Citation auctions as a method to improve selection of scientific papers

This paper describes the basis of citation auctions as a new approach to selecting scientific papers for publication. Our main idea is to use an auction for selecting papers for publication through - differently from the state of the art - bids that consist of the number of citations that a scientist expects to receive if the paper is published. Hence, a citation auction is the selection process itself, and no reviewers are involved. The benefits of the proposed approach are two-fold. First, the cost of refereeing will be either totally eliminated or significantly reduced, because the process of citation auction does not need prior understanding of the paper's content to judge the quality of its contribution. Additionally, the method will not prejudge the content of the paper, so it will increase the openness of publications to new ideas. Second, scientists will be much more committed to the quality of their papers, paying close attention to distributing and explaining their papers in detail to maximize the number of citations that the paper receives. Sample analyses of the number of citations collected in papers published in years 1999-2004 for one journal, and in years 2003-2005 for a series of conferences (in a totally different discipline), via Google scholar, are provided. Finally, a simple simulation of an auction is given to outline the behaviour of the citation auction approach

Indirect likelihood inference (revised)

Standard indirect Inference (II) estimators take a given finite-dimensional statistic, Z_{n} , and then estimate the parameters by matching the sample statistic with the model-implied population moment. We here propose a novel estimation method that utilizes all available information contained in the distribution of Z_{n} , not just its first moment. This is done by computing the likelihood of Z_{n}, and then estimating the parameters by either maximizing the likelihood or computing the posterior mean for a given prior of the parameters. These are referred to as the maximum indirect likelihood (MIL) and Bayesian Indirect Likelihood (BIL) estimators, respectively. We show that the IL estimators are first-order equivalent to the corresponding moment-based II estimator that employs the optimal weighting matrix. However, due to higher-order features of Z_{n} , the IL estimators are higher order efficient relative to the standard II estimator. The likelihood of Z_{n} will in general be unknown and so simulated versions of IL estimators are developed. Monte Carlo results for a structural auction model and a DSGE model show that the proposed estimators indeed have attractive finite sample properties.