The evolution of conventions under incomplete information

We formulate an evolutionary learning process in the spirit ofYoung (1993a) for games of incomplete information. The process involves trembles. For many games, if the amount of trembling is small, play will be in accordance with the games' (semi-strict) Bayesian equilibria most of the time. This supports the notion of Bayesian equilibrium. Further, often play will most of the time be in accordance with exactly one Bayesian equilibrium. This gives a selection among the Bayesian equilibria. For two specific games of economic interest wecharacterize this selection. The first is an extension to incomplete information of the prototype strategic conflict known as Chicken. The second is an incomplete information bilateral monopoly, which is also an extension to incompleteinformation of Nash's demand game, or a simple version ofthe so-called sealed bid double auction. For both gamesselection by evolutionary learning is in favor of Bayesianequilibria where some types of players fail to coordinate, such that the outcome is inefficient.

Gazelle companies: Growth drivers and an evolution analysis

Gazelle companies are relevant because they generate much more employment than other companies and deliver high returns to their shareholders. This paper analyzes their behavior in the years of high growth and their evolution in the following years. The main factors that explain their success are competitive advantages based on human resources, innovation, internationalization, the excellence in processes and a conservative financial policy. Nevertheless, as time goes by they can be divided in two groups: a group which continues having growth, but most of them with lower growth rates; and the rest which face great problems or even disappear. The present study identifies several key factors that explain this different evolution.

On ignoring scientific evidence: The bumpy road to enlightenment

It is well accepted that people resist evidence that contradicts their beliefs.Moreover, despite their training, many scientists reject results that are inconsistent withtheir theories. This phenomenon is discussed in relation to the field of judgment anddecision making by describing four case studies. These concern findings that clinical judgment is less predictive than actuarial models; simple methods have proven superiorto more theoretically correct methods in times series forecasting; equal weighting ofvariables is often more accurate than using differential weights; and decisions cansometimes be improved by discarding relevant information. All findings relate to theapparently difficult-to-accept idea that simple models can predict complex phenomenabetter than complex ones. It is true that there is a scientific market place for ideas.However, like its economic counterpart, it is subject to inefficiencies (e.g., thinness,asymmetric information, and speculative bubbles). Unfortunately, the market is only correct in the long-run. The road to enlightenment is bumpy.

Stochastic evolution of rules for playing normal form games

The evolution of boundedly rational rules for playing normal form games is studied within stationary environments ofstochastically changing games. Rules are viewed as algorithms prescribing strategies for the different normal formgames that arise. It is shown that many of the folk results of evolutionary game theory typically obtained witha fixed game and fixed strategies carry over to the present case. The results are also related to recent experimentson rules and games.

The evolution of inequity in the access to health care in Spain: 1987-2001

This paper reports an analysis of the evolution of equity in access to health care in Spain over the period 1987-2001, a time span covering the development of the modern Spanish National Health System. Our measures of access are the probabilities of visiting a doctor, using emergency services and being hospitalised. For these three measures we obtain indices of horizontal inequity from microeconometric models of utilization that exploit the individual information in the Spanish National Health Surveys of 1987 and 2001. We find that by 2001 the system has improved in the sense that differences in income no longer lead to different access given the same level of need. However, the tenure of private health insurance leads to differences in access given the same level of need, and its contribution to inequity has increased over time, both because insurance is more concentrated among the rich and because the elasticity of utilization for the three services has increased too.

Grinder's Group Mastery Theory : scientific research and its application to classroom teaching

Estudi centrat en el paper de la comunicació no verbal com a eina docent per a la gestió de l’aula, prenent com a referència el model de comunicació de Michael Grinder (Pentimento), basat en la Programació Neuro-lingüística (PNL). Aquest model s’analitza i es compara amb altres models i estudis sobre la comunicació no verbal, per establir-ne similituds i diferències. Per tal d’avaluar l’eficàcia de les tècniques de gestió de l’aula a través de la comunicació no verbal proposades per Grinder en un context educatiu real, s’inclouen i s’analitzen enregistraments de la implementació de diferents tècniques en un institut de secundària de Catalunya. Tota la informació recollida i analitzada permet valorar i ressaltar com és de significatiu tot allò que s’expressa més enllà del llenguatge, i per tant, com són d’importants i d’útils les habilitats comunicatives d’un professor en la seva tasca d’ensenyar.