Random assignment of intervention points in two phase single-case designs: data-division-specific distributions

The present study explores the statistical properties of a randomization test based on the random assignment of the intervention point in a two-phase (AB) single-case design. The focus is on randomization distributions constructed with the values of the test statistic for all possible random assignments and used to obtain p-values. The shape of those distributions is investigated for each specific data division defined by the moment in which the intervention is introduced. Another aim of the study consisted in testing the detection of inexistent effects (i.e., production of false alarms) in autocorrelated data series, in which the assumption of exchangeability between observations may be untenable. In this way, it was possible to compare nominal and empirical Type I error rates in order to obtain evidence on the statistical validity of the randomization test for each individual data division. The results suggest that when either of the two phases has considerably less measurement times, Type I errors may be too probable and, hence, the decision making process to be carried out by applied researchers may be jeopardized.

A comparison of mean phase difference and generalized least squares for analyzing single-case data

The present study focuses on single-case data analysis and specifically on two procedures for quantifying differences between baseline and treatment measurements The first technique tested is based on generalized least squares regression analysis and is compared to a proposed non-regression technique, which allows obtaining similar information. The comparison is carried out in the context of generated data representing a variety of patterns (i.e., independent measurements, different serial dependence underlying processes, constant or phase-specific autocorrelation and data variability, different types of trend, and slope and level change). The results suggest that the two techniques perform adequately for a wide range of conditions and researchers can use both of them with certain guarantees. The regression-based procedure offers more efficient estimates, whereas the proposed non-regression procedure is more sensitive to intervention effects. Considering current and previous findings, some tentative recommendations are offered to applied researchers in order to help choosing among the plurality of single-case data analysis techniques.

A new aggregation method for strategic decision making and its application in assignment theory

A new aggregation method for decision making is presented by using induced aggregation operators and the index of maximum and minimum level. Its main advantage is that it can assess complex reordering processes in the aggregation that represent complex attitudinal characters of the decision maker such as psychological or personal factors. A wide range of properties and particular cases of this new approach are studied. A further generalization by using hybrid averages and immediate weights is also presented. The key issue in this approach against the previous model is that we can use the weighted average and the ordered weighted average in the same formulation. Thus, we are able to consider the subjective attitude and the degree of optimism of the decision maker in the decision process. The paper ends with an application in a decision making problem based on the use of the assignment theory.

The Uncertain generalized probabilistic weighted average and its application in the theory of expertons

A new model for dealing with decision making under risk by considering subjective and objective information in the same formulation is here presented. The uncertain probabilistic weighted average (UPWA) is also presented. Its main advantage is that it unifies the probability and the weighted average in the same formulation and considering the degree of importance that each case has in the analysis. Moreover, it is able to deal with uncertain environments represented in the form of interval numbers. We study some of its main properties and particular cases. The applicability of the UPWA is also studied and it is seen that it is very broad because all the previous studies that use the probability or the weighted average can be revised with this new approach. Focus is placed on a multi-person decision making problem regarding the selection of strategies by using the theory of expertons.

Wave-height hazard analysis in Eastern Coast of Spain : Bayesian approach using generalized Pareto distribution

Standard practice of wave-height hazard analysis often pays little attention to the uncertainty of assessed return periods and occurrence probabilities. This fact favors the opinion that, when large events happen, the hazard assessment should change accordingly. However, uncertainty of the hazard estimates is normally able to hide the effect of those large events. This is illustrated using data from the Mediterranean coast of Spain, where the last years have been extremely disastrous. Thus, it is possible to compare the hazard assessment based on data previous to those years with the analysis including them. With our approach, no significant change is detected when the statistical uncertainty is taken into account. The hazard analysis is carried out with a standard model. Time-occurrence of events is assumed Poisson distributed. The wave-height of each event is modelled as a random variable which upper tail follows a Generalized Pareto Distribution (GPD). Moreover, wave-heights are assumed independent from event to event and also independent of their occurrence in time. A threshold for excesses is assessed empirically. The other three parameters (Poisson rate, shape and scale parameters of GPD) are jointly estimated using Bayes' theorem. Prior distribution accounts for physical features of ocean waves in the Mediterranean sea and experience with these phenomena. Posterior distribution of the parameters allows to obtain posterior distributions of other derived parameters like occurrence probabilities and return periods. Predictives are also available. Computations are carried out using the program BGPE v2.0

Axiomatization of the nucl eolus of assignment games

On the domain of general assignment games (with possible reservation prices) the core is axiomatized as the unique solution satisfying two consistency principles: projection consistency and derived consistency. Also, an axiomatic characterization of the nucleolus is given as the unique solution that satisfies derived consistency and equal maximum complaint between groups. As a consequence, we obtain a geometric characterization of the nucleolus. Maschler et al. (1979) provide a geometrical characterization for the intersection of the kernel and the core of a coalitional game, showing that those allocations that lie in both sets are always the midpoint of certain bargaining range between each pair of players. In the case of the assignment game, this means that the kernel can be determined as those core allocations where the maximum amount, that can be transferred without getting outside the core, from one agent to his / her optimally matched partner equals the maximum amount that he / she can receive from this partner, also remaining inside the core. We now prove that the nucleolus of the assignment game can be characterized by requiring this bisection property be satisfied not only for optimally matched pairs but also for optimally matched coalitions. Key words: cooperative games, assignment game, core, nucleolus

Generalized synchronization in directionally coupled systems with identical individual dynamics

A simple chaotic flow is presented, which when driven by an identical copy of itself, for certain initial conditions, is able to display generalized synchronization instead of identical synchronization. Being that the drive and the response are observed in exactly the same coordinate system, generalized synchronization is demonstrated by means of the auxiliary system approach and by the conditional Lyapunov spectrum. This is interpreted in terms of changes in the structure of the system stationary points, caused by the coupling, which modify its global behavior.

Determination of the components of the gyration tensor of quartz by oblique incidence transmission two-modulator generalized ellipsometry

The two independent components of the gyration tensor of quartz, g11 and g33, have been spectroscopically measured using a transmission two-modulator generalized ellipsometer. The method is used to determine the optical activity in crystals in directions other than the optic axis, where the linear birefringence is much larger than the optical activity.

Isolation, structural assignment and total synthesis of Barmumycin

Barmumycin was isolated from an extract of the marine actinomycete Streptomyces sp. BOSC-022A and found to be cytotoxic against various human tumor cell lines. Based on preliminary one- and two-dimensional 1H- and 13C-NMR spectra, the natural compound was initially assigned the structure of macrolactone-type compound 1, which was later prepared by two different routes. However, major spectroscopic differences between isolated barmumycin and 1 led to revision of the proposed structure as E-16. Based on synthesis of this new compound, and subsequent spectroscopic comparison of it to an authentic sample of barmumycin, the structure of the natural compound was indeed confirmed as that of E-16.

Assignment markets with the same core

[spa] En el contexto de los juegos de asignación bilaterales, estudiamos el conjunto de matrices asociadas a mercados de asignación con el mismo nucleo. Se proporcionan condiciones sobre las entradas de la matriz que aseguran que los juegos de asignación asociados tienen el mismo núcleo. Se prueba que este conjunto de matrices que dan lugar al mismo núcleo forman un semirretículo con un número finito de elementos minimales y un único máximo. Se da una caracterización de estos elementos minimales. También se proporciona una condición suficiente para obtener un retículo.

Multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets: the core

[cat] En aquest treball introduïm la classe de "multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games", que generalitza la coneguda classe de jocs d’assignació de Böhm-Bawerk bilaterals a situacions amb un nombre arbitrari de sectors. Trobem els extrems del core de qualsevol multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game a partir d’un joc convex definit en el conjunt de sectors enlloc del conjunt de venedors i compradors. Addicionalment estudiem quan el core d’aquests jocs d’assignació és estable en el sentit de von Neumann-Morgenstern.

Consistency and the core of multi-sided assignment markets

[cat] En aquest treball es demostra que en el domini dels jocs d’assignació equilibrats multisectorials (Quint, 1991), el core és l’única solució no buida que satisfà derived consistency i projection consistency. També es caracteritza el core en tota la classe dels jocs d’assignació multisectorials amb els axiomes de singleness best, individual antimonotonicity i derived consistency. Com a casos particulars, s’obtenen dues noves axiomàtiques del core per als jocs d’assignació bilaterals (Shapley and Shubik, 1972).

A geometric chracterization of the nucleolus of the assignment game

Maschler et al. (1979) caracteritzen geomètricament la intersecció del kernel i del core en els jocs cooperatius, demostrant que les distribucions que pertanyen a ambdós conjunts es troben en el punt mig d’un cert rang de negociació entre parelles de jugadors. En el cas dels jocs d’assignació, aquesta caracterització vol dir que el kernel només conté aquells elements del core on el màxim que un jugador pot transferir a una parella òptima és igual al màxim que aquesta parella li pot transferir, sense sortir-se’n del core. En aquest treball demostrem que el nucleolus d’un joc d’assignació queda caracteritzat si requerim que aquesta propietat de bisecció es compleixi no només per parelles, sinó també per coalicions entre sectors aparellades òptimament.

A geometric chracterization of the nucleolus of the assignment game

Maschler et al. (1979) caracteritzen geomètricament la intersecció del kernel i del core en els jocs cooperatius, demostrant que les distribucions que pertanyen a ambdós conjunts es troben en el punt mig d’un cert rang de negociació entre parelles de jugadors. En el cas dels jocs d’assignació, aquesta caracterització vol dir que el kernel només conté aquells elements del core on el màxim que un jugador pot transferir a una parella òptima és igual al màxim que aquesta parella li pot transferir, sense sortir-se’n del core. En aquest treball demostrem que el nucleolus d’un joc d’assignació queda caracteritzat si requerim que aquesta propietat de bisecció es compleixi no només per parelles, sinó també per coalicions entre sectors aparellades òptimament.

Assignment markets with the same core

[spa] En el contexto de los juegos de asignación bilaterales, estudiamos el conjunto de matrices asociadas a mercados de asignación con el mismo nucleo. Se proporcionan condiciones sobre las entradas de la matriz que aseguran que los juegos de asignación asociados tienen el mismo núcleo. Se prueba que este conjunto de matrices que dan lugar al mismo núcleo forman un semirretículo con un número finito de elementos minimales y un único máximo. Se da una caracterización de estos elementos minimales. También se proporciona una condición suficiente para obtener un retículo.