Measuring and making decisions for social reciprocity

Social reciprocity may explain certain emerging psychological processes, which are likely to be founded on dyadic relations. Although some indices and statistics have been proposed to measure and make statistical decisions regarding social reciprocity in groups, these were generally developed to identify association patterns rather than to quantify the discrepancies between what each individual addresses to his/her partners and what is received from them in return. Additionally, social researchers are not only interested in measuring groups at the global level, since dyadic and individual measurements are also necessary for a proper description of social interactions. This study is concerned with a new statistic for measuring social reciprocity at the global level and with decomposing it in order to identify those dyads and individuals which account for a significant part of asymmetry in social interactions. In addition to a set of indices some exact analytical results are derived and a way of making statistical decisions is proposed.

On the origin of the selectivity of plasmidic H-NS towards horizontally acquired DNA: Linking H-NS oligomerization and cooperative DNA binding

The nucleoid-associated protein H-NS is a global modulator of the expression of genes associated with adaptation to environmental changes. A variant of H-NS expressed in the R27 plasmid was previously shown to selectively modulate the expression of horizontally acquired genes, with minimal effects on core genes that are repressed by the chromosomal form of H-NS. Both H-NS proteins are formed by an oligomerization domain and a DNA-binding domain, which are connected by a linker that is highly flexible in the absence of DNA. We studied DNA binding by means of oligomer-forming chimeric proteins in which domains of the chromosomal and plasmidic variants are exchanged, as well as in monomeric truncated forms containing the DNA-binding domain and variable portions of the linker. Point mutations in the linker were also examined in full-length and truncated H-NS constructs. These experiments show that the linker region contributes to DNA binding affinity and that it is a main component of the distinct DNA binding properties of chromosomal and plasmidic H-NS. We propose that interactions between the linker and DNA limit the flexibility of the connection between H- NS oligomerization and DNA binding and provide an allosteric indirect readout mechanism to detect long- range distortions of DNA, thus enabling discrimination between core and horizontally acquired DNA.

Housing Wealth and Housing Decisions in Old Age: Sale and Reversion

Population ageing brings new challenges to long-term household economic decisions. In the event of old-age dependency, housing assets become a key self-insurance device. However, little empirical evidence has been reported regarding an individual"s expectations of having to use their housing wealth for such a purpose. This paper draws upon two complementary data sources to empirically examine: (1) the influence of housing assets on an individual"s willingness-to-sell (WTS) their dwelling for care purposes, and (2) the willingness to take out a reverse mortgage contract loan in the event of old-age dependency. The paper"s findings suggest that homeowners" WTS in old age is unaffected by their income or housing assets and is, rather, determined by socio-environmental housing characteristics and the individual"s health and personal needs. Conversely, the study finds that the uptake of home reversion loans is largely dependent on income or education, but not on a household"s housing assets.

Cooperative motion of intrinsic and actuated semiflexible swimmers

We examine the phenomenon of hydrodynamic-induced cooperativity for pairs of flagellated micro-organism swimmers, of which spermatozoa cells are an example. We consider semiflexible swimmers, where inextensible filaments are driven by an internal intrinsic force and torque-free mechanism (intrinsic swimmers). The velocity gain for swimming cooperatively, which depends on both the geometry and the driving, develops as a result of the near-field coupling of bending and hydrodynamic stresses. We identify the regimes where hydrodynamic cooperativity is advantageous and quantify the change in efficiency. When the filaments' axes are parallel, hydrodynamic interaction induces a directional instability that causes semiflexible swimmers that profit from swimming together to move apart from each other. Biologically, this implies that flagella need to select different synchronized collective states and to compensate for directional instabilities (e.g., by binding) in order to profit from swimming together. By analyzing the cooperative motion of pairs of externally actuated filaments, we assess the impact that stress distribution along the filaments has on their collective displacements.

Llenguatge i decisions morals

'Què faries si l"única manera de salvar cinc persones d"una mort segura a causa d"un accident atzarós fos provocar expressament la mort d"una altra persona que no està en perill?" No és una pregunta fàcil, ni la resposta trivial. Prenem decisions constantment, sovint intranscendents-quina camisa em poso avui?-, però també moltes que tenen un cert component moral, que poden afectar altres persones.

El cervell bilingüe pren decisions més depressa

Diferents estudis mostren que les persones que parlen dues llengües són més àgils a l"hora de resoldre conflictes en què cal valorar diferents informacions de manera simultània

Competition in notch signaling with cis enriches cell fate decisions

Notch signaling is involved in cell fate choices during the embryonic development of Metazoa. Commonly, Notch signaling arises from the binding of the Notch receptor to its ligands in adjacent cells driving cell-to-cell communication. Yet, cell-autonomous control of Notch signaling through both ligand-dependent and ligand-independent mechanisms is known to occur as well. Examples include Notch signaling arising in the absence of ligand binding, and cis-inhibition of Notch signaling by titration of the Notch receptor upon binding to its ligands within a single cell. Increasing experimental evidences support that the binding of the Notch receptor with its ligands within a cell (cis-interactions) can also trigger a cell-autonomous Notch signal (cis-signaling), whose potential effects on cell fate decisions and patterning remain poorly understood. To address this question, herein we mathematically and computationally investigate the cell states arising from the combination of cis-signaling with additional Notch signaling sources, which are either cell-autonomous or involve cell-to-cell communication. Our study shows that cis-signaling can switch from driving cis-activation to effectively perform cis-inhibition and identifies under which conditions this switch occurs. This switch relies on the competition between Notch signaling sources, which share the same receptor but differ in their signaling efficiency. We propose that the role of cis-interactions and their signaling on fine-grained patterning and cell fate decisions is dependent on whether they drive cis-inhibition or cis-activation, which could be controlled during development. Specifically, cis-inhibition and not cis-activation facilitates patterning and enriches it by modulating the ratio of cells in the high-ligand expression state, by enabling additional periodic patterns like stripes and by allowing localized patterning highly sensitive to the precursor state and cell-autonomous bistability. Our study exemplifies the complexity of regulations when multiple signalng sources share the same receptor and provides the tools for their characterization.

When decisions of others matter to me: an electrophysiological analysis.

Background: Actions of others may have immediate consequences for oneself. We probed the neural responses associated with the observation of another person"s action using event-related potentials in a modified gambling task. In this task a"performer" bet either a higher or lower number and could win or lose this amount. Three different groups of"observers" were also studied. The first (neutral) group simply observed the performer"s action, which had no consequences for the observers. In the second (parallel) group, wins/losses of the performer were paralleled by similar wins and losses by the observer. In the third (reverse) group, wins of the performer led to a loss of the observer and vice versa. Results: ERPs of the performers showed a mediofrontal feedback related negativity (FRN) to losses. The neutral and parallel observer groups did similarly show an FRN response to the performer"s losses with a topography indistinguishable from that seen in the performers. In the reverse group, however, the FRN occurred for wins of the performer which translated to losses for the observer. Conclusions: Taking into account previous experiments, we suggest that the FRN response in observers is driven by two evaluative processes (a) related to the benefit/loss for oneself and (b) related to the benefit/loss of another person

Enjoying cooperative games: The R package GameTheory

This paper focuses on cooperative games with transferable utility. We propose the computation of two solutions, the Shapley value for n agents and the nucleolus with a maximum of four agents. The current approach is also focused on conflicting claims problems, a particular case of coalitional games. We provide the computation of the most well-known and used claims solutions: the proportional, the constrained equal awards, the constrained equal losses, the Talmud and the random arrival rules. Keywords: Cooperative game, Shapley value, nucleolus, claims problem, claims rule, bankruptcy.

On the (in)compatibility of rationality, monotonicity and consistency for cooperative games

On the domain of cooperative transferable utility games, we investigate if there are single valued solutions that reconcile rationality, consistency and monotonicity (with respect to the worth of the grand coalition) properties. This paper collects some impossibility results on the combination of core selection with either complement or projected consistency, and core selection, max consistency and monotonicity. By contrast, possibility results show up when combining individual rationality, projected consistency and monotonicity.

Parallel characterizations of a generalized shapley value and a generalized banzhaf value for cooperative games with level structure of cooperation

We present parallel characterizations of two different values in the framework of restricted cooperation games. The restrictions are introduced as a finite sequence of partitions defined on the player set, each of them being coarser than the previous one, hence forming a structure of different levels of a priori unions. On the one hand, we consider a value first introduced in Ref. [18], which extends the Shapley value to games with different levels of a priori unions. On the other hand, we introduce another solution for the same type of games, which extends the Banzhaf value in the same manner. We characterize these two values using logically comparable properties.

The Role of Firm Size in Training Provision Decisions: evidence from Spain

The level of training provided by small firms to their employees is below that provided by their larger counterparts. The provision of firm-related training is believed to be associated to certain characteristics of the firm. In this paper we argue that small firms provide fewer training opportunities as they are less likely to be associated with these characteristics than large firms. The suitability of estimating training decisions as a double-decision process is examined here: first, a firm has to decide whether to provide training or not and, second, having decided to do so, the amount of training to provide. The differences in training provision between small and large firms are decomposed in order to analyse the individual contribution of these characteristics to explaining the gap. The results show that small firms face greater obstacles in accessing training and that the main reasons for that are related to their technological activity and the geographical scope of the market in which they operate.

A characterization of cooperative TU-games with large monotonic core

[cat] El concepte de joc cooperatiu amb large core és introduït per Sharkey (1982) i el de Population Monotonic Allocation Scheme és definit per Sprumont (1990). Inspirat en aquests conceptes, Moulin (1990) introdueix la noció de large monotonic core donant una caracterització per a jocs de tres jugadors. En aquest document provem que tots els jocs amb large monotonic core són convexes. A més, donem un criteri efectiu per determinar si un joc té large monotonic core o no, i daquí obtenim una caracterització pel cas de quatre jugadors.

A characterization of cooperative TU-games with large monotonic core

[cat] El concepte de joc cooperatiu amb large core és introduït per Sharkey (1982) i el de Population Monotonic Allocation Scheme és definit per Sprumont (1990). Inspirat en aquests conceptes, Moulin (1990) introdueix la noció de large monotonic core donant una caracterització per a jocs de tres jugadors. En aquest document provem que tots els jocs amb large monotonic core són convexes. A més, donem un criteri efectiu per determinar si un joc té large monotonic core o no, i daquí obtenim una caracterització pel cas de quatre jugadors.

On the structure of cooperative and competitive solutions for a generalized assignment game

We study cooperative and competitive solutions for a many- to-many generalization of Shapley and Shubik (1972)'s assignment game. We consider the Core, three other notions of group stability and two al- ternative definitions of competitive equilibrium. We show that (i) each group stable set is closely related with the Core of certain games defined using a proper notion of blocking and (ii) each group stable set contains the set of payoff vectors associated to the two definitions of competitive equilibrium. We also show that all six solutions maintain a strictly nested structure. Moreover, each solution can be identified with a set of ma- trices of (discriminated) prices which indicate how gains from trade are distributed among buyers and sellers. In all cases such matrices arise as solutions of a system of linear inequalities. Hence, all six solutions have the same properties from a structural and computational point of view.