114 resultados para Democracy
Resumo:
In this article, I firstly offer a synthesis of a brief set of analytical elements of the theory of democracy and federalism established in the recent debate which identify a number of flaws in the normative and institutional bases of plurinational democracies. It is necessary to overcome these flaws in order to achieve a true political and constitutional recognition and accommodation of the national pluralism of this kind of liberal democracies (section 1). Secondly, we will focus on the Spanish case of the “Estado de las Autonomías” taking into account the recent reform of the Catalan constitutional law (Estatut d’autonomia 2006) (section 2). A final section makes a number of concluding remarks relating the previously highlighted elements of the theory of democracy and federalism with the analysis of the Catalan case (section 3).
Resumo:
In light of the existing theories about institutional change, this paper seeks to advance a common framework to understand the unfolding of decentralization and federalization in three countries: Brazil, Spain, and South Africa. Although in different continents, these three countries witnessed processes after their respective transitions to democracy that transferred administrative and fiscal authority to their regions (decentralization) and vertically distributed political and institutional capacity (federalization). This paper attempts to explain how institutional changes prompted a shift of power and authority towards regional governments by looking at internal sources of change within the intergovernmental arena in the three countries. This analysis is organized around two propositions: that once countries transit to democracy under all-encompassing constitutions there are high incentives for institutional change, and that under a bargained intergovernmental interaction among political actors subnational political elites are able to advance their interests incrementally. In short, through a common framework this paper will explain the evolving dynamics of intergovernmental dynamics in three countries.
Resumo:
Opinion polls are widely used to capture public sentiments on a varietyof issues. If citizens are unwilling to reveal certain policy preferences toothers, opinion polls may fail to characterize population preferences accurately.The innovation of this paper is to use unique data to measurebiases in opinion polls for a broad range of policies. I combine data on184 referenda held in Switzerland between 1987 and 2007, with postballotsurveys that ask for each proposal how the citizens voted. Thedifference between stated preferences in the survey and revealed preferences at the ballot box provides a direct measure of bias in opinion polls.I find that these biases vary by policy areas, with the largest ones occurring in policies on immigration, international integration, and votesinvolving liberal/conservative attitudes. Also, citizens show a tendencyto respond in accordance to the majority.
Resumo:
Gray (1988) has put forward a hypothesis on how a national accountingenvironment might reflect the cultural dimensions identified by Hofstede (1980, 1983). A number of studies have tested Gray's hypothesis, including one by Pourjalali and Meek (1995) which identified a match between changes in cultural dimensions and the accounting environment in Iran following the revolution. In this paper we replicate this work in the context of Spain following the death of Franco in 1975 and the emergence of a democratic constitution in 1978. Specifically, we: 1) Consider Gray's hypothesis built on Hofstede's cultural dimensions and review some empirical tests of the hypotheses.2) Building on the work of Hofstede and Gray, we: put forward some hypotheses on how we would expect cultural dimensions to change in Spain with the transition to democracy.3) Review developments in accounting in Spain following the transition to democracy, in order to identify how well these fit with our hypotheses.
Resumo:
Throughout the 19th century and until the mid-20th century, in terms of long-terminvestment in human capital and, above all, in education, Spain lagged far behind theinternational standards and, more specifically, the levels attained by its neighbours inEurope. In 1900, only 55% of the population could read; in 1950, the figure was 93%.This no doubt contributed to a pattern of slower economic growth in which thephysical strength required for agricultural work, measured here through height, had alarger impact than education on economic growth. It was not until the 1970s, with thearrival of democracy, that the Spanish education system was modernized and theinfluence of education on economic growth increased.
Resumo:
Social capital a dense network of associations facilitating cooperation within a community typically leads to positive political and economic outcomes, as demonstrated by a large literature following Putnam. A growing literature emphasizes the potentially "dark side" of social capital. This paper examines the role of social capital in the downfall of democracy in interwar Germany by analyzing Nazi party entry rates in a cross-section of towns and cities. Before the Nazi Party's triumphs at the ballot box, it built an extensive organizational structure, becoming a mass movement with nearly a million members by early 1933. We show that dense networks of civic associations such as bowling clubs, animal breeder associations, or choirs facilitated the rise of the Nazi Party. The effects are large: Towns with one standard deviation higher association density saw at least one-third faster growth in the strength of the Nazi Party. IV results based on 19th century measures of social capital reinforce our conclusions. In addition, all types of associations veteran associations and non-military clubs, "bridging" and "bonding" associations positively predict NS party entry. These results suggest that social capital in Weimar Germany aided the rise of the Nazi movement that ultimately destroyed Germany's first democracy.
Resumo:
We present a theory of the choice of alternative democratic constitutions, a majoritarian or a consensual one, in an unequal society. A majoritarian democracy redistributes resources from the collectivity toward relatively few people, and has a relatively small government and low level of taxation. A consensual democracy redistributes resources toward a broader spectrum of social groups but also has a larger government and a higher level of taxation. We show that a consensual system turns out to be preferred by society when ex ante income inequality is relatively low, while a majoritarian system is chosen when income inequality is relatively high. We also obtain that consensual democracies should be expected to be ruled more often by center-left coalitions while the right should have an advantage in majoritarian constitutions. The implications for the relationship between inequality and redistribution are discussed. Historical evidence and a cross-sectional analysis support our results.
Resumo:
Foreign aid provides a windfall of resources to recipient countries and may result in the same rent seeking behavior as documented in the curse of natural resources literature. In this paper we discuss this effect and document its magnitude. Using data for 108 recipient countries in the period 1960 to 1999, we find that foreign aid has a negative impact on democracy. In particular, if the foreign aid over GDP that a country receives over a period of five years reaches the 75th percentile in the sample, then a 10-point index of democracy is reduced between 0.6 and one point, a large effect. For comparison, we also measure the effect of oil rents on political institutions. The fall in democracy if oil revenues reach the 75th percentile is smaller, (0.02). Aid is a bigger curse than oil.
Resumo:
According to the economic approach to politicaltransitions, transitory negative economic shocks can open a windowof opportunity for democratic improvement. Testing the theoryrequires a source of transitory shocks to the aggregate economy. Weuse rainfall shocks in Sub-Saharan African countries and find thatnegative rainfall shocks are followed by significant improvement indemocratic institutions. Instrumental variables estimates indicate thatfollowing a transitory negative income shock of 1 percent,democracy scores improve by 0.9 percentage points and theprobability of a democratic transition increases by 1.3 percentagepoints.
Resumo:
L’èxit de l’iniciativa ciutadana europea (ICE) com a instrument de democràcia directa a nivell europeu està directament relacionat amb la seva promulgació. Els ciutadans d’arreu Europa han d’estar informats sobre aquest nou mecanisme per tal que es dugui a terme, la qual cosa suposa una dificultat. Aquest estudi qualitatiu ens mostra els recursos i problemes en la divulgació de les ICE. Una anàlisi basat en entrevistes amb diferents organitzadors d’aquestes ICE que ens dona algunes idees sobre les seves estratègies de comunicació, així com l’ús d’eines de comunicació i relacions amb els mitjans de comunicació. A banda de les dificultats lingüístiques i financeres hi ha altres obstacles més específics relacionats amb l’ICE.
Resumo:
We analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition, and interpret the findings as being indicative of the influence wielded by land development lobbies. We use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 2003-2007. In Spain, land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities having periodically to pass compre- hensive land use plans. The main policy variable in these plans, and the one analyzed here, is the amount of land classified for potential development. We measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government. We instrument this variable using the number of votes obtained by parties represented in local government when standing at the first national legislative elections following the re-establishment of democracy, and the number of votes they actually obtained regionally at the national legislative elections. The results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development. This effect is found to be most marked in suburbs, in towns with a high percent of commuters and homeowners, and in municipalities governed by the left.
Resumo:
As adult height is a well-established retrospective measure of health and standard of living, it is important to understand the factors that determine it. Among them, the influence of socio-environmental factors has been subjected to empirical scrutiny. This paper explores the influence of generational (or environmental) effects and individual and gender-specific heterogeneity on adult height. Our data set is from contemporary Spain, a country governed by an authoritarian regime between 1939 and 1977. First, we use normal position and quantile regression analysis to identify the determinants of self-reported adult height and to measure the influence of individual heterogeneity. Second, we use a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition approach to explain the `gender height gap¿ and its distribution, so as to measure the influence on this gap of individual heterogeneity. Our findings suggest a significant increase in adult height in the generations that benefited from the country¿s economic liberalization in the 1950s, and especially those brought up after the transition to democracy in the 1970s. In contrast, distributional effects on height suggest that only in recent generations has ¿height increased more among the tallest¿. Although the mean gender height gap is 11 cm, generational effects and other controls such as individual capabilities explain on average roughly 5% of this difference, a figure that rises to 10% in the lowest 10% quantile.
Resumo:
We analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition, and interpret the findings as being indicative of the influence wielded by land development lobbies. We use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 2003-2007. In Spain, land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities having periodically to pass compre- hensive land use plans. The main policy variable in these plans, and the one analyzed here, is the amount of land classified for potential development. We measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government. We instrument this variable using the number of votes obtained by parties represented in local government when standing at the first national legislative elections following the re-establishment of democracy, and the number of votes they actually obtained regionally at the national legislative elections. The results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development. This effect is found to be most marked in suburbs, in towns with a high percent of commuters and homeowners, and in municipalities governed by the left.
Resumo:
As adult height is a well-established retrospective measure of health and standard of living, it is important to understand the factors that determine it. Among them, the influence of socio-environmental factors has been subjected to empirical scrutiny. This paper explores the influence of generational (or environmental) effects and individual and gender-specific heterogeneity on adult height. Our data set is from contemporary Spain, a country governed by an authoritarian regime between 1939 and 1977. First, we use normal position and quantile regression analysis to identify the determinants of self-reported adult height and to measure the influence of individual heterogeneity. Second, we use a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition approach to explain the `gender height gap¿ and its distribution, so as to measure the influence on this gap of individual heterogeneity. Our findings suggest a significant increase in adult height in the generations that benefited from the country¿s economic liberalization in the 1950s, and especially those brought up after the transition to democracy in the 1970s. In contrast, distributional effects on height suggest that only in recent generations has ¿height increased more among the tallest¿. Although the mean gender height gap is 11 cm, generational effects and other controls such as individual capabilities explain on average roughly 5% of this difference, a figure that rises to 10% in the lowest 10% quantile.