The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: An experimental study

We report an experiment on the effect of intergroup competition on group coordination in the minimal-effort game (Van Huyck et al., 1990). The competition was between two 7-person groups. Each player in each group independently chose an integer from 1 to 7. The group with the higher minimum won the competition and each of its members was paid according to the game s original payoff matrix. Members of the losing group were paid nothing. In case of a tie, each player was paid half the payoff in the original matrix. This treatment was contrasted with two control treatments where each of the two groups played an independent coordination game, either with or without information about the minimum chosen by the outgroup. Although the intergroup competition does not change the set of strict equilibria, we found that it improved collective rationality by moving group members in the direction of higher-payoff equilibria. Merely providing group members with information about the minimal-effort level in the other group was not sufficient to generate this effect.

Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty

This paper introduces a new solution concept, a minimax regret equilibrium, which allows for the possibility that players are uncertain about the rationality and conjectures of their opponents. We provide several applications of our concept. In particular, we consider pricesetting environments and show that optimal pricing policy follows a non-degenerate distribution. The induced price dispersion is consistent with experimental and empirical observations (Baye and Morgan (2004)).

Property enforcement as organized consent

This article develops and tests a theory of the institutions that makeproperty rights viable, ensuring their enforcement, mobilizing thecollateral value of assets and promoting growth. In contrast tocontractual rights, property rights are enforced in rem, being affectedonly with the consent of the right holder. This ensures enforcement butis costly when multiple, potentially colliding rights are held in thesame asset. Different institutions reduce the cost of gathering consentsto overcome this trade-off of enforcement benefits for consent costs:recording of deeds with title insurance, registration of rights and evena regimen of purely private transactions. All three provide functionallysimilar services, but their relative performance varies with the numberof transactions, the risk of political opportunism and regulatoryconsistency. The analysis also shows the rationality of allowingcompetition in the preparation and support of private contractswhile requiring territorial monopoly in recording and registrationactivities, this to ensure independence and protect third parties.

The biased balance: Observation, formalism and interpretation of a dissymmetric measuring device

This paper studies a balance whose unobservable fulcrum is not necessarilylocated at the middle of its two pans. It presents three differentmodels, showing how this lack of symmetry modifies the observation, theformalism and the interpretation of such a biased measuring device. Itargues that the biased balance can be an interesting source of inspirationfor broadening the representational theory of measurement.

The minimax distortion redundancy in empirical quantizer design

We obtain minimax lower and upper bounds for the expected distortionredundancy of empirically designed vector quantizers. We show that the meansquared distortion of a vector quantizer designed from $n$ i.i.d. datapoints using any design algorithm is at least $\Omega (n^{-1/2})$ awayfrom the optimal distortion for some distribution on a bounded subset of${\cal R}^d$. Together with existing upper bounds this result shows thatthe minimax distortion redundancy for empirical quantizer design, as afunction of the size of the training data, is asymptotically on the orderof $n^{1/2}$. We also derive a new upper bound for the performance of theempirically optimal quantizer.

Exact tests for correlation and for the slope in simple linear regressions without making assumptions

We present an exact test for whether two random variables that have known bounds on their support are negatively correlated. The alternative hypothesis is that they are not negatively correlated. No assumptions are made on the underlying distributions. We show by example that the Spearman rank correlation test as the competing exact test of correlation in nonparametric settings rests on an additional assumption on the data generating process without which it is not valid as a test for correlation.We then show how to test for the significance of the slope in a linear regression analysis that invovles a single independent variable and where outcomes of the dependent variable belong to a known bounded set.

Endogenous bargaining power

We present a novel approach to N-person bargaining, based on the idea thatthe agreement reached in a negotiation is determined by how the directconflict resulting from disagreement would be resolved. Our basic buildingblock is the disagreement function, which maps each set of feasible outcomesinto a disagreement point. Using this function and a weak axiom basedon individual rationality we reach a unique solution: the agreement inthe shadow of conflict, ASC. This agreement may be construed as the limitof a sequence of partial agreements, each of which is reached as a functionof the parties relative power. We examine the connection between ASC andasymmetric Nash solutions. We show the connection between the power ofthe parties embodied in the ASC solution and the bias in the SWF thatwould select ASC as an asymmetric Nash solution.

A one-shot Prisoners’ Dilemma with procedural utility

This article introduces a model of rationality that combines procedural utility over actions with consequential utility over payoffs. It applies the model to the Prisoners Dilemma and shows that empirically observed cooperative behaviors can be rationally explained by a procedural utility for cooperation. The model characterizes the situations in which cooperation emerges as a Nash equilibrium. When rational individuals are not solely concerned by the consequences of their behavior but also care for the process by which these consequences are obtained, there is no one single rational solution to a Prisoners Dilemma. Rational behavior depends on the payoffs at stake and on the procedural utility of individuals. In this manner, this model of procedural utility reflects how ethical considerations, social norms or emotions can transform a game of consequences.

A theory of reference-dependent behavior

Extensive field and experimental evidence in a variety of environments show that behavior depends on a reference point. This paper provides an axiomatic characterization of this dependence. We proceed by imposing gradually more structure on both choice correspondences and preference relations, requiring increasingly higher levels of rationality, and freeing the decision-maker from certain types of inconsistencies. The appropriate degree of behavioral structure will depend on the phenomenon that is to be modeled. Lastly, we provide two applications of our work: one to model the status-quo bias, and another to model addictive behavior.

Effects of uncertain lifetime and annuity insurance on capital accumulation and growth

This paper studies the effects of uncertain lifetime on capitalaccumulation and growth and also the sensitivity of thoseeffects to the existence of a perfect annuities market. Themodel is an overlapping generations model with uncertainlifetimes. The technology is convex and such that the marginalproduct of capital is bounded away from zero. A contribution ofthis paper is to show that the existence of accidental bequestsmay lead the economy to an equilibrium that exhibits asymptoticgrowth, which is impossible in an economy with a perfect annuitiesmarket or with certain lifetimes. This paper also shows that ifindividuals face a positive probability of surviving in everyperiod, they may be willing to save at any age. This effect ofuncertain lifetime on savings may also lead the economy to anequilibrium exhibiting asymptotic growth even if there exists aperfect annuities market.

A process approach to the utility for gambling

This paper argues that any specific utility or disutility for gamblingmust be excluded from expected utility because such a theory is consequentialwhile a pleasure or displeasure for gambling is a matter of process, notof consequences. A (dis)utility for gambling is modeled as a process utilitywhich monotonically combines with expected utility restricted to consequences.This allows for a process (dis)utility for gambling to be revealed. Asan illustration, the model shows how empirical observations in the Allaisparadox can reveal a process disutility of gambling. A more general modelof rational behavior combining processes and consequences is then proposedand discussed.

Behavioral assumptions and management ability

The paper explores the consequences that relying on different behavioral assumptions intraining managers may have on their future performance. We argue that training with anemphasis on the standard assumptions used in economics (rationality and self-interest) is goodfor technical posts but may also lead future managers to rely excessively on rational and explicitsafeguarding, crowding out instinctive relational heuristics and signaling a bad human type topotential partners. In contrast, human assumptions used in management theories, because oftheir diverse, implicit and even contradictory nature, do not conflict with the innate set ofcooperative tools and may provide a good training ground for such tools. We present tentativeconfirmatory evidence by examining how the weight given to behavioral assumptions in the corecourses of the top 100 business schools influences the average salaries of their MBA graduates.Controlling for the self-selected average quality of their students and some other schools characteristics, average salaries are seen to be significantly greater for schools whose core MBAcourses contain a higher proportion of management courses as opposed to courses based oneconomics or technical disciplines.

A zero-delay sequential scheme for lossy coding of individual sequences

We consider adaptive sequential lossy coding of bounded individual sequences when the performance is measured by the sequentially accumulated mean squared distortion. Theencoder and the decoder are connected via a noiseless channel of capacity $R$ and both are assumed to have zero delay. No probabilistic assumptions are made on how the sequence to be encoded is generated. For any bounded sequence of length $n$, the distortion redundancy is defined as the normalized cumulative distortion of the sequential scheme minus the normalized cumulative distortion of the best scalarquantizer of rate $R$ which is matched to this particular sequence. We demonstrate the existence of a zero-delay sequential scheme which uses common randomization in the encoder and the decoder such that the normalized maximum distortion redundancy converges to zero at a rate $n^{-1/5}\log n$ as the length of the encoded sequence $n$ increases without bound.

Reputation and honesty in a market for information

Previous works on asymmetric information in asset markets tendto focus on the potential gains in the asset market itself. We focus on the market for information and conduct an experimental study to explore, in a game of finite but uncertain duration, whether reputation can be an effective constraint on deliberate misinformation. At the beginning of each period, an uninformed potential asset buyer can purchase information, at a fixed price and from a fully-informed source, about the value of the asset in that period. The informational insiders cannot purchase the asset and are given short-term incentives to provide false information when the asset value is low. Our model predicts that, in accordance with the Folk Theorem, Pareto-superior outcomes featuring truthful revelation should be sustainable. However, this depends critically on beliefs about rationality and behavior. We find that, overall, sellers are truthful 89% of the time. More significantly, the observed frequency of truthfulness is 81% when the asset value is low. Our result is consistent with both mixed-strategy and trigger strategy interpretations and provides evidence that most subjects correctly anticipate rational behavior. We discuss applications to financial markets, media regulation, and the stability of cartels.

Processes and consequences in business ethical dilemmas: The oil industry and climate changes

This paper proposes a framework to examine business ethical dilemmas andbusiness attitudes towards such dilemmas. Business ethical dilemmas canbe understood as reflecting a contradiction between a socially detrimentalprocess and a self-interested profitable consequence. This representationallows us to distinguish two forms of behavior differing by whetherpriority is put on consequences or on processes. We argue that theseforms imply very different business attitudes towards society:controversial or competitive for the former and aligned or cooperativefor the latter. These attitudes are then analyzed at the discursive level in order to address the question of good faith in businessargumentation, i.e. to which extent are these attitudes consistent withactual business behaviors. We argue that consequential attitudes mostlyinvolve communication and lobbying actions aiming at eluding the dilemma.Therefore, the question of good faith for consequential attitudes liesin the consistency between beliefs and discourse. On the other hand,procedural attitudes acknowledge the dilemma and claim a change of theprocess of behavior. They thus raise the question of the consistencybetween discourses and actual behavior. We apply this processes/consequencesframework to the case of the oil industry s climate change ethical dilemmawhich comes forth as a dilemma between emitting greenhouse gases and making more profits . And we examine the different attitudes of two oilcorporations-BP Amoco and ExxonMobil-towards the dilemma.