Business Cycles, Unemployment Insurance, and the Calibration of Matching Models

This paper points out an empirical puzzle that arises when an RBC economy with a job matching function is used to model unemployment. The standard model can generate sufficiently large cyclical fluctuations in unemployment, or a sufficiently small response of unemployment to labor market policies, but it cannot do both. Variable search and separation, finite UI benefit duration, efficiency wages, and capital all fail to resolve this puzzle. However, both sticky wages and match-specific productivity shocks help the model reproduce the stylized facts: both make the firm's flow of surplus more procyclical, thus making hiring more procyclical too.

The Evolution of Inequity in the Access to Health Care in Spain: 1987-2001

This paper reports an analysis of the evolution of income related health inequalities in Spain over the period 1987-2001. We use recently developed methods in order to cardinalise and model self assessed health within a regression framework, decompose the sources of inequality and explain the observed differences between 1987 (one year after the 1986 General Health Act was approved) and 2001 (the latest available representative data on health for the Spanish population). The results show that the period has witnessed a reduction in income related health inequality. The driver of such reduction has been the weakening of the income health gradient, which lends support to the hypothesis that the important health policy reforms implemented over the period have been successful in the objective of reducing socio-economic inequalities in health. Our results also suggest that actions aimed at improving the health of those with low levels of education and of those who are not actively participating in the labor market would lead to further reductions in income related health inequality.

Employment Protection, International Specialization, and Innovation

We develop a model to analyse the implications of firing costs on incentives for R&D and international specialization. The Key idea is paying the firing cost, the country with a rigid labor market will tend to produce relatively secure goods, at a late stage of their product life cycle. Under international trade, an international product cycle emerges where, roughly, new goods are first produced in the low firing cost country will specialize in 'secondary innovations', that is, improvements in existing goods, while the low firing cost country will more specialize in 'primary innovation', that is, invention of new goods.

Wage rigidity and job creation

Recent research in macroeconomics emphasizes the role of wage rigidity in accounting for the volatility of unemployment fluctuations. We use worker-level datafrom the CPS to measure the sensitivity of wages of newly hired workers to changesin aggregate labor market conditions. The wage of new hires, unlike the aggregatewage, is volatile and responds almost one-to-one to changes in labor productivity.We conclude that there is little evidence for wage stickiness in the data. We alsoshow, however, that a little wage rigidity goes a long way in amplifying the responseof job creation to productivity shocks.

Structural unemployment

Structural unemployment is due to mismatch between available jobs and workers.We formalize this concept in a simple model of a segmented labor market with searchfrictions within segments. Worker mobility, job mobility and wage bargaining costsacross segments generate structural unemployment. We estimate the contribution ofthese costs to fluctuations in US unemployment, operationalizing segments as statesor industries. Most structural unemployment is due to wage bargaining costs, whichare large but nevertheless contribute little to unemployment fluctuations. Structuralunemployment is as cyclical as overall unemployment and no more persistent, bothin the current and in previous recessions.

Compensating wage differentials and voluntary job changes: Evidence from West Germany

Does the labor market place wage premia on jobs that involve physical strain,job, insecurity or bad regulation of hours? This paper derives bounds on themonetary returns to these job disamenities in the West German labor market.We show that in a market with dispersion in both job characteristics andwages, the average wage change of workers who switch jobs voluntarily and optfor consuming more (less) disamenities,provides an upper (lower) bound on themarket return to the disamenity. Using longitudinal information from workersin the German Socio Economic Panel, we estimate an upper bound of 5% and alower bound of 3.5% for the market return to work strain in a job.

Employee referrals and efficiency wages

Many workers believe that personal contacts are crucial for obtainingjobs in high-wage sectors. On the other hand, firms in high-wage sectorsreport using employee referrals because they help provide screening andmonitoring of new employees. This paper develops a matching model thatcan explain the link between inter-industry wage differentials and useof employee referrals. Referrals lower monitoring costs because high-effortreferees can exert peer pressure on co-workers, allowing firms to pay lowerefficiency wages. On the other hand, informal search provides fewer job andapplicant contacts than formal methods (e.g., newspaper ads). In equilibrium,the matching process generates segmentation in the labor market becauseof heterogeneity in the size of referral networks. Referrals match good high-paying jobs to well-connected workers, while formal methods matchless attractive jobs to less-connected workers. Industry-level data show apositive correlation between industry wage premia and use of employeereferrals. Moreover, evidence using the NLSY shows similar positive andsignificant OLS and fixed-effects estimates of the returns to employeereferrals, but insignificant effects once sector of employment is controlledfor. This evidence suggests referred workers earn higher wages not becauseof higher unobserved ability or better matches but rather because theyare hired in high-wage sectors.

The ins and outs of unemployment: An analysis conditional on technology shocks

We analyze how unemployment, job finding and job separation rates reactto neutral and investment-specific technology shocks. Neutral shocks increaseunemployment and explain a substantial portion of it volatility; investment-specificshocks expand employment and hours worked and contribute to hoursworked volatility. Movements in the job separation rates are responsible for theimpact response of unemployment while job finding rates for movements alongits adjustment path. The evidence warns against using models with exogenousseparation rates and challenges the conventional way of modelling technologyshocks in search and sticky price models.

Award errors and permanent disability benefits in Spain

There is a controversial debate about the effects of permanent disability benefits on labormarket behavior. In this paper we estimate equations for deserving and receiving disabilitybenefits to evaluate the award error as the difference in the probability of receiving anddeserving using survey data from Spain. Our results indicate that individuals aged between55 and 59, self-employers or working in an agricultural sector have a probability of receiving a benefit without deserving it significantly higher than the rest of individuals. We also find evidence of gender discrimination since male have a significantly higher probability of receiving a benefit without deserving it. This seems to confirm that disability benefits are being used as an instrument for exiting the labor market for some individuals approaching the early retirement or those who do not have right to retire early. Taking into account that awarding process depends on Social Security Provincial Department, this means that some departments are applying loosely the disability requirements for granting disability benefits.

Financial intermediation and equity investment with costly monitoring

This paper studies the efficiency of equilibria in a productive OLG economy where the process of financial intermediation is characterized by costly state verification. Both competitive equilibria and Constrained Pareto Optimal allocations are characterized. It is shown that market outcomes can be socially inefficient, even when a weaker notion than Pareto optimality is considered.

Estimating the probability of leaving unemployment using uncompleted spells from repeated cross-section data

We propose a new econometric estimation method for analyzing the probabilityof leaving unemployment using uncompleted spells from repeated cross-sectiondata, which can be especially useful when panel data are not available. Theproposed method-of-moments-based estimator has two important features:(1) it estimates the exit probability at the individual level and(2) it does not rely on the stationarity assumption of the inflowcomposition. We illustrate and gauge the performance of the proposedestimator using the Spanish Labor Force Survey data, and analyze the changesin distribution of unemployment between the 1980s and 1990s during a periodof labor market reform. We find that the relative probability of leavingunemployment of the short-term unemployed versus the long-term unemployedbecomes significantly higher in the 1990s.

Unemployment vs. mismatch of talents: Reconsidering unemployment benefits

We develop an equilibrium search-matching model with risk-neutral agentsand two-sided ex-ante heterogeneity. Unemployment insurance has thestandard effect of reducing employment, but also helps workers to get a suitable job. The predictions of our simple modelare consistent with the contrasting performance of the labor market in Europeand US in terms of unemployment, productivity growth and wage inequality.To show this, we construct two fictitious economies with calibratedparameters which only differ by the degree of unemployment insurance andassume that they are hit by a common technological shock which enhancesthe importance of mismatch. This shock reduces the proportion of jobs whichworkers regards as acceptable in the economy with unemployment insurance(Europe). As a result, unemployment doubles in this economy.In the laissez-faire economy (US), unemployment remains constant,but wage inequality increases more and productivity grows less due to largermismatch. The model can be used to address a number of normative issues.

Schumpeterian technology shocks

We analyze the labor market effects of neutral and investment-specific technologyshocks along the intensive margin (hours worked) and the extensive margin(unemployment). We characterize the dynamic response of unemploymentin terms of the job separation and the job finding rate. Labor market adjustmentsoccur along the extensive margin in response to neutral shocks, along theintensive margin in response to investment specific shocks. The job separationrate accounts for a major portion of the impact response of unemployment. Neutralshocks prompt a contemporaneous increase in unemployment because of asharp rise in the separation rate. This is prolonged by a persistent fall in thejob finding rate. Investment specific shocks rise employment and hours worked.Neutral shocks explain a substantial portion of the volatility of unemploymentand output; investment specific shocks mainly explain hours worked volatility.This suggests that neutral progress is consistent with Schumpeterian creative destruction,while investment-specific progress operates as in a neoclassical growthmodel.

Are changes in education important for the wage premium and unemployment?

A generalized rise in unemployment rates for both college and high-schoolgraduates, a widening education wage premium, and a sharp increase incollege education participation are characteristic features of thetransformations of the U.S. labor market between 1970 and 1990. This paperinvestigates the interactions between these changes in the labor marketand in educational attainment. First, it develops an equilibrium searchand matching model of the labor market where education is endogenouslydetermined. Second, calibrated versions of the model are used to studyquantitatively whether either a skill-biased change in technology or amismatch shock can explain the above facts. The skill-biased shock accountsfor a considerable part of the changes but fails to produce the increasein unemployment for the educated labor force. The mismatch shock explainsinstead much of the change in the four variables, including the wage premium.

The impact of tax credits on labour supply

One of the principle aims of the Working Families' Tax Credit in the UK was to increase the participation of single mothers. The literature to date concludes there was approximately a five-percentage-point increase in employment of single mothers. The differences-in-differences methodology that is typically used compares single mother with single women without children. However, the characteristics of these groups are very different, and change over time in relative covariates are likely to violate the identifying assumption. We find that when we control for differential trends between women with and without children, the employment effect of the policy falls significantly. Moreover, the effect is borne solely by those working full-time (30 hours or more), while having no effect on inducing people into the labor market from inactivity. Looking closely at important covariates over time, we can see sizeable changes in the relative returns to employment between the treatment and control groups.