60 resultados para regret aversion
Resumo:
Some current utility models presume that people are concerned with their relative standing in a reference group. If this is true, do certain types care more about this than others? Using simple binary decisions and self-reported happiness, we investigate both the prevalence of ``difference aversion'' and whether happiness levels influence the taste for social comparisons. Our decision tasks distinguish between a person s desire to achieving the social optimum, equality or advantageous relative standing. Most people appear to disregard relative payoffs, instead typically making choices resulting in higher social payoffs. While we do not find a strong general correlation between happiness and concern for relative payoffs, we do observe that a willingness to lower another person s payoff below one s own (competitive preferences) seems correlated with unhappiness.
Resumo:
In this paper we consider the equilibrium effects of an institutionalinvestor whose performance is benchmarked to an index. In a partialequilibrium setting, the objective of the institutional investor is modeledas the maximization of expected utility (an increasing and concave function,in order to accommodate risk aversion) of final wealth minus a benchmark.In equilibrium this optimal strategy gives rise to the two-beta CAPM inBrennan (1993): together with the market beta a new risk-factor (that wecall active management risk) is brought into the analysis. This new betais deffined as the normalized (to the benchmark's variance) covariancebetween the asset excess return and the excess return of the market overthe benchmark index. Different to Brennan, the empirical test supports themodel's predictions. The cross-section return on the active management riskis positive and signifficant especially after 1990, when institutionalinvestors have become the representative agent of the market.
Resumo:
Are poor people more or less likely to take money risks than wealthy folks?We find that risk attraction is more prevalent among the wealthy when theamounts of money at risk are small (not surprising, since ten dollars is asmaller amount for a wealthy person than for a poor one), but, interestingly,for the larger amounts of money at risk the fraction of the nonwealthydisplaying risk attraction exceeds that of the wealthy.We also replicate our previous finding that many people display riskattraction for small money amounts, but risk aversion for large ones. Weargue that preferences yielding risk attraction for small money amounts,together with risk aversion for larger amounts, at all levels of wealth, while contradicting the expected utility hypothesis, may be well-defined,independently of reference points, on the choice space.
Resumo:
One plausible mechanism through which financial market shocks may propagate across countriesis through the impact that past gains and losses may have on investors risk aversion and behavior. This paper presents a stylized model illustrating how heterogeneous changes in investors risk aversion affect portfolio allocation decisions and stock prices. Our empirical findings suggest that when funds returns are below average, they adjust their holdings toward the average (or benchmark) portfolio. In so doing, funds tend to sell the assets of countries in which they were overweight , increasing their exposure to countries in which they were underweight. Based on this insight, the paper constructs an index of financial interdependence which reflects the extent to which countries share overexposed funds. The index helps in explain the pattern of stock market comovement across countries. Moreover, a comparison of this interdependence measure to indices of trade or commercial bank linkages indicates that our index can improve predictions about which countries are more likely to be affected by contagion from crisis centers.
Resumo:
We investigate on-line prediction of individual sequences. Given a class of predictors, the goal is to predict as well as the best predictor in the class, where the loss is measured by the self information (logarithmic) loss function. The excess loss (regret) is closely related to the redundancy of the associated lossless universal code. Using Shtarkov's theorem and tools from empirical process theory, we prove a general upper bound on the best possible (minimax) regret. The bound depends on certain metric properties of the class of predictors. We apply the bound to both parametric and nonparametric classes ofpredictors. Finally, we point out a suboptimal behavior of the popular Bayesian weighted average algorithm.
Resumo:
In this paper we present a simple theory-based measure of the variations in aggregate economic efficiency: the gap between the marginal product of labor and the household s consumption/leisure tradeoff. We show that this indicator corresponds to the inverse of the markup of price over social marginal cost, and give some evidence in support of this interpretation. We then show that, with some auxilliary assumptions our gap variable may be used to measure the efficiency costs of business fluctuations. We find that the latter costs are modest on average. However, to the extent the flexible price equilibrium is distorted,the gross efficiency losses from recessions and gains from booms may be large. Indeed, we find that the major recessions involved large efficiency losses. These results hold for reasonable parameterizations of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and steady state distortions.
Resumo:
We test whether risk attitudes change when losses instead of gains areinvolved. The study of gain-loss asymmetries has been largely confinedto reflected choices, where all the money amounts of a positiveprospect are multiplied by minus one. We define the decomposition reflection = translation + probability switch, and experimentally findboth a translation effect (risk attraction becomes more frequent whengains are translated into losses) and a probability switch effect (riskattraction becomes more frequent when the probability of the best outcomedecreases). Surprisingly, the switch effect is somewhat stronger than thetranslation effect, negating a conventional reflection effect when onestarts with choices between gains with a low probability of the bestoutcome. We conclude by arguing that, while both the translation effectand the switch effect contradict the expected utility hypothesis, thetranslation effect implies a deeper violation of standard preference theory.
Resumo:
We consider an agent who has to repeatedly make choices in an uncertainand changing environment, who has full information of the past, who discountsfuture payoffs, but who has no prior. We provide a learning algorithm thatperforms almost as well as the best of a given finite number of experts orbenchmark strategies and does so at any point in time, provided the agentis sufficiently patient. The key is to find the appropriate degree of forgettingdistant past. Standard learning algorithms that treat recent and distant pastequally do not have the sequential epsilon optimality property.
Resumo:
A welfare analysis of unemployment insurance (UI) is performed in a generalequilibrium job search model. Finitely-lived, risk-averse workers smooth consumption over time by accumulating assets, choose search effort whenunemployed, and suffer disutility from work. Firms hire workers, purchasecapital, and pay taxes to finance worker benefits; their equity is the assetaccumulated by workers. A matching function relates unemployment, hiringexpenditure, and search effort to the formation of jobs. The model is calibrated to US data; the parameters relating job search effort to the probability of job finding are chosen to match microeconomic studies ofunemployment spells. Under logarithmic utility, numerical simulation shows rather small welfaregains from UI. Even without UI, workers smooth consumption effectivelythrough asset accumulation. Greater risk aversion leads to substantiallylarger welfare gains from UI; however, even in this case much of its welfareimpact is due not to consumption smoothing effects, but rather to decreased work disutility, or to a variety of externalities.
Resumo:
This paper analyzes the political economy of immigration when the salient electoralissue is the level of immigrants and the relevant immigration policy is the expenditurein immigration control. We consider that immigration affects voters? welfarethrough economic and non economic factors. We model political competition `a laWittman with the ideology of parties endogenously determined at equilibrium. Atequilibrium, parties propose different levels of immigration, located to the left and tothe right of the median voter?s ideal point, and combine skilled and unskilled workersamong their constituencies. Numerical simulations provide the levels of immigrationproposed by the two parties and the composition of parties? constituencies as we varythe efficacy of immigration control and the intensity of immigration aversion.
Resumo:
During the Greek debt crisis after 2010, the German government insisted on harshausterity measures. This led to a rapid cooling of relations between the Greekand German governments. We compile a new index of public acrimony betweenGermany and Greece based on newspaper reports and internet search terms. Thisinformation is combined with historical maps on German war crimes during theoccupation between 1941 and 1944. During months of open conflict between Germanand Greek politicians, German car sales fell markedly more than those of cars fromother countries. This was especially true in areas affected by German reprisals duringWorldWar II: areas where German troops committed massacres and destroyed entirevillages curtailed their purchases of German cars to a greater extent during conflictmonths than other parts of Greece. We conclude that cultural aversion was a keydeterminant of purchasing behavior, and that memories of past conflict can affecteconomic choices in a time-varying fashion. These findings are compatible withbehavioral models emphasizing the importance of salience for individual decision-making.
Resumo:
We experimentally question the assertion of Prospect Theory that people display risk attraction in choices involving high-probability losses. Indeed, our experimental participants tend to avoid fair risks for large (up to ? 90), high-probability (80%) losses. Our research hinges on a novel experimental method designed to alleviate the house-money bias that pervades experiments with real (not hypothetical) loses.Our results vindicate Daniel Bernoulli?s view that risk aversion is the dominant attitude,But, contrary to the Bernoulli-inspired canonical expected utility theory, we do find frequent risk attraction for small amounts of money at stake.In any event, we attempt neither to test expected utility versus nonexpected utility theories, nor to contribute to the important literature that estimates value and weighting functions. The question that we ask is more basic, namely: do people display risk aversion when facing large losses, or large gains? And, at the risk of oversimplifying, our answer is yes.
Resumo:
El presente artículo pretende ampliar el modelo original de SANDMO (Journal of Public Economics, 1981 , Vol. 16), relativo a evasión e imposición óptima, en dos direcciones. De un lado, haciendo extensivo el marco de preferencias redistributivas hacia otros objetivos sociales distintos del utilitarista; asimismo, permitiendo el que los sujetos no defraudadores puedan diferir entre sí, de acuerdo con la bibliografía más corriente sobre el tema, por razón de la capacidad productiva que posean en el mercado de trabajo. Dichas modificaciones, además de deslindar los aspectos de aversión al riesgo de lo que propiamente es el grado de concavidad de la función de bienestar, facilitan una más completa descripción del modo como operan los factores que inciden en la conducta del contribuyente.
Resumo:
We empirically investigate the determinants of EMU sovereign bond yield spreads with respect to the German bund. Using panel data techniques, we examine the role of a wide set of potential drivers. To our knowledge, this paper presents one of the most exhaustive compilations of the variables used in the literature to study the behaviour of sovereign yield spreads and, in particular, to gauge the effect on these spreads of changes in market sentiment and risk aversion. We use a sample of both central and peripheral countries from January 1999 to December 2012 and assess whether there were significant changes after the outbreak of the euro area debt crisis. Our results suggest that the rise in sovereign risk in central countries can only be partially explained by the evolution of local macroeconomic variables in those countries.
Resumo:
We empirically investigate the determinants of EMU sovereign bond yield spreads with respect to the German bund. Using panel data techniques, we examine the role of a wide set of potential drivers. To our knowledge, this paper presents one of the most exhaustive compilations of the variables used in the literature to study the behaviour of sovereign yield spreads and, in particular, to gauge the effect on these spreads of changes in market sentiment and risk aversion. We use a sample of both central and peripheral countries from January 1999 to December 2012 and assess whether there were significant changes after the outbreak of the euro area debt crisis. Our results suggest that the rise in sovereign risk in central countries can only be partially explained by the evolution of local macroeconomic variables in those countries.