivorce rate by about 1, a sizeable effect given the average rate of 4.2 divorces per 1,000married people in 2002.

Contractual allocation of decision rights and incentives: The case of automobile distribution

We analyze empirically the allocation of rights and monetary incentives in automobile franchise contracts. These contracts substantially restrict the decision rights of dealers and grant manufacturers extensive contractual completion and enforcement powers, converting the manufacturers, de facto, in a sort of quasi-judiciary instance. Variation in the allocation of decision rights andincentive intensity is explained by the incidence of moral hazard in the relation. In particular, when the cost of dealer moral hazard is higher and the risk of manufactureropportunism is lower, manufacturers enjoy more discretion in determining the performance required from their dealers and in using mechanisms such as monitoring, termination and monetary incentives to ensure such performance is provided. We also explore the existence of interdependencies between the different elements of the system. and find some complementarities between completion and termination rights, and between monitoring rights and the intensity of incentives.

Social preferences: Some simple tests and a new model

Departures from pure self interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of "social preferences". We conduct experiments on simple two-person and three-person games with binary choices that test these theories more directly than the array of games conventionally considered. Our experiments show strong support for the prevalence of "quasi-maximin" preferences: People sacrifice to increase the payoffs for all recipients, but especially for the lowest-payoff recipients. People are also motivated by reciprocity: While people are reluctant to sacrifice to reciprocate good or bad behavior beyond what they would sacrifice for neutral parties, they withdraw willingness to sacrifice to achieve a fair outcome when others are themselves unwilling to sacrifice. Some participants are averse to getting different payoffs than others, but based on our experiments and reinterpretation of previous experiments we argue that behavior that has been presented as "difference aversion" in recent papers is actually a combination of reciprocal and quasi-maximin motivations. We formulate a model in which each player is willing to sacrifice to allocate the quasi-maximin allocation only to those players also believed to be pursuing the quasi-maximin allocation, and may sacrifice to punish unfair players.

On moments and tail behaviors of storage processes

We study the existence of moments and the tail behaviour of the densitiesof storage processes. We give sufficient conditions for existence andnon-existence of moments using the integrability conditions ofsubmultiplicative functions with respect to Lévy measures. Then, we studythe asymptotical behavior of the tails of these processes using the concaveor convex envelope of the release rate function.

Money and prices in models of bounded rationality in high inflation economies

This paper studies the short run correlation of inflation and money growth. We study whether a model of learning can do better than a model of rational expectations, we focus our study on countries of high inflation. We take the money process as an exogenous variable, estimated from the data through a switching regime process. We findthat the rational expectations model and the model of learning both offer very good explanations for the joint behavior of money and prices.

Almost sure testability of classes of densities

Let a class $\F$ of densities be given. We draw an i.i.d.\ sample from a density $f$ which may or may not be in $\F$. After every $n$, one must make a guess whether $f \in \F$ or not. A class is almost surely testable if there exists such a testing sequence such that for any $f$, we make finitely many errors almost surely. In this paper, several results are given that allowone to decide whether a class is almost surely testable. For example, continuity and square integrability are not testable, but unimodality, log-concavity, and boundedness by a given constant are.

Audit quality: Attributes, private safeguards and the role of regulation

This article examines the private mechanisms used to safeguard quality in auditing, with a view to defining rules capable of facilitating the performance of market forces. An outline is given of a general theory of private quality assurance in auditing, based on the use of quasi-rents to self-enforce quality dimensions. Particular attention is paid to the role of fee income diversification as the key ingredient of private incentives for audit quality. The role of public regulation is then situated in the context defined by the presence of these safeguard mechanisms. This helps in defining the content of rules and the function of regulatory bodies in facilitating and strengthening the protective operation of the market. By making sense of the interaction between regulation, quality attributes and private safeguards, the analysis helps to evaluate the relative merits of different regulatory options.

Recurrent hyperinflations and learning

This paper uses a model of boundedly rational learning to accountfor the observations of recurrent hyperinflations in the lastdecade. We study a standard monetary model where the fullyrational expectations assumption is replaced by a formaldefinition of quasi-rational learning. The model under learningis able to match remarkably well some crucial stylized factsobserved during the recurrent hyperinflations experienced byseveral countries in the 80's. We argue that, despite being asmall departure from rational expectations, quasi-rationallearning does not preclude falsifiability of the model and itdoes not violate reasonable rationality requirements.

Física i esport: estudi d'un moviment real mitjançant vídeo

Treball de recerca realitzat per alumnes d’ensenyament secundari i guardonat amb un Premi CIRIT per fomentar l'esperit científic del Jovent l’any 2010. L’objectiu inicial ha estat l'anàlisi mitjançant una càmera de vídeo d'un moviment parabòlic real, un salt de longitud, per intentar combinar física i esport. Però, com quasi sempre quan un investiga de forma rigorosa i atenta, es va obrir una porta, un nou objectiu. La comparació entre salts d'un amateur i uns professionals ens va permetre descobrir la tècnica dels saltadors, que d'altra banda complicava el moviment. El descobriment que amb una petita implementació tècnica podíem millorar la marca de salt va reorientar el treball i li va donar la vessant esportiva desitjada. S’ha seguit una metodologia d'observació i anàlisi experimental i d'aplicació del coneixement fent servir una tècnica, encara que no nova, poc utilitzada en treballs d'aquests nivells, el tractament de vídeos com a sensors cinemàtics. A través del processament fotograma a fotograma amb el software MultiLab s'han pogut identificar les variables involucrades en l'optimització del salt; s'han comparat les evolucions en els diferents salts i s'ha après d'aquest anàlisi per aplicar-ho a la millora. No cal oblidar una primera recerca documental, incloses les entrevistes a professionals.