Disseny i implementació de la base de dades: Sistema de votació ciutadana a nivell Europeu a través d'Internet

La Unió Europea necessita i per tant ens encarrega, un disseny de base de dades per tald'emmagatzemar la informació de futures eleccions ciutadanes a través d'Internet.

Economic and environmental effects of the CO2 taxation: an input-output analysis for Spain

CO2 emissions induced by human activities are the major cause of climate change; hence, strong environmental policy that limits the growing dependence on fossil fuel is indispensable. Tradable permits and environmental taxes are the usual tools used in CO2 reduction strategies. Such economic tools provide incentives to polluting industries to reduce their emissions through market signals. The aim of this work is to investigate the direct and indirect effects of an environmental tax on Spanish products and services. We apply an environmentally extended input-output (EIO) model to identify CO2 emission intensities of products and services and, accordingly, we estimate the tax proportional to these intensities. The short-term price effects are analyzed using an input-output price model. The effect of tax introduction on consumption prices and its influence on consumers’ welfare are determined. We also quantify the environmental impacts of such taxation in terms of the reduction in CO2 emissions. The results, based on the Spanish economy for the year 2007, show that sectors with relatively poor environmental profile are subjected to high environmental tax rates. And consequently, applying a CO2 tax on these sectors, increases production prices and induces a slight increase in consumer price index and a decrease in private welfare. The revenue from the tax could be used to counter balance the negative effects on social welfare and also to stimulate the increase of renewable energy shares in the most impacting sectors. Finally, our analysis highlights that the environmental and economic goals cannot be met at the same time with the environmental taxation and this shows the necessity of finding other (complementary or alternative) measures to ensure both the economic and ecological efficiencies. Keywords: CO2 emissions; environmental tax; input-output model, effects of environmental taxation.

An Inquiry into the use of illegal electoral practices and effects of political violence

This article investigates whether vote-buying and the instigation of violence in the disputed 2007 Kenyan elections were strategically motivated, and whether those affected by electoral violence changed their views towards ethno-politics and the use of violence. To answer these questions, a panel survey conducted before and after the elections is combined with external indicators of electoral violence. We find that political parties targeted vote-buying towards specific groups to weaken the support of their political rivals and to mobilize their own supporters. Furthermore, parties instigated violence strategically in areas where they were less likely to win. Although the victims of violence would prefer that parties are no longer allowed to organize in ethnic or religious lines, they are more likely to identify in ethnic terms, support the use of violence and avoid relying on the police to resolve disputes. The overall findings suggest an increased risk of electoral-violence reoccurring.

Uncertainty, electoral Incentives and political myopia

In this paper, we study the determinants of political myopia in a rational model of electoral accountability where the key elements are informational frictions and uncertainty. We build a framework where political ability is ex-ante unknown and policy choices are not perfectly observable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians invest too little in costly policies with future returns in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reelection probability. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty reduces political myopia and may, under some conditions, increase social welfare. We use the model to study how political rewards can be set so as to maximise social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of our theory are consistent with a number of stylised facts and with a new empirical observation documented in this paper: aggregate uncertainty, measured by economic volatility, is associated to better ...scal discipline in a panel of 20 OECD countries.

Spain in Europe 2004-2008

In March of 2004, the Observatory of European Foreign Policy published a special monograph about Spain in Europe (1996-2004) in digital format. The objective of the monograph was to analyse Spain’s foreign policy agenda and strategy during the period of José María Aznar’s presidency. As the title suggests, one of the initial suppositions of the analysis is the Europeanization of Spanish foreign activities. Is that how it was? Did Aznar’s Spain see the world and relate to it through Brussels? The publication was well received, considering the number of visits received and above all the institutions which asked to link the publication to their web pages. Among these, the EUobserver published the introduction to the piece in English titled Aznar: thinking locally, acting in Europe (described by the EUobserver as a paper of utmost importance). The fact that the elections were held three days after the tragic events of the 11th of March dramatically increased interest in Spain and the implications for Europe. This publication is the second of its type, in this case analysing the period of the Zapatero government (2004-2008). Once again the starting premise (the Europeanization of the agenda and the methods employed) has been considered by the analysts. And once again the articles collected in this publication serve to “triangulate” the analysis. Spain and Europe are two vertices (more or less distant, in essence and in form) which the authors handle in their analysis of the case (third vertex).

España en Europa 1996-2004

Pensar globalmente, actuar localmente” es un slogan imprescindible en el discurso político de nuestros días. Pues bien, la práctica política, en materia de Unión Europea, de los dos gobiernos del Partido Popular, presididos por José María Aznar (1996-2004), nos permite acuñar un slogan de signo bien diferente: “pensar localmente, actuar en Europa”. En efecto, si algo caracteriza a estos ocho años de práctica política de José María Aznar es haber convertido sus preocupaciones domésticas en factor exclusivo de su estrategia europea, con independencia del contexto de cada momento y de la necesidad de encajar objetivos nacionales con objetivos europeos. De ahí que sea lógico que la campaña electoral que ha precedido a las elecciones generales del 14 de marzo no haya recogido ninguno de los temas que dominan en la agenda de la UE en el momento actual. Ni la ampliación, ni la Constitución, ni tampoco el proceso de conformación de un núcleo duro tienen cabida en el debate político españo

Spain in Europe 1996-2004

“Thinking globally, acting locally" is an essential slogan in the current political discourse. Yet, in view of the policies on the European Union carried out by the two governments of the People’s Party (PP) headed by José María Aznar between 1996 and 2004, we could coin a quite different slogan: "thinking locally, acting in Europe". Indeed, José María Aznar’s policy-making during the last eight years has been characterised by turning his domestic concerns into the ‘exclusive factor’ of his European strategy, regardless of the context and the need for fitting in national objectives with Europeans’. Hence, it was natural that the electoral campaign preceding the general elections held on Sunday, 14 March, did not deal with any of the topics prevailing in the EU’s current agenda. Neither enlargement nor the Constitution, nor the process of shaping a core group within the EU, seem to have room in Spain’s political debate...

An electronic voting platform with elliptic curve cryptography

The future of elections seems to be electronic voting systems du to its advantatges over the traditional voting. Nowadays, there are some different paradigms to ensure the security and reliability of e-voting. This document is part of a wider project which presents an e-Voting platform based on elliptic curve cryptography. It uses an hybrid combination of two of the main e-Voting paradigms to guarantee privacy and security in the counting phase, these are precisely, the mixnets and the homomorphic protocols. This document is focused in the description of the system and the maths and programming needed to solve the homomorphic part of it. In later chapters, there is a comparison between a simple mixing system and our system proposal.

Assembling genes from predicted exons in linear time with dynamic programming

In a number of programs for gene structure prediction in higher eukaryotic genomic sequences, exon prediction is decoupled from gene assembly: a large pool of candidate exons is predicted and scored from features located in the query DNA sequence, and candidate genes are assembled from such a pool as sequences of nonoverlapping frame-compatible exons. Genes are scored as a function of the scores of the assembled exons, and the highest scoring candidate gene is assumed to be the most likely gene encoded by the query DNA sequence. Considering additive gene scoring functions, currently available algorithms to determine such a highest scoring candidate gene run in time proportional to the square of the number of predicted exons. Here, we present an algorithm whose running time grows only linearly with the size of the set of predicted exons. Polynomial algorithms rely on the fact that, while scanning the set of predicted exons, the highest scoring gene ending in a given exon can be obtained by appending the exon to the highest scoring among the highest scoring genes ending at each compatible preceding exon. The algorithm here relies on the simple fact that such highest scoring gene can be stored and updated. This requires scanning the set of predicted exons simultaneously by increasing acceptor and donor position. On the other hand, the algorithm described here does not assume an underlying gene structure model. Indeed, the definition of valid gene structures is externally defined in the so-called Gene Model. The Gene Model specifies simply which gene features are allowed immediately upstream which other gene features in valid gene structures. This allows for great flexibility in formulating the gene identification problem. In particular it allows for multiple-gene two-strand predictions and for considering gene features other than coding exons (such as promoter elements) in valid gene structures.

On iterative performance of LDPC and Root-LDPC codes over block-fading channels

This paper presents our investigation on iterativedecoding performances of some sparse-graph codes on block-fading Rayleigh channels. The considered code ensembles are standard LDPC codes and Root-LDPC codes, first proposed in and shown to be able to attain the full transmission diversity. We study the iterative threshold performance of those codes as a function of fading gains of the transmission channel and propose a numerical approximation of the iterative threshold versus fading gains, both both LDPC and Root-LDPC codes.Also, we show analytically that, in the case of 2 fading blocks,the iterative threshold root of Root-LDPC codes is proportional to (α1 α2)1, where α1 and α2 are corresponding fading gains.From this result, the full diversity property of Root-LDPC codes immediately follows.

Sustainable and equitable retirement in a life course perspective

We argue that long term sustainability of social security systems requires not only better equilibrium between the proportion in retirement and in employment but also an equitable distribution of the additional financial burden that aging inevitably will require. We examine how a proportional fixed ratios model of burden sharing between the aged and non-aged will establish inter-generational equity. Additionally we address the question of intra-generational equity and argue that the positive association between lifetime income and longevity requires more progressive financing of pensions and of care for the elderly.

Ratio maps and correspondence analysis

We compare two methods for visualising contingency tables and developa method called the ratio map which combines the good properties of both.The first is a biplot based on the logratio approach to compositional dataanalysis. This approach is founded on the principle of subcompositionalcoherence, which assures that results are invariant to considering subsetsof the composition. The second approach, correspondence analysis, isbased on the chi-square approach to contingency table analysis. Acornerstone of correspondence analysis is the principle of distributionalequivalence, which assures invariance in the results when rows or columnswith identical conditional proportions are merged. Both methods may bedescribed as singular value decompositions of appropriately transformedmatrices. Correspondence analysis includes a weighting of the rows andcolumns proportional to the margins of the table. If this idea of row andcolumn weights is introduced into the logratio biplot, we obtain a methodwhich obeys both principles of subcompositional coherence and distributionalequivalence.

Social capital, government expenditures, and growth

Countries with greater social capital have higher economic growth. We show that socialcapital is also highly positively correlated across countries with government expenditureon education. We develop an infinite-horizon model of public spending and endogenousstochastic growth that explains both facts through frictions in political agency whenvoters have imperfect information. In our model, the government provides servicesthat yield immediate utility, and investment that raises future productivity. Voters aremore likely to observe public services, so politicians have electoral incentives to underprovidepublic investment. Social capital increases voters' awareness of all governmentactivity. As a consequence, both politicians' incentives and their selection improve.In the dynamic equilibrium, both the amount and the efficiency of public investmentincrease, permanently raising the growth rate.

The political cost of reforms

This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politiciansperceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters.To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknownand investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politiciansmake too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannotbe fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary tothe conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may,under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study howpolitical rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistentwith a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection.They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economicuncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.

An agenda-setting model of electoral competition

This paper presents a model of electoral competition focusing on the formation of thepublic agenda. An incumbent government and a challenger party in opposition competein elections by choosing the issues that will key out their campaigns. Giving salience toan issue implies proposing an innovative policy proposal, alternative to the status-quo.Parties trade off the issues with high salience in voters concerns and those with broadagreement on some alternative policy proposal. Each party expects a higher probabilityof victory if the issue it chooses becomes salient in the voters decision. But remarkably,the issues which are considered the most important ones by a majority of votes may notbe given salience during the electoral campaign. An incumbent government may survivein spite of its bad policy performance if there is no sufficiently broad agreement on apolicy alternative. We illustrate the analytical potential of the model with the case of theUnited States presidential election in 2004.