Information Dispersion and Equilibrium Multiplicity

This paper studies the implications of correlation of private signals about the liquidation value of a risky asset in a variation of a standard noisy rational expectations model in which traders receive endowment shocks which are private information and have a common component. We …nd that a necessary condition to generate multiple linear partially revealing rational expectations equilibria is the existence of several sources of information dispersion. In this context equilibrium multiplicity tends to occur when information is more dispersed. A necessary condition to have strategic complementarity in information acquisition is to have mul- tiple equilibria. When the equilibrium is unique there is strategic substi- tutability in information acquisition, corroborating the result obtained in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). JEL Classi…cation: D82, D83, G14 Keywords: Multiplicity of equilibria, strategic complementarity, asym- metric information.

Public and private learning from prices, strategic substitutability and complementarity, and equilibrium multiplicity

We study a general static noisy rational expectations model where investors have private information about asset payoffs, with common and private components, and about their own exposure to an aggregate risk factor, and derive conditions for existence and uniqueness (or multiplicity) of equilibria. We find that a main driver of the characterization of equilibria is whether the actions of investors are strategic substitutes or complements. This latter property in turn is driven by the strength of a private learning channel from prices, arising from the multidimensional sources of asymmetric information, in relation to the usual public learning channel. When the private learning channel is strong (weak) in relation to the public we have strong (weak) strategic complementarity in actions and potentially multiple (unique) equilibria. The results enable a precise characterization of whether information acquisition decisions are strategic substitutes or complements. We find that the strategic substitutability in information acquisition result obtained in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) is robust. JEL Classification: D82, D83, G14 Keywords: Rational expectations equilibrium, asymmetric information, risk exposure, hedging, supply information, information acquisition.

Simultaneous Nash bargaining with consistent beliefs

We propose and analyze a new solution concept, the R solution, for three-person, transferable utility, cooperative games. In the spirit of the Nash Bargaining Solution, our concept is founded on the predicted outcomes of simultaneous, two-party negotiations that would be the alternative to the grand coalition. These possibly probabilistic predictions are based on consistent beliefs. We analyze the properties of the R solution and compare it with the Shapley value and other concepts. The R solution exists and is unique. It belongs to the bargaining set and to the core whenever the latter is not empty. In fact, when the grand coalition can simply execute one of the three possible bilateral trades, the R solution is the most egalitarian selection of the bargaining set. Finally, we discuss how the R solution changes important conclusions of several well known Industrial Organization models.

Hardy-Weinberg Equilibrium and the Ternary Plot

The Hardy-Weinberg law, formulated about 100 years ago, states that under certainassumptions, the three genotypes AA, AB and BB at a bi-allelic locus are expected to occur inthe proportions p2, 2pq, and q2 respectively, where p is the allele frequency of A, and q = 1-p.There are many statistical tests being used to check whether empirical marker data obeys theHardy-Weinberg principle. Among these are the classical xi-square test (with or withoutcontinuity correction), the likelihood ratio test, Fisher's Exact test, and exact tests in combinationwith Monte Carlo and Markov Chain algorithms. Tests for Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium (HWE)are numerical in nature, requiring the computation of a test statistic and a p-value.There is however, ample space for the use of graphics in HWE tests, in particular for the ternaryplot. Nowadays, many genetical studies are using genetical markers known as SingleNucleotide Polymorphisms (SNPs). SNP data comes in the form of counts, but from the countsone typically computes genotype frequencies and allele frequencies. These frequencies satisfythe unit-sum constraint, and their analysis therefore falls within the realm of compositional dataanalysis (Aitchison, 1986). SNPs are usually bi-allelic, which implies that the genotypefrequencies can be adequately represented in a ternary plot. Compositions that are in exactHWE describe a parabola in the ternary plot. Compositions for which HWE cannot be rejected ina statistical test are typically “close" to the parabola, whereas compositions that differsignificantly from HWE are “far". By rewriting the statistics used to test for HWE in terms ofheterozygote frequencies, acceptance regions for HWE can be obtained that can be depicted inthe ternary plot. This way, compositions can be tested for HWE purely on the basis of theirposition in the ternary plot (Graffelman & Morales, 2008). This leads to nice graphicalrepresentations where large numbers of SNPs can be tested for HWE in a single graph. Severalexamples of graphical tests for HWE (implemented in R software), will be shown, using SNPdata from different human populations

Social capital and the equilibrium number of entrepreneurs

Social capital is viewed either as a proprietary asset that serves private interests, including those of entrepreneurs, or as a collective asset that supports trust-based transactions saving on transaction costs both in markets and within the boundaries of firms, and benefiting society as a whole. This paper explains the relative specialization between entrepreneurs and market-governed exchanges as a result of the interaction between social capital that lowers transaction costs, and the scale economies of ability in managerial jobs (Lucas 1978). The main hypothesis formulated in the paper is that higher social capital will benefit the hierarchy relatively more than the market as a governance mechanism, and therefore in economies with higher social capital, the equilibrium number of entrepreneurs will be lower and their average span of control larger than in economies with lower social capital. The empirical evidence, with data from the Spanish Autonomous Communities, is consistent with this prediction.

Equilibrium of drops on inclined hydrophilic surfaces

Why does not gravity make drops slip down the inclined surfaces, e.g., plant leaves? The current explanation is based on the existence of surface inhomogeneities, which cause a sustaining force that pins the contact line. Following this theory, the drop remains in equilibrium until a critical value of the sustaining force is reached. We propose an alternative analysis, from the point of view of energy balance, for the particular case in which the drop leaves a liquid film behind. The critical angle of the inclined surface at which the drop slips down is predicted. This result does not depend explicitly on surface inhomogeneities, but only on the drop size and surface tensions. There is good agreement with experiments for contact angles below 90° where the formation of the film is expected, whereas for greater contact angles great discrepancies arise

Unstable equilibrium: young adult women in family and career formation in Southern Europe

The paper examines the relationship between family formation (i.e., living with a partner and having children) and women’s occupational career in southern Europe (i.e., Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain). The relationship is explored by analysing the impact that different family structures and male [nvolvement in caring activities have on women’s early occupational trajectories (i.e., remaining in the same occupational status, experiencing downward or upward mobility, or withdrawing from paid work). This research shows that male involvement in caring activities does not really push women ahead in their career, but the absolute lack of male support seems to negatively affect women’s permanence in paid work. These results apply to all southern European countries except Portugal, where the absolute absence of the partners’ support in caring activities does not seem to alter women’s determination to remain in paid work. The methodology applied consists of the estimation of multinomial logit regression models and the analysis is based on eight waves (1994-2001) of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP).

The role of moral values in the economic analysis of crime: A general equilibrium approach

In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium model of crime and show thatlaw enforcement has different roles depending on the equilibrium characterization and the value of social norms. When an economy has a unique stable equilibrium where a fraction of the population is productive and the remaining predates, the government can choose an optimal law enforcement policy to maximize a welfare function evaluated at the steady state. If such steady state is not unique, law enforcement is still relevant but in a completely different way because the steady state that prevails depends on the initial proportions of productive and predator individuals in the economy. The relative importance of these proportions can be changed through law enforcement policy.

Equilibrium asset prices and savings of heterogeneous agents in the presence of incomplete markets and portfolio constraints

We study the quantitative properties of a dynamic general equilibrium model in which agents face both idiosyncratic and aggregate income risk, state-dependent borrowing constraints that bind in some but not all periods and markets are incomplete. Optimal individual consumption-savings plans and equilibrium asset prices are computed under various assumptions about income uncertainty. Then we investigate whether our general equilibrium model with incomplete markets replicates two empirical observations: the high correlation between individual consumption and individual income, and the equity premium puzzle. We find that, when the driving processes are calibrated according to the data from wage income in different sectors of the US economy, the results move in the direction of explaining these observations, but the model falls short of explaining the observed correlations quantitatively. If the incomes of agents are assumed independent of each other, the observations can be explained quantitatively.

An experiment on Nash implementation

We perform an experimental test of Maskin's canonical mechanism for Nashimplementation, using 3 subjects in non-repeated groups, as well as 3 outcomes, states of nature, and integer choices. We find that this mechanism succesfully implements the desired outcome a large majority of the time and an imbedded comprehension test indicates that subjects were generally able to comprehend their decision tasks. The performance can also be improved by imposing a fine on non designated dissidents. We offer some explanations for the imperfect implementation, including risk preferences, the possibilities that agents have for collusion, and the mixed strategy equilibria of the game.

Quotient spaces of boundedly rational types

By identifying types whose low-order beliefs up to level li about the state of nature coincide, weobtain quotient type spaces that are typically smaller than the original ones, preserve basic topologicalproperties, and allow standard equilibrium analysis even under bounded reasoning. Our Bayesian Nash(li; l-i)-equilibria capture players inability to distinguish types belonging to the same equivalence class.The case with uncertainty about the vector of levels (li; l-i) is also analyzed. Two examples illustratethe constructions.

Credit constraints in general equilibrium: Experimental results

Our work attempts to investigate the influence of credit tightness orexpansion on activity and relative prices in a multimarket set-up. We report on somedouble- auction, two-market experiments where subjects had to satisfy an inequalityinvolving the use of credit. The experiments display two regimes, characterizedby high and low credit availability. The critical value of credit at the commonboundary of the two regimes has a compelling interpretation as the maximal credituse at the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium of the abstract economy naturally associatedto our experimental environment. Our main results are that changes in theavailability of credit: (a): have minor and unsystematic effects on quantitiesand relative prices in the high-credit regime, (b): have substantial effects, bothon quantities and relative prices, in the low-credit regime.