Contractual resolutions of financial distress

In a financial contracting model, we study the optimal debt structure to resolve financial distress. Weshow that a debt structure where two distinct debt classes co-exist - one class fully concentrated andwith control rights upon default, the other dispersed and without control rights - removes the controllingcreditor's liquidation bias when investor protection is strong. These results rationalize the use and theperformance of floating charge financing, debt financing where the controlling creditor takes the entirebusiness as collateral, in countries with strong investor protection. Our theory predicts that the efficiency ofcontractual resolutions of financial distress should increase with investor protection.

High-growth cooperatives: Financial profile and key factors for competitiveness

Given the current economic environment, high-growth companies are particularly relevant for their contribution to employment generation and wealth.This paper discusses the results of a survey that was conducted in order to gain a deeper understanding of high-growth cooperatives through analyzing their financial profiles and then identifying key contributing factors to their growth. To do this, we compared this particular sample with other cooperatives and other high-growth mercantile companies.The results show the main drivers related to high-growth companies success. They are the competitive advantages based on the surveyed group, modern management techniques, quality and productivity, innovation and internationalization. Additionally, we have observed some financial strengths and weaknesses. In this sense, they are under capitalized companies with an unbalanced growth.

Adoption of financial technologies: Implications for money demand and monetary policy

In this paper we argue that inventory models are probably not usefulmodels of household money demand because the majority of households does nothold any interest bearing assets. The relevant decision for most people is notthe fraction of assets to be held in interest bearing form, but whether to holdany of such assets at all. The implications of this realization are interesting and important. We find that(a) the elasticity of money demand is very small when the interest rate is small,(b) the probability that a household holds any amount of interest bearing assetsis positively related to the level of financial assets, and (c) the cost ofadopting financial technologies is positively related to age and negatively relatedto the level of education. Unlike the traditional methods of money demand estimation, our methodology allowsfor the estimation of the interest--elasticity at low values of the nominalinterest rate. The finding that the elasticity is very small for interest ratesbelow 5 percent suggests that the welfare costs of inflation are small. At interest rates of 6 percent, the elasticity is close to 0.5. We find thatroughly one half of this elasticity can be attributed to the Baumol--Tobin orintensive margin and half of it can be attributed to the new adopters or extensivemargin. The intensive margin is less important at lower interest rates and moreimportant at higher interest rates.

Quasi-integration in less-than-truckload trucking

This work studies the organization of less-than-truckload trucking from a contractual point of view. We show that the huge number of owner-operators working in the industry hides a much less fragmented reality. Most of those owner-operators are quasi-integrated in higher organizational structures. This hybrid form is generally more efficient than vertical integration because, in the Spanish institutional environment, it lessens serious moral hazard problems, related mainly to the use of the vehicles, and makes it possible to reach economies of scale and density. Empirical evidence suggests that what leads organizations to vertically integrate is not the presence of such economies but hold-up problems, related to the existence of specific assets. Finally, an international comparison hints that institutional constraints are able to explain differences in the evolution of vertical integration across countries.

Logistics-production, logistics-marketing and external integration: Their impact on performance

Highly competitive environments are leading companies to implement SupplyChain Management (SCM) to improve performance and gain a competitiveadvantage. SCM involves integration, co-ordination and collaborationacross organisations and throughout the supply chain. It means that SCMrequires internal (intraorganisational) and external (interorganisational)integration. This paper examines the Logistics-Production and Logistics-Marketing interfaces and their relation with the external integrationprocess. The study also investigates the causal impact of these internaland external relationships on the company s logistical service performance.To analyse this, an empirical study was conducted in the Spanish Fast MovingConsumer Goods (FMCG) sector.

Regulating financial conglomerates

We investigate the optimal regulation of financial conglomerates which combinea bank and a non-bank financial institution. The conglomerate s risk-taking incentivesdepend upon the level of market discipline it faces, which in turn isdetermined by the conglomerate s liability strucure. We examine optimal capitalrequirements for standalone institutions, for integrated financial conglomerates,and for financial conglomerates that are structured as holding companies.For a given risk profile, integrated conglomerates have a lower probability offailure than either their standalone or decentralised equivalent. However, whenrisk profiles are endogenously selected conglomeration may extend the reachof the deposit insurance safety net and hence provide incentives for increasedrisk-taking. As a result, integrated conglomerates may optimally attract highercapital requirements. In contrast, decentralised conglomerates are able to holdassets in the socially most efficient place. Their optimal capital requirementsencourage this. Hence, the practice of regulatory arbitrage , or of transferingassets from one balance sheet to another, is welfare-increasing. We discuss thepolicy implications of our finding in the context not only of the present debateon the regulation of financial conglomerates but also in the light of existingUS bank holding company regulation.

A dilution cost approach to financial intermediation and securities markets

This paper proposes a model of financial markets and corporate finance,with asymmetric information and no taxes, where equity issues, Bankdebt and Bond financing may all co-exist in equilibrium. The paperemphasizes the relationship Banking aspect of financial intermediation:firms turn to banks as a source of investment mainly because banks aregood at helping them through times of financial distress. The debtrestructuring service that banks may offer, however, is costly. Therefore,the firms which do not expect to be financially distressed prefer toobtain a cheaper market source of funding through bond or equity issues.This explains why bank lending and bond financing may co-exist inequilibrium. The reason why firms or banks also issue equity in our modelis simply to avoid bankruptcy. Banks have the additional motive that theyneed to satisfy minimum capital adequacy requeriments. Several types ofequilibria are possible, one of which has all the main characteristics ofa "credit crunch". This multiplicity implies that the channels of monetarypolicy may depend on the type of equilibrium that prevails, leadingsometimes to support a "credit view" and other times the classical "moneyview".

Subcontracting and vertical integration in the Spanish cotton industry

This paper examines changes in the organization of the Spanish cotton industry from 1720 to 1860 in its core region of Catalonia. As the Spanish cotton industry adopted the most modern technology and experienced the transition to the factory system, cotton spinning and weaving mills became increasingly vertically integrated. Asset specificity more than other factors explained this tendency towards vertical integration. The probability for a firm of being vertically integrated was higher among firms located in districts with high concentration ratios and rose with size and the use of modern machinery. Simultaneously, subcontracting predominated in other phases of production and distribution where transaction costs appears to be less important.

Financial intermediation and equity investment with costly monitoring

This paper studies the efficiency of equilibria in a productive OLG economy where the process of financial intermediation is characterized by costly state verification. Both competitive equilibria and Constrained Pareto Optimal allocations are characterized. It is shown that market outcomes can be socially inefficient, even when a weaker notion than Pareto optimality is considered.

Rethinking the effects of financial liberalization

During the last few decades, many emerging markets have lifted restrictions on cross-borderfinancial transactions. The conventional view was that this would allow these countries to: (i)receive capital inflows from advanced countries that would finance higher investment and growth;(ii) insure against aggregate shocks and reduce consumption volatility; and (iii) accelerate thedevelopment of domestic financial markets and achieve a more efficient domestic allocationof capital and better sharing of individual risks. However, the evidence suggests that thisconventional view was wrong.In this paper, we present a simple model that can account for the observed effects of financialliberalization. The model emphasizes the role of imperfect enforcement of domestic debts and theinteractions between domestic and international financial transactions. In the model, financialliberalization might lead to different outcomes: (i) domestic capital flight and ambiguous effectson net capital flows, investment, and growth; (ii) large capital inflows and higher investmentand growth; or (iii) volatile capital flows and unstable domestic financial markets. The modelshows how these outcomes depend on the level of development, the depth of domestic financialmarkets, and the quality of institutions.