194 resultados para Quantum Games
Resumo:
This paper explores three aspects of strategic uncertainty: its relation to risk, predictability of behavior and subjective beliefs of players. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Behavior in coordination games is related to risk aversion, experience seeking, and age.From the distribution of certainty equivalents we estimate probabilities for successful coordination in a wide range of games. For many games, success of coordination is predictable with a reasonable error rate. The best response to observed behavior is close to the global-game solution. Comparing choices in coordination games with revealed risk aversion, we estimate subjective probabilities for successful coordination. In games with a low coordination requirement, most subjects underestimate the probability of success. In games with a high coordination requirement, most subjects overestimate this probability. Estimating probabilistic decision models, we show that the quality of predictions can be improved when individual characteristics are taken into account. Subjects behavior is consistent with probabilistic beliefs about the aggregate outcome, but inconsistent with probabilistic beliefs about individual behavior.
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Equivalence classes of normal form games are defined using the geometryof correspondences of standard equilibiurm concepts like correlated, Nash,and robust equilibrium or risk dominance and rationalizability. Resultingequivalence classes are fully characterized and compared across differentequilibrium concepts for 2 x 2 games. It is argued that the procedure canlead to broad and game-theoretically meaningful distinctions of games aswell as to alternative ways of viewing and testing equilibrium concepts.Larger games are also briefly considered.
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Experiments in which subjects play simultaneously several finite prisoner's dilemma supergames with and without an outside optionreveal that: (i) subjects use probabilistic start and endeffect behaviour, (ii) the freedom to choose whether to play the prisoner's dilemma game enhances cooperation, (iii) if the payoff for simultaneous defection is negative, subjects' tendency to avoid losses leads them to cooperate; while this tendency makes them stick to mutual defection if its payoff is positive.
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We characterize the prekernel of NTU games by means of consistency,converse consistency, and five axioms of the Nash type on bilateral problems.The intersection of the prekernel and the core is also characterized with thesame axioms over the class of games where the core is nonempty.
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Many experiments have shown that human subjects do not necessarily behave in line with game theoretic assumptions and solution concepts. The reasons for this non-conformity are multiple. In this paper we study the argument whether a deviation from game theory is because subjects are rational, but doubt that others are rational as well, compared to the argument that subjects, in general, are boundedly rational themselves. To distinguish these two hypotheses, we study behavior in repeated 2-person and many-person Beauty-Contest-Games which are strategically different from one another. We analyze four different treatments and observe that convergence toward equilibrium is driven by learning through the information about the other player s choice and adaptation rather than self-initiated rational reasoning.
Resumo:
We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertaintyabout the payoffs. Our game is closely related to models that have beenused in many macroeconomic and financial applications to solve problemsof equilibrium indeterminacy. In our experiment each subject receives anoisy signal about the true payoffs. This game has a unique strategyprofile that survives the iterative deletion of strictly dominatedstrategies (thus a unique Nash equilibrium). The equilibrium outcomecoincides, on average, with the risk-dominant equilibrium outcome ofthe underlying coordination game. The behavior of the subjects convergesto the theoretical prediction after enough experience has been gained. The data (and the comments) suggest that subjects do not apply through"a priori" reasoning the iterated deletion of dominated strategies.Instead, they adapt to the responses of other players. Thus, the lengthof the learning phase clearly varies for the different signals. We alsotest behavior in a game without uncertainty as a benchmark case. The gamewith uncertainty is inspired by the "global" games of Carlsson and VanDamme (1993).
Resumo:
We use subjects actions in modified dictator games to perform a within-subject classification ofindividuals into four different types of interdependent preferences: Selfish, Social Welfaremaximizers, Inequity Averse and Competitive. We elicit beliefs about other subjects actions inthe same modified dictator games to test how much of the existent heterogeneity in others actions is known by subjects. We find that subjects with different interdependent preferences infact have different beliefs about others actions. In particular, Selfish individuals cannotconceive others being non-Selfish while Social Welfare maximizers are closest to the actualdistribution of others actions. We finally provide subjects with information on other subjects actions and re-classify individuals according to their (new) actions in the same modified dictatorgames. We find that social information does not affect Selfish individuals, but that individualswith interdependent preferences are more likely to change their behavior and tend to behavemore selfishly.
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We construct a model in which the ambiguity of candidates allows them toincrease the number of voters to whom they appeal when voters have intense preferences for one of the alternatives available. An ambiguous candidate may offer voters with different preferences the hope that their most preferred alternative will be implemented. We find conditions under which ambiguous strategies are chosen in equilibrium. These conditions include the case in which there is an outcome that is a majority winner against all other outcomes but is not the most preferred outcome for a majority of voters. It is shown that if the number of candidates or parties increases, ambiguity will not be possible in equilibrium, but a larger set of possible policies increases the chance that at least one candidate will choose to be ambiguous in equilibrium.
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It is shown that in any affine space of payoff matrices the equilibriumpayoffs of bimatrix games are generically finite.
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In this paper we provide a full characterization of the pure-strategyNash Equilibria for the p-Beauty Contest Game when we restrict player schoices to integer numbers. Opposed to the case of real number choices,equilibrium uniqueness may be lost depending on the value of p and thenumber of players: in particular, as p approaches 1 any symmetric profileconstitutes a Nash Equilibrium. We also show that any experimental p-BeautyContest Game can be associated to a game with the integer restriction andthus multiplicity of equilibria becomes an issue. Finally, we show thatin these games the iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies maynot lead to a single outcome while the iterated best-reply process alwaysdoes (though the outcome obtained depends on the initial conditions).
Resumo:
Two finite extensive-form games are empirically equivalent when theempirical distribution on action profiles generated by every behaviorstrategy in one can also be generated by an appropriately chosen behaviorstrategy in the other. This paper provides a characterization ofempirical equivalence. The central idea is to relate a game's informationstructure to the conditional independencies in the empirical distributionsit generates. We present a new analytical device, the influence opportunitydiagram of a game, describe how such a diagram is constructed for a givenextensive-form game, and demonstrate that it provides a complete summaryof the information needed to test empirical equivalence between two games.
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The evolution of boundedly rational rules for playing normal form games is studied within stationary environments ofstochastically changing games. Rules are viewed as algorithms prescribing strategies for the different normal formgames that arise. It is shown that many of the folk results of evolutionary game theory typically obtained witha fixed game and fixed strategies carry over to the present case. The results are also related to recent experimentson rules and games.
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A polarizable quantum mechanics and molecular mechanics model has been extended to account for the difference between the macroscopic electric field and the actual electric field felt by the solute molecule. This enables the calculation of effective microscopic properties which can be related to macroscopic susceptibilities directly comparable with experimental results. By seperating the discrete local field into two distinct contribution we define two different microscopic properties, the so-called solute and effective properties. The solute properties account for the pure solvent effects, i.e., effects even when the macroscopic electric field is zero, and the effective properties account for both the pure solvent effects and the effect from the induced dipoles in the solvent due to the macroscopic electric field. We present results for the linear and nonlinear polarizabilities of water and acetonitrile both in the gas phase and in the liquid phase. For all the properties we find that the pure solvent effect increases the properties whereas the induced electric field decreases the properties. Furthermore, we present results for the refractive index, third-harmonic generation (THG), and electric field induced second-harmonic generation (EFISH) for liquid water and acetonitrile. We find in general good agreement between the calculated and experimental results for the refractive index and the THG susceptibility. For the EFISH susceptibility, however, the difference between experiment and theory is larger since the orientational effect arising from the static electric field is not accurately described
Resumo:
In this work a new admittance spectroscopy technique is proposed to determine the conduction band offset in single quantum well structures (SQW). The proposed technique is based on the study of the capacitance derivative versus the frequency logarithm. This method is found to be less sensitive to parasitic effects, such as leakage current and series resistance, than the classical conductance analysis. Using this technique, we have determined the conduction band offset in In0.52Al0.48As/InxGa1¿xAs/In0.52Al0.48As SQW structures. Two different well compositions, x=0.53, which corresponds to the lattice¿matched case and x=0.60, which corresponds to a strained case, and two well widths (5 and 25 nm) have been considered. The average results are ¿Ec=0.49±0.04 eV for x=0.53 and ¿Ec =0.51±0.04 eV for x=0.6, which are in good agreement with previous reported data.
Electrical transport quantum effects in the In0.53Ga0.47As/In0.52Al0.48As heterostructure on silicon
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Electrical transport in a modulation doped heterostructure of In0.53Ga0.47As/In0.52Al0.48As grown on Si by molecular beam epitaxy has been measured. Quantum Hall effect and Subnikov¿De Haas oscillations were observed indicating the two¿dimensional character of electron transport. A mobility of 20¿000 cm2/V¿s was measured at 6 K for an electron sheet concentration of 1.7×1012 cm¿2. Transmission electron microscopy observations indicated a significant surface roughness and high defect density of the InGaAs/InAlAs layers to be present due to the growth on silicon. In addition, fine¿scale composition modulation present in the In0.53Ga0.47As/In0.52Al0.48As may further limit transport properties.