A model of shadow banking

We present a model of shadow banking in which financial intermediaries originate and trade loans, assemble these loans into diversified portfolios, and then finance these portfolios externally with riskless debt. In this model: i) outside investor wealth drives the demand for riskless debt and indirectly for securitization, ii) intermediary assets and leverage move together as in Adrian and Shin (2010), and iii) intermediaries increase their exposure to systematic risk as they reduce their idiosyncratic risk through diversification, as in Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2010). Under rational expectations, the shadow banking system is stable and improves welfare. When investors and intermediaries neglect tail risks, however, the expansion of risky lending and the concentration of risks in the intermediaries create financial fragility and fluctuations in liquidity over time.

Endogenous credit cycles

I develop an overlapping-generations framework in which changes in lending standards generateendogenous cycles. In my economy, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about thequality of their projects need to borrow funds. Intermediaries screen entrepreneurs both throughthe amount of investment undertaken and through the level of entrepreneurial net worth.I show that endogenous regime switches in financial contracts from pooling to separatingand vice-versa may generate fluctuations even in the absence of exogenous shocks. Whenthe economy is in the pooling (separating) regime, lending standards seem lax ( tight ) andinvestment is high (low). Differently from the existing literature, my model does not requireentrepreneurial net worth to be counter cyclycal or inconsequential for determining aggregateinvestment.

Bands width, credibility and exchange risk: Lessons from the EMS experience

This paper presents an analysis of the credibility of the EMScurrencies that covers the period before and after the increase in thebands of fluctuation. Our credibility indicator is based on the inferredprobabilities derived from the estimation of a Markov-switching model(Hamilton (1989)) applied to the expected rate of depreciation. Theresults show that, for most of the currencies, credibility has improved,at least transitorily, after the increase in the bands. However, for allcurrencies, the credibility measured by the indicator proposed in thispaper has been eroded recently even with the widened bands.

The equity premium and the risk free rate: A cross country, cross maturity examination

This paper examines the relationship between the equity premium and the risk free rate at three different maturities using post 1973 data fora panel of 7 OECD countries. We show the existence of subsample instabilities,of some cross country differences and of inconsistencies with the expectations theory of the term structure. We perform simulations using a standard consumptionbased CAPM model and demonstrate that the basic features of Mehra and Prescott's(1985) puzzle remain, regardless of the time period, the investment maturity and the country considered. Modifications of the basic setup are also considered.

Boundedly rational credit cycles

We propose an evolutionary model of a credit market. We show that theeconomy exhibits credit cycles. The model predicts dynamics which are consistent with some evidence about the Great Depression. Real shocks triggerepisodes of credit--crunch which are observed in the process of adjustmenttowards the post shock equilibrium.

The role of interbank markets in monetary policy: A model with rationing

This paper analyses the impact of asymmetric information in the interbankmarket and establishes its crucial role in the microfoundations of the monetarypolicy transmission mechanism. We show that interbank market imperfectionsinduce an equilibrium with rationing in the credit market. This has two majorimplications: first, it reconciles the irresponsiveness of business investment to theuser cost of capital with the large impact of monetary policy (magnitude effect)and, second, it shows that banks liquidity positions condition their reaction tomonetary policy (Kashyap and Stein liquidity effect).

Credit cycles in theory and experiment

We test in the laboratory the potential of evolutionary dynamics as predictor of actual behavior. To this end, we propose an asymmetricgame -which we interpret as a borrowerlender relation-, study itsevolutionary dynamics in a random matching set-up, and tests itspredictions. The model provides conditions for the existence ofcredit markets and credit cycles. The theoretical predictions seemto be good approximations of the experimental results.

Inequality over the business cycle: Estimating income risk using micro-data on consumption

We use CEX repeated cross-section data on consumption and income, to evaluate the nature of increased income inequality in the 1980s and 90s. We decompose unexpected changes in family income into transitory and permanent, and idiosyncratic and aggregate components, and estimate the contribution of each component to total inequality. The model we use is a linearized incomplete markets model, enriched to incorporate risk-sharing while maintaining tractability. Our estimates suggest that taking risk sharing into account is important for the model fit; that the increase in inequality in the 1980s was mainly permanent; and that inequality is driven almost entirely by idiosyncratic income risk. In addition we find no evidence for cyclical behavior of consumption risk, casting doubt on Constantinides and Duffie s (1995) explanation for the equity premium puzzle.

Heterogeneous life-cycle profiles, income risk and consumption inequality

Was the increase in income inequality in the US due to permanent shocks or merely to an increase in the variance of transitory shocks? The implications for consumption and welfare depend crucially on the answer to this question. We use CEX repeated cross-section data on consumption and income to decompose idiosyncratic changes in income into predictable life-cycle changes, transitory and permanent shocks and estimate the contribution of each to total inequality. Our model fits the joint evolution of consumption and income inequality well and delivers two main results. First, we find that permanent changes in income explain all of the increase in inequality in the 1980s and 90s. Second, we reconcile this finding with the fact that consumption inequality did not increase much over this period. Our results support the view that many permanent changes in income are predictable for consumers, even if they look unpredictable to the econometrician, consistent withmodels of heterogeneous income profiles.

Population based resource allocation: The use of hybrid risk adjustment

The emphasis on integrated care implies new incentives that promote coordinationbetween levels of care. Considering a population as a whole, the resource allocation systemhas to adapt to this environment. This research is aimed to design a model that allows formorbidity related prospective and concurrent capitation payment. The model can be applied inpublicly funded health systems and managed competition settings.Methods: We analyze the application of hybrid risk adjustment versus either prospective orconcurrent risk adjustment formulae in the context of funding total health expenditures for thepopulation of an integrated healthcare delivery organization in Catalonia during years 2004 and2005.Results: The hybrid model reimburses integrated care organizations avoiding excessive risktransfer and maximizing incentives for efficiency in the provision. At the same time, it eliminatesincentives for risk selection for a specific set of high risk individuals through the use ofconcurrent reimbursement in order to assure a proper classification of patients.Conclusion: Prospective Risk Adjustment is used to transfer the financial risk to the healthprovider and therefore provide incentives for efficiency. Within the context of a National HealthSystem, such transfer of financial risk is illusory, and the government has to cover the deficits.Hybrid risk adjustment is useful to provide the right combination of incentive for efficiency andappropriate level of risk transfer for integrated care organizations.

Local volatility changes in the black-scholes model

In this paper we address a problem arising in risk management; namely the study of price variations of different contingent claims in the Black-Scholes model due to anticipating future events. The method we propose to use is an extension of the classical Vega index, i.e. the price derivative with respect to the constant volatility, in thesense that we perturb the volatility in different directions. Thisdirectional derivative, which we denote the local Vega index, will serve as the main object in the paper and one of the purposes is to relate it to the classical Vega index. We show that for all contingent claims studied in this paper the local Vega index can be expressed as a weighted average of the perturbation in volatility. In the particular case where the interest rate and the volatility are constant and the perturbation is deterministic, the local Vega index is an average of this perturbation multiplied by the classical Vega index. We also study the well-known goal problem of maximizing the probability of a perfect hedge and show that the speed of convergence is in fact dependent of the local Vega index.

Endogenous policy leads to inefficient risk sharing

We analyze risk sharing and fiscal spending in a two-region model withcomplete markets. Fiscal policy determines tax rates for each state ofnature. When fiscal policy is decentralized, it can be used to affect prices of securities. To manipulate prices to their beneffit, regionschoose pro-cyclical fiscal spending. This leads to incomplete risk sharing,despite the existence of complete markets and the absence of aggregaterisk. When a fiscal union centralizes fiscal policy, securities pricescan no longer be manipulated and complete risk sharing ensues. If regionsare homogeneous, median income residents of both regions prefer the fiscalunion. If they are heterogeneous, the median resident of the rich regionprefers the decentralized setting.

Trade credit: Suppliers as debt collectors and insurance providers

There are two fundamental puzzles about trade credit: why does it appearto be so expensive,and why do input suppliers engage in the business oflending money? This paper addresses and answers both questions analysingthe interaction between the financial and the industrial aspects of thesupplier-customer relationship. It examines how, in a context of limitedenforceability of contracts, suppliers may have a comparative advantageover banks in lending to their customers because they hold the extrathreat of stopping the supply of intermediate goods. Suppliers may alsoact as lenders of last resort, providing insurance against liquidityshocks that may endanger the survival of their customers. The relativelyhigh implicit interest rates of trade credit result from the existenceof default and insurance premia. The implications of the model areexamined empirically using parametric and nonparametric techniques on apanel of UK firms.

Keeping up with the Joneses: An international asset pricing model

We derive an international asset pricing model that assumes local investorshave preferences of the type "keeping up with the Joneses." In aninternational setting investors compare their current wealth with that oftheir peers who live in the same country. In the process of inferring thecountry's average wealth, investors incorporate information from the domesticmarket portfolio. In equilibrium, this gives rise to a multifactor CAPMwhere, together with the world market price of risk, there existscountry-speciffic prices of risk associated with deviations from thecountry's average wealth level. The model performs signifficantly better, interms of explaining cross-section of returns, than the international CAPM.Moreover, the results are robust, both for conditional and unconditionaltests, to the inclusion of currency risk, macroeconomic sources of risk andthe Fama and French HML factor.

Ignorance promotes competition: An auction model with endogenous private valuations

We study a situation in which an auctioneer wishes to sell an object toone of N risk-neutral bidders with heterogeneous preferences. Theauctioneer does not know bidders preferences but has private informationabout the characteristics of the ob ject, and must decide how muchinformation to reveal prior to the auction. We show that the auctioneerhas incentives to release less information than would be efficient andthat the amount of information released increases with the level ofcompetition (as measured by the number of bidders). Furthermore, in aperfectly competitive market the auctioneer would provide the efficientlevel of information.