Sales restriction, quality selection and the mode of competition

A regulator imposing “sales restrictions” on firms competing in oligopolistic markets may enhance quality provision by the firms. Moreover, for most restrictions levels, the impact on quality selection is invariant to the mode of competition

Toronto Waterfront Internacional Competition

Concurs internacional restringit per invitació per a la Toronto Waterfront international competition

Anisotropic dispersion, space competition, and the slowdown of the Neolithic transition

The front speed of the Neolithic (farmer) spread in Europe decreased as it reached Northern latitudes, where the Mesolithic (huntergatherer) population density was higher. Here, we describe a reaction diffusion model with (i) an anisotropic dispersion kernel depending on the Mesolithicpopulation density gradient and (ii) a modified population growth equation. Both effects are related to the space available for the Neolithic population. The model is able to explain the slowdown of the Neolithic front as observed from archaeological data

Supply Multipliers in Two Regional Economies

This paper focuses on the analysis of the economic impact that sectorial total factor productivity – or valued added - gains have on two regional Spanish economies (Catalonia and Extremadura). In particular it is studied the quantitative effect that each sector’s valued added injections has on household welfare (real disposable income), on the consumption price indices and factor relative prices, on real production (GDP) and on the government and foreign net income. To do that, we introduce the concept of supply multiplier. The analytical approach consists of a computable general equilibrium model, in which it is assumed perfect competition and cleared markets of goods and factors. All the parameters and exogenous variables of the model are calibrated by means of two social accounting matrices, one for each region under study. The results allow identifying those sectors with the greatest multipliers impact on consumer welfare as the key sectors in the regional economies. Keywords: efficiency gains, supply multipliers, key sectors, computable general equilibrium. JEL Classification: C68, R13.

Improving the organisation and commercialisation of small coffee and cocoa producers in the Northern Amazon Region of Ecuador

Coffee and cocoa represent the main sources of income for small farmers in the Northern Amazon Region of Ecuador. The provinces of Orellana and Sucumbios, as border areas, have benefited from investments made by many public and private institutions. Many of the projects carried out in the area have been aimed at energising the production of coffee and cocoa, strengthening the producers’ associations and providing commercialisation infrastructure. Improving the quality of life of this population threatened by poverty and high migration flows mainly from Colombia is a significant challenge. This paper presents research highlighting the importance of associative commercialisation to raising income from coffee and cocoa. The research draws on primary information obtained during field work, and from official information from the Ministry of Agriculture. The study presents an overview of current organisational structures, initiatives of associative commercialisation, stockpiling of infrastructure and ownership regimes, as well as estimates for both ‘robusta’ coffee and national cocoa production and income. The analysis of the main constraints presents different alternatives for the implementation of public land policies. These policies are aimed at mitigating the problems associated with the organisational structure of the producers, with processes of commercialisation and with environmental aspects, among others.

Essential role of the N-terminal region of TFII-I in viability and behavior

Background: GTF2I codes for a general intrinsic transcription factor and calcium channel regulator TFII-I, with high and ubiquitous expression, and a strong candidate for involvement in the morphological and neuro-developmental anomalies of the Williams-Beuren syndrome (WBS). WBS is a genetic disorder due to a recurring deletion of about 1,55-1,83 Mb containing 25-28 genes in chromosome band 7q11.23 including GTF2I. Completed homozygous loss of either the Gtf2i or Gtf2ird1 function in mice provided additional evidence for the involvement of both genes in the craniofacial and cognitive phenotype. Unfortunately nothing is now about the behavioral characterization of heterozygous mice. Methods: By gene targeting we have generated a mutant mice with a deletion of the first 140 amino-acids of TFII-I. mRNA and protein expression analysis were used to document the effect of the study deletion. We performed behavioral characterization of heterozygous mutant mice to document in vivo implications of TFII-I in the cognitive profile of WBS patients. Results: Homozygous and heterozygous mutant mice exhibit craniofacial alterations, most clearly represented in homozygous condition. Behavioral test demonstrate that heterozygous mutant mice exhibit some neurobehavioral alterations and hyperacusis or odynacusis that could be associated with specific features of WBS phenotype. Homozygous mutant mice present highly compromised embryonic viability and fertility. Regarding cellular model, we documented a retarded growth in heterozygous MEFs respect to homozygous or wild-type MEFs. Conclusion: Our data confirm that, although additive effects of haploinsufficiency at several genes may contribute to the full craniofacial or neurocognitive features of WBS, correct expression of GTF2I is one of the main players. In addition, these findings show that the deletion of the fist 140 amino-acids of TFII-I altered it correct function leading to a clear phenotype, at both levels, at the cellular model and at the in vivo model.

Interbank Competition with Costly Screening

We analyse credit market equilibrium when banks screen loan applicants. When banks have a convex cost function of screening, a pure strategy equilibrium exists where banks optimally set interest rates at the same level as their competitors. This result complements Broecker s (1990) analysis, where he demonstrates that no pure strategy equilibrium exists when banks have zero screening costs. In our set up we show that interest rate on loans are largely independent of marginal costs, a feature consistent with the extant empirical evidence. In equilibrium, banks make positive profits in our model in spite of the threat of entry by inactive banks. Moreover, an increase in the number of active banks increases credit risk and so does not improve credit market effciency: this point has important regulatory implications. Finally, we extend our analysis to the case where banks have differing screening abilities.

Bundling and competition for slots: Sequential pricing

In this paper we study, as in Jeon-Menicucci (2009), competition between sellerswhen each of them sells a portfolio of distinct products to a buyer having limitedslots. This paper considers sequential pricing and complements our main paper (Jeon-Menicucci, 2009) that considers simultaneous pricing.First, Jeon-Menicucci (2009) find that under simultaneous individual pricing, equilibriumoften does not exist and hence the outcome is often inefficient. By contrast,equilibrium always exists under sequential individual pricing and we characterize it inthis paper. We find that each seller faces a trade-off between the number of slots heoccupies and surplus extraction per product, and there is no particular reason thatthis leads to an efficient allocation of slots.Second, Jeon-Menicucci (2009) find that when bundling is allowed, there alwaysexists an efficient equilibrium but inefficient equilibria can also exist due to purebundling (for physical products) or slotting contracts. Under sequential pricing,we find that all equilibria are efficient regardless of whether firms can use slottingcontracts, and both for digital goods and for physical goods. Therefore, sequentialpricing presents an even stronger case for laissez-faire in the matter of bundling thansimultaneous pricing.

The achievable region approach to the optimal control of stochastic systems

The achievable region approach seeks solutions to stochastic optimisation problems by: (i) characterising the space of all possible performances(the achievable region) of the system of interest, and (ii) optimisingthe overall system-wide performance objective over this space. This isradically different from conventional formulations based on dynamicprogramming. The approach is explained with reference to a simpletwo-class queueing system. Powerful new methodologies due to the authorsand co-workers are deployed to analyse a general multiclass queueingsystem with parallel servers and then to develop an approach to optimalload distribution across a network of interconnected stations. Finally,the approach is used for the first time to analyse a class of intensitycontrol problems.

Bargaining, coalitions and competition

We study a decentralized matching model in a large exchange economy,in which trade takes place through non--cooperative bargaining in coalitionsof finite size. Under essentially the same conditions of core equivalence, we show that the strategic equilibrium outcomes of our model coincide with theWalrasian allocations of the economy. Our method of proof exploits equivalenceresults between the core and Walrasian equilibria. Our model relaxes differentiability and convexity of preferences thereby covering the caseof indivisible goods.

Let's (not) talk about sex: The effect of information provision on gender differences in performance under competition

We study how gender differences in performance under competition areaffected by the provision of information regarding rival s gender and/ordifferences in relative ability. In a laboratory experiment, we use two tasks thatdiffer regarding perceptions about which gender outperforms the other. Weobserve women s underperformance only under two conditions: 1) tasks areperceived as favoring men and 2) rivals gender is explicitly mentioned. Thisresult can be explained by stereotype-threat being reinforced when explicitlymentioning gender in tasks in which women already consider they are inferior.Omitting information about gender is a safe alternative to avoid women sunderperformance in competition.

Endogenous spillovers, increased competition and re-organization waves

We consider an entrepreneur that is the sole producer of a costreducing skill, but the entrepreneur that hires a team to usethe skill cannot prevent collusive trade for the innovation related knowledge between employees and competitors. We showthat there are two types of diffusion avoiding strategies forthe entrepreneur to preempt collusive communication i) settingup a large productive capacity (the traditional firm) and ii)keeping a small team (the lean firm). The traditional firm ischaracterized by its many "marginal" employees that work shortdays, receive flat wages and are incompletely informed about the innovation. The lean firm is small in number of employees,engages in complete information sharing among members, that are paid with stock option schemes. We find that the lean firm is superior to the traditional firm when technological entry costsare low and when the sector is immature.

Recontracting and competition

We characterize the set of Walrasian allocations of an economy as theset of allocations which can be supported by abstract equilibria that satisfy a recontracting condition which reflects the idea that agents can freely trade with each other. An alternative (and weaker) recontracting condition characterizesthe core. The results are extended to production economies by extending thedefinition of the recontracting condition to include the possibility of agentsto recontract with firms. However, no optimization requirement is imposed onfirms. In pure exchange economies, an abstract equilibrium is a feasible allocation and a list of choice sets, one for each agent, that satisfy thefollowing conditions: an agent's choice set is a subset of the commodity space that includes his endowment; and each agent's equilibrium bundle isa maximal element in his choice set, with respect to his preferences. Therecontracting condition requires that any agent can buy bundles from any other agent's choice set by offering the other agent a bundle he prefers tohis equilibrium bundle.