Take-the-best and other simple strategies: Why and when they work 'well' in binary choice

The effectiveness of decision rules depends on characteristics of bothrules and environments. A theoretical analysis of environments specifiesthe relative predictive accuracies of the lexicographic rule 'take-the-best'(TTB) and other simple strategies for binary choice. We identify threefactors: how the environment weights variables; characteristics of choicesets; and error. For cases involving from three to five binary cues, TTBis effective across many environments. However, hybrids of equal weights(EW) and TTB models are more effective as environments become morecompensatory. In the presence of error, TTB and similar models do not predictmuch better than a naïve model that exploits dominance. We emphasizepsychological implications and the need for more complete theories of theenvironment that include the role of error.

Implementation, elimination of weakly dominated strategies and evolutionary dynamics

This paper is concerned with the realism of mechanisms that implementsocial choice functions in the traditional sense. Will agents actually playthe equilibrium assumed by the analysis? As an example, we study theconvergence and stability properties of Sj\"ostr\"om's (1994) mechanism, onthe assumption that boundedly rational players find their way to equilibriumusing monotonic learning dynamics and also with fictitious play. Thismechanism implements most social choice functions in economic environmentsusing as a solution concept the iterated elimination of weakly dominatedstrategies (only one round of deletion of weakly dominated strategies isneeded). There are, however, many sets of Nash equilibria whose payoffs maybe very different from those desired by the social choice function. Withmonotonic dynamics we show that many equilibria in all the sets ofequilibria we describe are the limit points of trajectories that havecompletely mixed initial conditions. The initial conditions that lead tothese equilibria need not be very close to the limiting point. Furthermore,even if the dynamics converge to the ``right'' set of equilibria, it stillcan converge to quite a poor outcome in welfare terms. With fictitious play,if the agents have completely mixed prior beliefs, beliefs and play convergeto the outcome the planner wants to implement.

Rational reasoning or adaptive behavior? Evidence from two-person beauty contest games

Many experiments have shown that human subjects do not necessarily behave in line with game theoretic assumptions and solution concepts. The reasons for this non-conformity are multiple. In this paper we study the argument whether a deviation from game theory is because subjects are rational, but doubt that others are rational as well, compared to the argument that subjects, in general, are boundedly rational themselves. To distinguish these two hypotheses, we study behavior in repeated 2-person and many-person Beauty-Contest-Games which are strategically different from one another. We analyze four different treatments and observe that convergence toward equilibrium is driven by learning through the information about the other player s choice and adaptation rather than self-initiated rational reasoning.

The minimax distortion redundancy in empirical quantizer design

We obtain minimax lower and upper bounds for the expected distortionredundancy of empirically designed vector quantizers. We show that the meansquared distortion of a vector quantizer designed from $n$ i.i.d. datapoints using any design algorithm is at least $\Omega (n^{-1/2})$ awayfrom the optimal distortion for some distribution on a bounded subset of${\cal R}^d$. Together with existing upper bounds this result shows thatthe minimax distortion redundancy for empirical quantizer design, as afunction of the size of the training data, is asymptotically on the orderof $n^{1/2}$. We also derive a new upper bound for the performance of theempirically optimal quantizer.

Exact tests for correlation and for the slope in simple linear regressions without making assumptions

We present an exact test for whether two random variables that have known bounds on their support are negatively correlated. The alternative hypothesis is that they are not negatively correlated. No assumptions are made on the underlying distributions. We show by example that the Spearman rank correlation test as the competing exact test of correlation in nonparametric settings rests on an additional assumption on the data generating process without which it is not valid as a test for correlation.We then show how to test for the significance of the slope in a linear regression analysis that invovles a single independent variable and where outcomes of the dependent variable belong to a known bounded set.

A characterization of sequential rationalizability

A choice function is sequentially rationalizable if there is an ordered collection of asymmetric binary relations that identifies the selected alternative in every choice problem. We propose a property, F-consistency, and show that it characterizes the notion of sequential rationalizability. F-consistency is a testable property that highlights the behavioral aspects implicit in sequentially rationalizable choice. Further, our characterization result provides a novel tool with which to study how other behavioral concepts are related to sequential rationalizability, and establish a priori unexpected implications. In particular, we show that the concept of rationalizability by game trees, which, in principle, had little to do with sequential rationalizability, is a refinement of the latter. Every choice function that is rationalizable by a game tree is also sequentially rationalizable. Finally, we show that some prominent voting mechanisms are also sequentially rationalizable.

Imitation of succesful behavior in Cournot markets

In an experimental standard Cournot Oligopoly we test the importance ofmodels of behavior characterized by imitation of succesful behavior. Wefind that the players appear to the rather reluctant to imitate.

Effects of uncertain lifetime and annuity insurance on capital accumulation and growth

This paper studies the effects of uncertain lifetime on capitalaccumulation and growth and also the sensitivity of thoseeffects to the existence of a perfect annuities market. Themodel is an overlapping generations model with uncertainlifetimes. The technology is convex and such that the marginalproduct of capital is bounded away from zero. A contribution ofthis paper is to show that the existence of accidental bequestsmay lead the economy to an equilibrium that exhibits asymptoticgrowth, which is impossible in an economy with a perfect annuitiesmarket or with certain lifetimes. This paper also shows that ifindividuals face a positive probability of surviving in everyperiod, they may be willing to save at any age. This effect ofuncertain lifetime on savings may also lead the economy to anequilibrium exhibiting asymptotic growth even if there exists aperfect annuities market.

Stochastic evolution of rules for playing normal form games

The evolution of boundedly rational rules for playing normal form games is studied within stationary environments ofstochastically changing games. Rules are viewed as algorithms prescribing strategies for the different normal formgames that arise. It is shown that many of the folk results of evolutionary game theory typically obtained witha fixed game and fixed strategies carry over to the present case. The results are also related to recent experimentson rules and games.

A zero-delay sequential scheme for lossy coding of individual sequences

We consider adaptive sequential lossy coding of bounded individual sequences when the performance is measured by the sequentially accumulated mean squared distortion. Theencoder and the decoder are connected via a noiseless channel of capacity $R$ and both are assumed to have zero delay. No probabilistic assumptions are made on how the sequence to be encoded is generated. For any bounded sequence of length $n$, the distortion redundancy is defined as the normalized cumulative distortion of the sequential scheme minus the normalized cumulative distortion of the best scalarquantizer of rate $R$ which is matched to this particular sequence. We demonstrate the existence of a zero-delay sequential scheme which uses common randomization in the encoder and the decoder such that the normalized maximum distortion redundancy converges to zero at a rate $n^{-1/5}\log n$ as the length of the encoded sequence $n$ increases without bound.

Public and private saving and investment

We decompose aggregate saving and investment into its publicand private components and then document a variety of ``stylized facts''associated with saving and investment rates for a sample of15 countries over the period 1975--1989. In order to seewhether these empirical relationships are consistent with aworld of perfect capital mobility we develop a multi--countrymodel with free trade in a riskfree bond and calibrate it tothe fifteen OECD countries. We pay special attential tomodeling the fiscal policy rules. The model performsremarkably well in accounting for a wide variety of timeseries relationships. Nonetheless the model is not able to capture the crosssectional aspect of the data. In particular, the model cannot accountfor both the large cross country correlation between aggregate saving and investmentrates and the very negative cross country relationship between the public andprivate saving minus investment gaps.

Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information

This paper studies the equilibrating process of several implementationmechanisms using naive adaptive dynamics. We show that the dynamics convergeand are stable, for the canonical mechanism of implementation in Nash equilibrium.In this way we cast some doubt on the criticism of ``complexity'' commonlyused against this mechanism. For mechanisms that use more refined equilibrium concepts,the dynamics converge but are not stable. Some papers in the literatureon implementation with refined equilibrium concepts have claimed that themechanisms they propose are ``simple'' and implement ``everything'' (incontrast with the canonical mechanism). The fact that some of these ``simple''mechanisms have unstable equilibria suggests that these statements shouldbe interpreted with some caution.

Ignoring information in binary choice with continuous variables: When is less 'more'?

When can a single variable be more accurate in binary choice than multiple sources of information? We derive analytically the probability that a single variable (SV) will correctly predict one of two choices when both criterion and predictor are continuous variables. We further provide analogous derivations for multiple regression (MR) and equal weighting (EW) and specify the conditions under which the models differ in expected predictive ability. Key factors include variability in cue validities, intercorrelation between predictors, and the ratio of predictors to observations in MR. Theory and simulations are used to illustrate the differential effects of these factors. Results directly address why and when one-reason decision making can be more effective than analyses that use more information. We thus provide analytical backing to intriguing empirical results that, to date, have lacked theoretical justification. There are predictable conditions for which one should expect less to be more.

Aportaciones al conocimiento de la geología de Bac Grillera (prepirineo, Girona)

The Bac Grillera nappe (Prepirenean of Girona) shows a stratigraphic section composed of two unconformi ty-bounded units. The lower unit is composed by rethian (marly limestones) and liassic (brechoid marly limestones and limestones). The upper unit (sandstones and marly limestones) belongs to the upper Cretaceous (Campanian)

Serie estratigráfica de Liásico de la provincia de Girona

From several small stratigraphic sections, we have reconstituted the Liassic interval of the Girona Province (NE Spain). We have been able to identify paleontologically the Carixian (Jamesoni, Ibex, and perhaps, Davoei zones), the Lower Domerian (Stockesi zone), and the Middle Toarcian (possibily Variabilis zone, as well as Thouarsense and Insigne zones). The Lower Toarcian (Serpentinus zone) is represented by fossil remains no ‘in situ’. The lowest Toarcián (Tenuicos-tatum zone) as well as the Middle and Upper Domerian (Margaritatus and Spinatum zones respectively, are probably represented by stratigraphic gaps