Absolute and relative deprivation and the measurement of poverty

This paper develops the link between poverty and inequality by focussing on a class of poverty indices (some of them well-known) which aggregate normative concerns for absolute and relative deprivation. The indices are distinguished by a parameter that captures the ethical sensitivity of poverty measurement to ``exclusion'' or ``relative-deprivation'' aversion. We also show how the indices can be readily used to predict the impact of growth on poverty. An illustration using LIS data finds that he United States show more relative deprivation than Denmark and Belgium whatever the percentiles considered, but that overall deprivation comparisons of the four countries considered will generally necessarily depend on the intensity of the ethical concern for relative deprivation. The impact of growth on poverty is also seen to depend on the presence of and on the attention granted to concerns over relative deprivation. }

An Atkinson-Gini family of social evaluation functions

We investigate the properties of a family of social evaluation functions and inequality indices which merge the features of the family of Atkinson (1970) and S-Gini (Donaldson and Weymark (1980, 1983), Yitzhaki (1983) and Kakwani (1980)) indices. Income inequality aversion is captured by decreasing marginal utilities, and aversion to rank inequality is captured by rank-dependent ethical weights, thus providing an ethically-flexible dual basis for the assessment of inequality and equity. These ocial evaluation functions can be interpreted as average utility corrected for the illfare of relative deprivation. They can alternatively be understood as averages of altruistic well-being in a population. They moreover have a simple graphical interpretation.

Regional income inequalities in Europe: an updated measurement and some decomposition results

In this paper well-known summary inequality indexes are used to explore interregional income inequalities in Europe. In particular, we mainly employ Theils’population-weighted index because of its appealing properties. Two decomposition analysis are applied. First, regional inequalities are decomposed by regional subgroups (countries). Second, intertemporal inequality changes are separated into income and population changes. The main results can be summarized as follows. First, data confirm a reduction in crossregional inequality during 1982-97. Second, this reduction is basically due to real convergence among countries. Third, currently the greater part of European interregional disparities is within-country by nature, which introduce an important challenge for the European policy. Fourth, inequality changes are due mainly to income variations, population changes playing a minor role.

A Model of ethnic conflict

We present a model of conflict, in which discriminatory government policy or social intolerance is responsive to various forms of ethnic activism, including violence. It is this perceived responsiveness -captured by the probability that the government gives in and accepts a proponed change in ethnic policy- that induces individuals to mobilize in support for their cause. Yet, mobilization is costly and demonstrators have to be compensated accordingly. Individuals have to weigh their ethnic radicalism with their material well-being to determine the size of their money contribution to the cause. Our main results are: (i) a one-sided increase in radicalism or in population size increases conflict; (ii) a one-sided increase in income has ambiguous effects depending on the elasticity of contributions to income; (iii) an increase in within-group inequality increases conflict; and (iv) an increase in the correlation between ethnic radicalism and inequality also increases conflict.

The Social contract with endogenous sentiments

Moral values infuence individual behavior and social interactions. A specially signif- cant instance is the case of moral values concerning work e¤ort. Individuals determine what they take to be proper behaviour and judge the others, and themselves, accordingly. They increase their esteem -and self-esteem- for those who perform in excess of the standard and decrease their esteem for those who work less. These changes in self-esteem result from the self-regulatory emotions of guilt or pride extensively studied in Social Psychology. We examine the interactions between sentiments, individual behaviour and the social contract in a model of rational voting over redistribution where individual self-esteem and relative es-teem for others are endogenously determined. Individuals di¤er in their productivities. The desired extent of redistribution depends both on individual income and on individual attitudes toward others. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in which sentiments, labor supply and redistribution are simultaneously determined. The model has two types of equilibria. In "cohesive" equilibria, all individuals conform to the standard of proper behav- iour, income inequality is low and social esteem is not biased toward any particular type. Under these conditions equilibrium redistribution increases in response to larger inequality. In a "clustered" equilibrium skilled workers work above the mean while unskilled workers work below. In such an equilibrium, income inequality is large and sentiments are biased in favor of the industrious. As inequality increases, this bias may eventually overtake the egoistic demand for greater taxation and equilibrium redistribution decreases. The type of equilibrium that emerges crucially depends on inequality. We contrast the predictions of the model with data on inequality, redistribution, work values and attitudes toward work and toward the poor for a set of OECD countries.

Variational inequalities in Hilbert spaces with measures and optimal stopping problems

We study the existence theory for parabolic variational inequalities in weighted L2 spaces with respect to excessive measures associated with a transition semigroup. We characterize the value function of optimal stopping problems for finite and infinite dimensional diffusions as a generalized solution of such a variational inequality. The weighted L2 setting allows us to cover some singular cases, such as optimal stopping for stochastic equations with degenerate diffusion coeficient. As an application of the theory, we consider the pricing of American-style contingent claims. Among others, we treat the cases of assets with stochastic volatility and with path-dependent payoffs.

Participació de la dona en l’esport i l’Olimpisme

Aquest document es va presentar a l’Assignatura Campus de la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB) “Esport, Olimpisme i Cultura Contemporània”, durant el curs acadèmic 1998/1999. L’autora analitza l’accés diferencial de la dona en l’esport dins l’ampli panorama de la desigualtat i de la discriminació social i cultural que, històricament, ha patit i sovint pateix la dona.

Characterizations of Lojasiewicz inequalities and applications

The classical Lojasiewicz inequality and its extensions for partial differential equation problems (Simon) and to o-minimal structures (Kurdyka) have a considerable impact on the analysis of gradient-like methods and related problems: minimization methods, complexity theory, asymptotic analysis of dissipative partial differential equations, tame geometry. This paper provides alternative characterizations of this type of inequalities for nonsmooth lower semicontinuous functions defined on a metric or a real Hilbert space. In a metric context, we show that a generalized form of the Lojasiewicz inequality (hereby called the Kurdyka- Lojasiewicz inequality) relates to metric regularity and to the Lipschitz continuity of the sublevel mapping, yielding applications to discrete methods (strong convergence of the proximal algorithm). In a Hilbert setting we further establish that asymptotic properties of the semiflow generated by -∂f are strongly linked to this inequality. This is done by introducing the notion of a piecewise subgradient curve: such curves have uniformly bounded lengths if and only if the Kurdyka- Lojasiewicz inequality is satisfied. Further characterizations in terms of talweg lines -a concept linked to the location of the less steepest points at the level sets of f- and integrability conditions are given. In the convex case these results are significantly reinforced, allowing in particular to establish the asymptotic equivalence of discrete gradient methods and continuous gradient curves. On the other hand, a counterexample of a convex C2 function in R2 is constructed to illustrate the fact that, contrary to our intuition, and unless a specific growth condition is satisfied, convex functions may fail to fulfill the Kurdyka- Lojasiewicz inequality.

Convolution inequalities in Lorentz spaces

In this paper we study boundedness of the convolution operator in different Lorentz spaces. In particular, we obtain the limit case of the Young-O'Neil inequality in the classical Lorentz spaces. We also investigate the convolution operator in the weighted Lorentz spaces. Finally, norm inequalities for the potential operator are presented.

An empirical analysis of wealth taxation: equity Vs.tax compliance

Capital taxation is currently under debate, basically due to problems of administrative control and proper assessment of the levied assets. We analyze both problems focusing on a capital tax, the annual wealth tax (WT), which is only applied in five OECD countries, being Spain one of them. We concentrate our analysis on top 1% adult population, which permits us to describe the evolution of wealth concentration in Spain along 1983-2001. On average top 1% holds about 18% of total wealth, which rises to 19% when tax incompliance and under-assessment is corrected for housing, the main asset. The evolution suggests wealth concentration has risen. Regarding WT, we analyze whether it helps to reduce wealth inequality or, on the contrary, it reinforces vertical inequity (due to especial concessions) and horizontal inequity (due to the de iure and to de facto different treatment of assets). We analyze in detail housing and equity shares. By means of a time series analysis, we relate the reported values with reasonable price indicators and proxies of the propensity to save. We infer net tax compliance is extremely low, which includes both what we commonly understand by (gross) tax compliance and the degree of under-assessment due to fiscal legislation (for housing). That is especially true for housing, whose level of net tax compliance is well below 50%. Hence, we corroborate the difficulties in taxing capital, and so cast doubts on the current role of the WT in Spain in reducing wealth inequality.

A theoretical and practical study on linear reforms of dual taxes

We extend the linear reforms introduced by Pf¨ahler (1984) to the case of dual taxes. We study the relative effect that linear dual tax cuts have on the inequality of income distribution -a symmetrical study can be made for dual linear tax hikes-. We also introduce measures of the degree of progressivity for dual taxes and show that they can be connected to the Lorenz dominance criterion. Additionally, we study the tax liability elasticity of each of the reforms proposed. Finally, by means of a microsimulation model and a considerably large data set of taxpayers drawn from 2004 Spanish Income Tax Return population, 1) we compare different yield-equivalent tax cuts applied to the Spanish dual income tax and 2) we investigate how much income redistribution the dual tax reform (Act ‘35/2006’) introduced with respect to the previous tax.

Government information transparency

This paper studies a model of announcements by a privately informed government about the future state of the economic activity in an economy subject to recurrent shocks and with distortions due to income taxation. Although transparent communication would ex ante be desirable, we find that even a benevolent government may ex-post be non-informative, in an attempt to countervail the tax distortion with a "second best" compensating distortion in information. This result provides a rationale for independent national statistical offices, committed to truthful communication. We also find that whether inequality in income distribution favors or harms government transparency depends on labor supply elasticity.

Redistributive taxation, public expenditure, and size of governent

We introduce a model of redistributive income taxation and public expenditure. This joint treatment permits analyzing the interdependencies between the two policies: one cannot be chosen independently of the other. Empirical evidence reveals that partisan confrontation essentially falls on expenditure policies rather than on income taxation. We examine the case in which the expenditure policy (or the size of government) is chosen by majority voting and income taxation is consistently adjusted. This adjustment consists of designing the income tax schedule that, given the expenditure policy, achieves consensus among the population. The model determines the consensus in- come tax schedule, the composition of public expenditure and the size of government. The main results are that inequality is negatively related to the size of government and to the pro-rich bias in public expenditure, and positively or negatively related to the marginal income tax, depending on substitutability between government supplied and market goods. These implications are validated using OECD data.

Work values, endogenous sentiments and redistribution

We examine the interactions between individual behavior, sentiments and the social contract in a model of rational voting over redistribution. Agents have moral "work values". Individuals' self-esteem and social consideration of others are endogenously determined comparing behaviors to moral standards. Attitudes toward redistribution depend on self-interest and social preferences. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in which sentiments, labor supply and redistribution are determined simultaneously. The equilibria feature different degrees of "social cohesion" and redistribution depending on pre-tax income inequality. In clustered equilibria the poor are held partly responsible for their low income since they work less than the moral standard and hence redistribution is low. The paper proposes a novel explanation for the emergence of different sentiments and social contracts across countries. The predictions appear broadly in line with well-documented differences between the United States and Europe.

The ‘Dragon’ and the ‘Elephant’ and Global Imbalances

Global financial imbalances receive a great deal of attention in relation to the emerging economies China and India. This chapter analyzes this relation, but argues first that they are actually re-balancing the existing structural inequality in the world economy, in which for so long only the Western economies and Japan dominated economic growth and international trade, moving towards a more multi-polar world economy. China in particular, with its rapid export-led growth, has indeed been part and parcel of the emerging financial imbalances, feeding the ‘over-consumption’ in the US and using its accumulating international reserves in buying US-treasury bonds. Finance therefore is moving to the economy that ‘least needs it’. This imbalance can only be redressed if the US (and some of the other OECD countries) start saving more and consuming less (and become more competitive), with China further stimulating domestic demand (which it already did in response to the crisis). China and to a lesser extend India, as emerging large economies and a more important roles in global markets, also contribute to new imbalances, such as the influence of the insatiable appetite for resources (carbon-hydrates, minerals and bio-mass) of these relatively energy-inefficient economies, while at the same time attracting an increasing share of FDI towards them. The chapter finally raises the issue that these three mentioned imbalances make it more difficult for developing countries (except for those who are resource-rich) to get access to the necessary development finance.