On the drivers of commodity co-movement: Evidence from biofuels

We use the recent introduction of biofuels to study the effect of industry factors on the relationshipsbetween wholesale commodity prices. Correlations between agricultural products and oilare strongest in the 2005-09 period, coinciding with the boom of biofuels, and remain substantialuntil 2011. We disentangle three possible drivers for the linkage: substitution, energy costs, andfinancialization. The timing and magnitude of the biofuels-to-oil relationships are different to thoseof other commodities, and far higher than can be justified by costs and financialization. Substitutionand costs drive the monthly correlations of long-term futures, and each of the three contributeequally to the daily co-movement of the short-term ones. The findings survive many robustnesschecks and appear in the stock market.

Costly search and design

Firms compete by choosing both a price and a design from a family of designs thatcan be represented as demand rotations. Consumers engage in costly sequential searchamong firms. Each time a consumer pays a search cost he observes a new offering. Anoffering consists of a price quote and a new good, where goods might vary in the extentto which they are good matches for the consumer. In equilibrium, only two design-styles arise: either the most niche where consumers are likely to either love or loathethe product, or the broadest where consumers are likely to have similar valuations. Inequilibrium, different firms may simultaneously offer both design-styles. We performcomparative statics on the equilibrium and show that a fall in search costs can lead tohigher industry prices and profits and lower consumer surplus. Our analysis is relatedto discussions of how the internet has led to the prevalence of niche goods and the"long tail" phenomenon.

How enforcement institutions affect markets

In an experiment we study market outcomes under alternative incentive structures for third-party enforcers. Our transactions resemble an anonymous credit market where lenders can give loans and borrowers can repay them. When borrowers default, judges are free to enforce repayment but are themselves paid differently in each of three treatments. First, paying judges according to lenders votes maximizes surplus and the equality of earnings. In contrast, paying judges according to borrowers votes triggers insufficient enforcement, destroying the market and producing the lowest surplus and the most unequal distribution of earnings. Lastly, judges paid the average earnings of borrowers and lenders achieve results close to those based on lender voting. We employ a steps-of-reasoning argument to interpret the performances of different institutions. When voting and enforcement rights are allocated to different classes of actors, the difficulty of their task changes, and arguably as a consequence they focus on high or low surplus equilibria.

Business cycles, unemployment insurance and the calibration of matching models

This paper theoretically and empirically documents a puzzle that arises when an RBC economy with a job matching function is used to model unemployment. The standard model can generate sufficiently large cyclical fluctuations in unemployment, or a sufficiently small response of unemployment to labor market policies, but it cannot do both. Variable search and separation, finite UI benefit duration, efficiency wages, and capital all fail to resolve this puzzle. However, either sticky wages or match-specific productivity shocks can improve the model's performance by making the firm's flow of surplus more procyclical, which makes hiring more procyclical too.

A retail benchmarking approach to efficient two-way access pricing

We study a retail benchmarking approach to determine access prices for interconnected networks. Instead of considering fixed access charges as in the existing literature, we study access pricing rules that determine the access price that network i pays to network j as a linear function of the marginal costs and the retail prices set by both networks. In the case of competition in linear prices, we show that there is a unique linear rule that implements the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium, independently of the underlying demand conditions. In the case of competition in two-part tariffs, we consider a class of access pricing rules, similar to the optimal one under linear prices but based on average retail prices. We show that firms choose the variable price equal to the marginal cost under this class of rules. Therefore, the regulator (or the competition authority) can choose one among the rules to pursue additional objectives such as consumer surplus, network coverage or investment: for instance, we show that both static and dynamic e±ciency can be achieved at the same time.

Optimal law enforcement under asymmetric information

In this paper, we focus on the problem created by asymmetric informationabout the enforcer's (agent's) costs associated to enforcement expenditure. This adverse selection problem affects optimal law enforcement because a low cost enforcer may conceal its information by imitating a high cost enforcer, and must then be given a compensation to be induced to reveal its true costs. The government faces a trade-off between minimizing the enforcer's compensation and maximizing the net surplus of harmful acts. As a consequence, the probability of apprehension and punishment is usually reduced leading to more offenses being committed. We show that asymmetry of information does not affect law enforcement as long as raising public funds is costless. The consideration of costly raising of public funds permits to establish the positive correlation between asymmetry of information between government and enforcers andthe crime rate.

Vertical Syndication-Proof Competitive Prices in Multilateral Markets

[eng] A multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game (Tejada, to appear) is a model for a multilateral market with a finite number of perfectly complementary indivisible commodities owned by different sellers, and inflexible demand and support functions. We show that for each such market game there is a unique vector of competitive prices for the commodities that is vertical syndication-proof, in the sense that, at those prices, syndication of sellers each owning a different commodity is neither beneficial nor detrimental for the buyers. Since, moreover, the benefits obtained by the agents at those prices correspond to the nucleolus of the market game, we provide a syndication-based foundation for the nucleolus as an appropriate solution concept for market games. For different solution concepts a syndicate can be disadvantageous and there is no escape to Aumman’s paradox (Aumann, 1973). We further show that vertical syndicationproofness and horizontal syndication-proofness – in which sellers of the same commodity collude – are incompatible requirements under some mild assumptions. Our results build on a self-interesting link between multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and bankruptcy games (O’Neill, 1982). We identify a particular subset of Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and we show that it is isomorphic to the whole class of bankruptcy games. This isomorphism enables us to show the uniqueness of the vector of vertical syndication-proof prices for the whole class of Böhm-Bawerk assignment market using well-known results of bankruptcy problems.

Auction theory, sequential local service privatization, and the effects of geographical scale economies on effective competition

A sequential weakly efficient two-auction game with entry costs, interdependence between objects, two potential bidders and IPV assumption is presented here in order to give some theoretical predictions on the effects of geographical scale economies on local service privatization performance. It is shown that the first object seller takes profit of this interdependence. The interdependence externality rises effective competition for the first object, expressed as the probability of having more than one final bidder. Besides, if there is more than one final bidder in the first auction, seller extracts the entire bidder¿s expected future surplus differential between having won the first auction and having lost. Consequences for second object seller are less clear, reflecting the contradictory nature of the two main effects of object interdependence. On the one hand, first auction winner becomes ¿stronger¿, so that expected payments rise in a competitive environment. On the other hand, first auction loser becomes relatively ¿weaker¿, hence (probably) reducing effective competition for the second object. Additionally, some contributions to static auction theory with entry cost and asymmetric bidders are presented in the appendix

Objetivo: cuantificar la reproducción

Se estudian en este trabajo algunas magnitudes relacionadas con el enfoque de la reproducción social. Ante todo se hace hincapié en tres ideas fundamentales, las nociones de: a) Salidas menos entradas; b) Salidas dividido por entradas; c) Subsistemas. A continuación se subrayan los obstáculos para la cuantificación directa de estos conceptos, y se repasan las vías sugeridas para sortear las dificultades (por medio de constructos teóricos propuestos por Leontief, von Neumann y Sraffa). Luego se examinan dos nuevos indicadores: la ¿tasaespecífica de excedente¿, que se refiere a los bienes autorreproducibles, y el ¿coeficiente neto de reproducción¿, que se predica de todos los bienes básicos. De pasada se apuntan algunas pistas para establecer indicadores del mismogénero en campos como la economía ecológica y la economía feminista. Por último, se anotan algunas conjeturas relacionadas con la dirección adecuada del cambio técnico

Vertical Syndication-Proof Competitive Prices in Multilateral Markets

[eng] A multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game (Tejada, to appear) is a model for a multilateral market with a finite number of perfectly complementary indivisible commodities owned by different sellers, and inflexible demand and support functions. We show that for each such market game there is a unique vector of competitive prices for the commodities that is vertical syndication-proof, in the sense that, at those prices, syndication of sellers each owning a different commodity is neither beneficial nor detrimental for the buyers. Since, moreover, the benefits obtained by the agents at those prices correspond to the nucleolus of the market game, we provide a syndication-based foundation for the nucleolus as an appropriate solution concept for market games. For different solution concepts a syndicate can be disadvantageous and there is no escape to Aumman’s paradox (Aumann, 1973). We further show that vertical syndicationproofness and horizontal syndication-proofness – in which sellers of the same commodity collude – are incompatible requirements under some mild assumptions. Our results build on a self-interesting link between multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and bankruptcy games (O’Neill, 1982). We identify a particular subset of Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and we show that it is isomorphic to the whole class of bankruptcy games. This isomorphism enables us to show the uniqueness of the vector of vertical syndication-proof prices for the whole class of Böhm-Bawerk assignment market using well-known results of bankruptcy problems.

Occurrence of patulin in organic and conventional apple juice. Risk assessment

Organic foods are promoted as environmentally friendly and its consumption has become increasingly popular. Nevertheless,organic farming practices could produce commodities more susceptible to fungal attack and as a result, food with higher levels of mycotoxins. Patulin is a mycotoxin mainly present in apples and apple-based products. In this paper, we report our recent results and an update of the patulin occurrence and their risk in conventional and organic apple juices around Europe.

Modeling and control of electromechanical systems

The material presented in the these notes covers the sessions Modelling of electromechanical systems, Passive control theory I and Passive control theory II of the II EURON/GEOPLEX Summer School on Modelling and Control of Complex Dynamical Systems.We start with a general description of what an electromechanical system is from a network modelling point of view. Next, a general formulation in terms of PHDS is introduced, and some of the previous electromechanical systems are rewritten in this formalism. Power converters, which are variable structure systems (VSS), can also be given a PHDS form.We conclude the modelling part of these lectures with a rather complex example, showing the interconnection of subsystems from several domains, namely an arrangement to temporally store the surplus energy in a section of a metropolitan transportation system based on dc motor vehicles, using either arrays of supercapacitors or an electric poweredflywheel. The second part of the lectures addresses control of PHD systems. We first present the idea of control as power connection of a plant and a controller. Next we discuss how to circumvent this obstacle and present the basic ideas of Interconnection and Damping Assignment (IDA) passivity-based control of PHD systems.

The problem of nitrogen disposal in the obese

Amino-N is preserved because of the scarcity and nutritional importance of protein. Excretion requires its conversion to ammonia, later incorporated into urea. Under conditions of excess dietary energy, the body cannot easily dispose of the excess amino-N against the evolutively adapted schemes that prevent its wastage; thus ammonia and glutamine formation (and urea excretion) are decreased. High lipid (and energy) availability limits the utilisation of glucose, and high glucose spares the production of ammonium from amino acids, limiting the synthesis of glutamine and its utilisation by the intestine and kidney. The amino acid composition of the diet affects the production of ammonium depending on its composition and the individual amino acid catabolic pathways. Surplus amino acids enhance protein synthesis and growth, and the synthesis of non-protein-N-containing compounds. But these outlets are not enough; consequently, less-conventional mechanisms are activated, such as increased synthesis of NO∙ followed by higher nitrite (and nitrate) excretion and changes in the microbiota. There is also a significant production of N(2) gas, through unknown mechanisms. Health consequences of amino-N surplus are difficult to fathom because of the sparse data available, but it can be speculated that the effects may be negative, largely because the fundamental N homeostasis is stretched out of normalcy, forcing the N removal through pathways unprepared for that task. The unreliable results of hyperproteic diets, and part of the dysregulation found in the metabolic syndrome may be an unwanted consequence of this N disposal conflict.

From symmetric glycerol derivatives to dissymmetric chlorohydrins

The anticipated worldwide increase in biodiesel production will result in an accumulation of glycerol for which there are insufficient conventional uses. The surplus of this by-product has increased rapidly during the last decade, prompting a search for new glycerol applications. We describe here the synthesis of dissymmetric chlorohydrin esters from symmetric 1,3-dichloro-2-propyl esters obtained from glycerol. We studied the influence of two solvents: 1,4-dioxane and 1-butanol and two bases: sodium carbonate and 1-butylimidazole, on the synthesis of dissymmetric chlorohydrin esters. In addition, we studied the influence of other bases (potassium and lithium carbonates) in the reaction using 1,4-dioxane as the solvent. The highest yield was obtained using 1,4-dioxane and sodium carbonate.

Role of the cellular prion protein in oligodendrocyte precursor cell proliferation and differentiation in the developing and adult mouse CNS

There are numerous studies describing the signaling mechanisms that mediate oligodendrocyte precursor cell (OPC) proliferation and differentiation, although the contribution of the cellular prion protein (PrPc) to this process remains unclear. PrPc is a glycosyl-phosphatidylinositol (GPI)-anchored glycoprotein involved in diverse cellular processes during the development and maturation of the mammalian central nervous system (CNS). Here we describe how PrPc influences oligodendrocyte proliferation in the developing and adult CNS. OPCs that lack PrPc proliferate more vigorously at the expense of a delay in differentiation, which correlates with changes in the expression of oligodendrocyte lineage markers. In addition, numerous NG2-positive cells were observed in cortical regions of adult PrPc knockout mice, although no significant changes in myelination can be seen, probably due to the death of surplus cells.