Convertibility, currency controls and the cost of capital in Western Europe, 1950-1999

For most of the post-war period, Europe s capital markets remained largely closed to international capital flows. Thispaper explores the costs of this policy. Using an event-study methodology, I examine the extent to which restrictions ofcurrent and capital account convertibility affected stock returns. The delayed introduction of full currency convertibilityincreased the cost of capital. Also, a string of measures designed to reduce capital mobility before the ultimate collapseof the Bretton Woods System had considerable negative effects. These findings offer an explanation for the mountingevidence suggesting that capital account liberalization facilitates growth.

Competition and cost overruns. Optimal misspecification of procurement contracts

Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in the initial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design specification in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspecification. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design specification and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project s design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design s specification level is seen to affect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design specification and shows that the sponsor s optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design specification so as to make significant cost overruns likely. Since no such misspecification occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.

Monetary unions and the transaction cost savings of a single currency

This paper studies the transaction cost savings of moving froma multi-currency exchange system to a single currency one. Theanalysis concentrates exclusively on the transaction andprecautionary demand for money and abstracts from any othermotives to hold currency. A continuous-time, stochastic Baumol-like model similar to that in Frenkel and Jovanovic (1980) isgeneralized to include several currencies and calibrated to fitEuropean data. The analysis implies an upper bound for thesavings associated with reductions of transaction costs derivedfrom the European Monetary Union of approximately 0.6\% of theCommunity GDP. Additionally, the magnitudes of the brokeragefee and the volatility of transactions, whose estimation hastraditionally been difficult to address empirically, areapproximated for Europe.

Interbank comptetition with costly screening

We analyse credit market equilibrium when banks screen loan applicants. When banks have a convex cost function of screening, a pure strategy equilibrium exists where banks optimally set interest rates at the same level as their competitors. This result complements Broecker s (1990) analysis, where he demonstrates that no pure strategy equilibrium exists when banks have zero screening costs. In our set up we show that interest rate on loansare largely independent of marginal costs, a feature consistent with the extant empirical evidence. In equilibrium, banks make positive profits in our model in spite of the threat of entry by inactive banks. Moreover, an increase in the number of active banks increases credit risk and so does not improve credit market effciency: this point has important regulatory implications. Finally, we extend our analysis to the case where banks havediffering screening abilities.

Competition and cost overruns in procurement

Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in theinitial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design speciffication in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspeciffication. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design speciffication and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project's design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design's speciffication level is seen to affect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design speciffication and shows that the sponsor's optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design speciffication so as to make signifficant cost overrunslikely. Since no such misspeciffication occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.

Cost-containment in health care: The case of Spain from the eighties up to 1997

The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the evolutionof health care expenditure in Spain during the period 1980-1997, andhenceforth to comment on the cost containment measures put forwardto control its growth. The paper is divided into three separatesections. The first offers a brief description of the Spanish HealthCare System, with emphasis placed on the issue of expenditure controland health planning targets. The second part outlines a set of costcontainment measures that has accompanied the process of extendinguniversal health care coverage which occurred during the mentionedperiod and which has helped keep public expenditure under control.Finally, the third part describes some of the more recent proposalsfor reform of the Spanish Health Care Sector.

Cost efficiency in primary care contracting: A stochastic frontier cost function approach

The principal aim of this paper is to estimate a stochastic frontier costfunction and an inefficiency effects model in the analysis of the primaryhealth care services purchased by the public authority and supplied by 180providers in 1996 in Catalonia. The evidence from our sample does not supportthe premise that contracting out has helped improve purchasing costefficiency in primary care. Inefficient purchasing cost was observed in thecomponent of this purchasing cost explicitly included in the contract betweenpurchaser and provider. There are no observable incentives for thecontracted-out primary health care teams to minimise prescription costs, whichare not explicitly included in the present contracting system.

Does it cost to be virtuous? The macroeconomic effects of fiscal constraints

We study whether and how fiscal restrictions alter the business cycle features of macrovariables for a sample of 48 US states. We also examine the typical transmission properties of fiscal disturbances and the implied fiscal rules of states with different fiscal restrictions. Fiscal constraints are characterized with a number of indicators. There are similarities in second moments of macrovariables and in the transmission properties of fiscal shocks across states with different fiscal constraints. The cyclical response of expenditure differs in size and sometimes in sign, but heterogeneity within groups makes point estimates statistically insignificant. Creative budget accounting is responsible for the pattern. Implications for the design of fiscal rules and the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact are discussed.

The marginal propensity to spend on adult children

We examine how much of an extra dollar of parental lifetime resources willultimately be passed on to adult children in the form of inter vivostransfers and bequests. We infer bequests from the stock of wealth late inlife. We use mortality rates and age specific estimates of the response oftransfers and wealth to permanent income to compute the expected presentdiscounted values of these responses to permanent income. Our estimatesimply parents pass on between 2 and 3 cents out of an extra dollar ofexpected lifetime resources in bequests and about 2 cents in transfers.The estimates increase with parental income and are smaller for nonwhites.They imply that about 15 percent of the effect of parental income onlifetime resources of adult children is through transfers and bequestsand about 85 percent is through the intergenerational correlation inearnings, although these estimates are sensitive to assumptions about theintergenerational earnings correlation, taxes, and the number of children.We compare our estimates to the implications of alternative computablebenchmark models of savings behavior in order to assess the likelyimportance of intended bequests for the wealth/income relationship.

Location of multiple server common service centers or public facilities for minimizing general congestion and travel cost functions

We propose a model and solution methods, for locating a fixed number ofmultiple-server, congestible common service centers or congestible publicfacilities. Locations are chosen so to minimize consumers congestion (orqueuing) and travel costs, considering that all the demand must be served.Customers choose the facilities to which they travel in order to receiveservice at minimum travel and congestion cost. As a proxy for thiscriterion, total travel and waiting costs are minimized. The travel costis a general function of the origin and destination of the demand, whilethe congestion cost is a general function of the number of customers inqueue at the facilities.

Detecció de matrícules amb sistemes de baix cost

En aquest projecte s'avaluen els mètodes utilitzats per els mecanismes de detecció de matrícules, i es proposarà un algorisme de detecció de matrícules dissenyat específicament per a sistemes de baix cost com ara els ordinadors actuals. Utilitzarem eines al nostre abast, com càmeres fotogràfiques domèstiques o de mòbil per analitzar el rendiment de l'algorisme

Cost stickiness revisited: Empirical aplication for farms

This article reviews previous research regarding cost stickiness and performs an empirical analysis applied to a sample of farms. It recognizes that modelization of cost stickiness is a particular case of representation of cost variations as a function of output variations. It also discusses methodological issues and analyses cost stickiness for all registered farm costs and opportunity costs of family work. Costs exhibit a considerable level of rigidity. Even for variable costs, a decrease in activity involves a lower decrease in costs than the amounts involved when activity increases. While registered indirect costs slightly decrease when activity decreases, opportunity costs always increase. The study provides empirical evidence that cost stickiness is significantly reduced with better management decision practices.

Application of a floating well concept to a latch-up-free, low-cost, smart power high-side switch technology

The aim of this brief is to present an original design methodology that permits implementing latch-up-free smart power circuits on a very simple, cost-effective technology. The basic concept used for this purpose is letting float the wells of the MOS transistors most susceptible to initiate latch-up.

A comment on the cost of capital for investments with non-homogeneous components

In this paper, the expression for the cost of capital is derived when net and replacement investments exhibit differences in their effective prices due to a different fiscal treatment. It is shown that, contrary to previous results in the literature, the cost of capital should be constructed under an opportunity cost criterion rather than a historical one. This result has some important economic consequences, since the optimizing firm will take into account not only the effective price for the new investments but also consider the opportunity cost of replacing them.

User cost of capital with delayed investment grants

The usual assumption when considering investment grants is that grant payments are automatic when investments are undertaken. However, evidence from case studies shows that there can exist some time lag until funds are received by granted firms. In this paper the effects of delays in grant payments on the optimal investment policy of the firm are analyzed. It is shown how these delays lead not only to a higher financing cost but to an effective reduction in the investment grant rate, and in some cases, how benefits from investment grants could be canceled due to interactions with tax effects.