Multi-sample analysis of moment-structures: Asymptotic validity of inferences based on second-order moments

In moment structure analysis with nonnormal data, asymptotic valid inferences require the computation of a consistent (under general distributional assumptions) estimate of the matrix $\Gamma$ of asymptotic variances of sample second--order moments. Such a consistent estimate involves the fourth--order sample moments of the data. In practice, the use of fourth--order moments leads to computational burden and lack of robustness against small samples. In this paper we show that, under certain assumptions, correct asymptotic inferences can be attained when $\Gamma$ is replaced by a matrix $\Omega$ that involves only the second--order moments of the data. The present paper extends to the context of multi--sample analysis of second--order moment structures, results derived in the context of (simple--sample) covariance structure analysis (Satorra and Bentler, 1990). The results apply to a variety of estimation methods and general type of statistics. An example involving a test of equality of means under covariance restrictions illustrates theoretical aspects of the paper.

Scaled and adjusted restricted tests in multi-sample analysis of moment structures

We extend to score, Wald and difference test statistics the scaled and adjusted corrections to goodness-of-fit test statistics developed in Satorra and Bentler (1988a,b). The theory is framed in the general context of multisample analysis of moment structures, under general conditions on the distribution of observable variables. Computational issues, as well as the relation of the scaled and corrected statistics to the asymptotic robust ones, is discussed. A Monte Carlo study illustrates thecomparative performance in finite samples of corrected score test statistics.

Bringing game theory to hypothesis testing: Establishing finite sample bounds on inference

Small sample properties are of fundamental interest when only limited data is avail-able. Exact inference is limited by constraints imposed by speci.c nonrandomizedtests and of course also by lack of more data. These e¤ects can be separated as we propose to evaluate a test by comparing its type II error to the minimal type II error among all tests for the given sample. Game theory is used to establish this minimal type II error, the associated randomized test is characterized as part of a Nash equilibrium of a .ctitious game against nature.We use this method to investigate sequential tests for the di¤erence between twomeans when outcomes are constrained to belong to a given bounded set. Tests ofinequality and of noninferiority are included. We .nd that inference in terms oftype II error based on a balanced sample cannot be improved by sequential sampling or even by observing counter factual evidence providing there is a reasonable gap between the hypotheses.

Some hypothesis tests for the covariance matrix when the dimension is large compared to the sample size

This paper analyzes whether standard covariance matrix tests work whendimensionality is large, and in particular larger than sample size. Inthe latter case, the singularity of the sample covariance matrix makeslikelihood ratio tests degenerate, but other tests based on quadraticforms of sample covariance matrix eigenvalues remain well-defined. Westudy the consistency property and limiting distribution of these testsas dimensionality and sample size go to infinity together, with theirratio converging to a finite non-zero limit. We find that the existingtest for sphericity is robust against high dimensionality, but not thetest for equality of the covariance matrix to a given matrix. For thelatter test, we develop a new correction to the existing test statisticthat makes it robust against high dimensionality.

Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need toborrow from banks. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitiveequilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added to provide entrepreneurs withadditional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of thisadditional market is that it must be non-exclusive, in the sense that entrepreneurs must be ableto simultaneously borrow from many different lenders operating in it. This makes it possible toattain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new market while separating them in themarket for bank loans.

Temporary help agencies and workers' occupational mobility

This paper focuses on the occupational mobility of temporary helpagency workers by studying their job-to-job upgrading chances as opposedto those who have not been hired through these intermediaries. A screeningapproach to the role of those labor brokers suggests that agency workersmay expect greater chances of upgrading from one occupation to another.Results obtained with a sample of Spanish workers show that workingthrough those intermediaries comparatively offers stronger prospects ofoccupational upgrading for workers of a medium qualification level. Thisbasic result is reinforced when the existence of self-selection into thistype of intermediated work is appropriately taken into account.

Honey, I shrunk the sample covariance matrix

The central message of this paper is that nobody should be using the samplecovariance matrix for the purpose of portfolio optimization. It containsestimation error of the kind most likely to perturb a mean-varianceoptimizer. In its place, we suggest using the matrix obtained from thesample covariance matrix through a transformation called shrinkage. Thistends to pull the most extreme coefficients towards more central values,thereby systematically reducing estimation error where it matters most.Statistically, the challenge is to know the optimal shrinkage intensity,and we give the formula for that. Without changing any other step in theportfolio optimization process, we show on actual stock market data thatshrinkage reduces tracking error relative to a benchmark index, andsubstantially increases the realized information ratio of the activeportfolio manager.

Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects needto borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, thecompetitive equilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurswith additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic ofthese additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it doesnot condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attainefficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the marketsfor monitored loans.

Hiring and firing costs, adverse selection and long-term unemployment

In this paper, we present a matching model with adverse selection that explains why flows into and out of unemployment are much lower in Europe compared to North America, while employment-to-employment flows are similar in the two continents. In the model,firms use discretion in terms of whom to fire and, thus, low quality workers are more likely to be dismissed than high quality workers. Moreover, as hiring and firing costs increase, firms find it more costly to hire a bad worker and, thus, they prefer to hire out of the pool of employed job seekers rather than out of the pool of the unemployed, who are more likely to turn out to be 'lemons'. We use microdata for Spain and the U.S. and find that the ratio of the job finding probability of the unemployed to the job finding probability of employed job seekers was smaller in Spain than in the U.S. Furthermore, using U.S. data, we find that the discrimination of the unemployed increased over the 1980's in those states that raised firing costs by introducing exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine.

Drivers and sources of supply flexibility: An exploratory study

Purpose - There has been much research on manufacturing flexibility, but supply chain flexibility is still an under-investigated area. This paper focuses on supply flexibility, the aspects of flexibility related to the upstream supply chain. Our purpose is to investigate why and how firms increase supply flexibility.Methodology/Approach An exploratory multiple case study was conducted. We analyzed seven Spanish manufacturers from different sectors (automotive, apparel, electronics and electrical equipment).Findings - The results show that there are some major reasons why firms need supply flexibility (manufacturing schedule fluctuations, JIT purchasing, manufacturing slack capacity, low level of parts commonality, demand volatility, demand seasonality and forecast accuracy), and that companies increase this type of flexibility by implementing two main strategies: to increase suppliers responsiveness capability and flexible sourcing . The results also suggest that the supply flexibility strategy selected depends on two factors: the supplier searching and switching costs and the type of uncertainty (mix, volume or delivery).Research limitations - This paper has some limitations common to all case studies, such as the subjectivity of the analysis, and the questionable generalizability of results (since the sample of firms is not statistically significant).Implications - Our study contributes to the existing literature by empirically investigating which are the main reasons for companies needing to increase supply flexibility, how they increase this flexibility, and suggesting some factors that could influence the selection of a particular supply flexibility strategy.

Dynamic adverse selection and debt

This paper argues that the strategic use of debt favours the revelationof information in dynamic adverse selection problems. Our argument is basedon the idea that debt is a credible commitment to end long term relationships.Consequently, debt encourages a privately informed party to disclose itsinformation at early stages of a relationship. We illustrate our pointwith the financing decision of a monopolist selling a good to a buyerwhose valuation is private information. A high level of (renegotiable)debt, by increasing the scope for liquidation, may induce the highvaluation buyer to buy early at a high price and thus increase themonopolist's expected payoff. By affecting the buyer's strategy, it mayreduce the probability of excessive liquidation. We investigate theconsequences of good durability and we examine the way debt mayalleviate the ratchet effect.

Long-run selection and the work ethic

That individuals contribute in social dilemma interactions even when contributing is costly is a well-established observation in the experimental literature. Since a contributor is always strictly worse off than a non-contributor the question is raised if an intrinsic motivation to contribute can survive in an evolutionary setting. Using recent results on deterministic approximation of stochastic evolutionary dynamics we give conditions for equilibria with a positive number of contributors to be selected in the long run.

Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: An experimental study

We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertaintyabout the payoffs. Our game is closely related to models that have beenused in many macroeconomic and financial applications to solve problemsof equilibrium indeterminacy. In our experiment each subject receives anoisy signal about the true payoffs. This game has a unique strategyprofile that survives the iterative deletion of strictly dominatedstrategies (thus a unique Nash equilibrium). The equilibrium outcomecoincides, on average, with the risk-dominant equilibrium outcome ofthe underlying coordination game. The behavior of the subjects convergesto the theoretical prediction after enough experience has been gained. The data (and the comments) suggest that subjects do not apply through"a priori" reasoning the iterated deletion of dominated strategies.Instead, they adapt to the responses of other players. Thus, the lengthof the learning phase clearly varies for the different signals. We alsotest behavior in a game without uncertainty as a benchmark case. The gamewith uncertainty is inspired by the "global" games of Carlsson and VanDamme (1993).

Optimal contracts, adverse selection and social preferences: An experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.