Interplay of spectral efficiency, power and doppler spectrum for reference-signal-assisted wireless communication

Expressions relating spectral efficiency, power, and Doppler spectrum, are derived for Rayleigh-faded wireless channels with Gaussian signal transmission. No side information on the state of the channel is assumed at the receiver. Rather, periodic reference signals are postulated in accordance with the functioning of most wireless systems. The analysis relies on a well-established lower bound, generally tight and asymptotically exact at low SNR. In contrast with most previous studies, which relied on block-fading channel models, a continuous-fading model is adopted. This embeds the Doppler spectrum directly in the derived expressions, imbuing them with practical significance. Closed-form relationships are obtained for the popular Clarke-Jakes spectrum and informative expansions, valid for arbitrary spectra, are found for the low- and high-power regimes. While the paper focuses on scalar channels, the extension to multiantenna settings is also discussed.

Spectral efficiency in reference-signal-assisted low-power wireless communication

Expressions relating spectral efficiency, power and Doppler spectrum are derived for low-power Rayleighfaded wireless channels with proper complex signaling. Noside information on the state of the channel is assumed at the receiver. Rather, periodic reference signals are postulated inaccordance with the functioning of most wireless systems. In contrast with most previous studies, which relied on block-fading channel models, a continuous-fading model is adopted. This embeds the Doppler spectrum directly in thederived expressions thereby imbuing them with practical significance.

Efficiency-based evaluation of aligners for industrial applications

This paper presents a novel efficiencybased evaluation of sentence and word aligners. This assessment is critical in order to make a reliable use in industrial scenarios. The evaluation shows that the resourcesrequired by aligners differ rather broadly. Subsequently, we establish limitation mechanisms on a set of aligners deployed as web services. These results, paired with the quality expected from the aligners, allow providers to choose the most appropriate aligner according to the task at hand.

La immigració i els efectes en el comportament empresarial: una anàlisi a nivell municipal de Catalunya

En aquest context de canvi econòmic i dels ritmes d’arribada dels fluxos migratoris, aquest treball aborda els efectes de la població immigrant sobre les empreses manufactureres localitzades en ciutats catalanes amb més de 1.000 habitants durant el període 2000-2008. El desenvolupament empíric posa especial èmfasi en la localització d’empreses i la població immigrada així com l’impacte que exerceix sobre el comportament de les empreses. Per tal de recollir les dades hem treballat amb tres bases de dades diferents: dades ofertes per Idescat, INE i Sistema de Anàlisis de Balances Ibéricos. En especial aquesta darrera base ha ofert informació a nivell individual de les empreses el qual ha requerit un procés de depuració complex i exhaustiu a través de programació estadística. En la literatura sobre els impactes econòmics dels immigrants predominen els treballs que han abordat un impacte sobre el mercat de treball, posant especial èmfasis en els diferencials salarials i la reducció de la bretxa salarial en funció del temps de residència dels immigrants. En canvi, en poques ocasions s’ha analitzat l’efecte de la immigració sobre el comportament de l’empresa. L’objectiu d’aquest treball és analitzar l’impacte dels entorns amb població immigrant a les ciutats catalanes i de forma més específica amb el creixement de les empreses locals i l’evolució dels seus nivells d’eficiència. Els objectius concrets que volem analitzar són els següents: i) mostrar les principals conclusions de la literatura ii) observar les pautes de localització d’immigrantsiii) mostrar les pautes de localització de les empreses iv) analitzar si les ciutats catalanes amb una major població immigrant presenten un impacte positiu o negatiu sobre el creixement de les empreses locals i l’evolució dels seus nivells d’eficiència a través d’eines economètriques.

A sequential model for older workers' labor transitions after a health shock

In this work we study older workers'(50-64) labor force transitions after a health/disability shock. We find that the probability of keeping working decreases with both age and severity of the shock. Moreover, we find strong interactions between age and severity in the 50-64 age range and none in the 30-49 age range. Regarding demographics we find that being female and married reduce the probability of keeping work. On the contrary, being main breadwinner, education and skill levels increase it. Interestingly, the effect of some demographics changes its sign when we look at transitions from inactivity to work. This is the case of being married or having a working spouse. Undoubtedly, leisure complementarities should play a role in the latter case. Since the data we use contains a very detailed information on disabilities, we are able to evaluate the marginal effect of each type of disability either in the probability of keeping working or in returning back to work. Some of these results may have strong policy implications.

Adverse Selection, Credit, and Efficiency: the Case of the Missing Market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our envi- ronment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow from banks. As is generally the case in economies with adverse selection, the competitive equilibrium of our economy is shown to be ine¢ cient. Under adverse selection, the choices made by one type of agents limit what can be o¤ered to other types in an incentive-compatible manner. This gives rise to an externality, which cannot be internalized in a competitive equilibrium. We show that, in this type of environment, the ine¢ ciency associated to adverse selection is the consequence of one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added (say, a .security market.), in which entrepreneurs can obtain funds beyond those o¤ered by banks, we show that the e¢ cient allocation is an equilibrium of the economy. In such an equilibrium, all entrepreneurs borrow at a pooling rate in the security market. When they apply to bank loans, though, only entrepreneurs with good projects pledge these additional funds as collateral. This equilibrium thus simultaneously entails cross- subsidization and separation between di¤erent types of entrepreneurs.

Adverse selection, credit, and efficiency: the case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitive equilibrium is typically inefficient. We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurs with additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of these additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it does not condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the markets for monitored loans.

Communication, Coordination, and Efficiency in Evolutionary One-population Models

We analyze the role of commitment in pre-play communication for ensuring efficient evolutionarily stable outcomes in coordination games. All players are a priori identical as they are drawn from the same population. In games where efficient outcomes can be reached by players coordinating on the same action we find commitment to be necessary to enforce efficiency. In games where efficienct outcomes only result from play of different actions, communication without commitment is most effective although efficiency can no longer be guaranteed. Only when there are many messages then inefficient outcomes are negligible as their basins of attraction become very small.

The Labor Market Effects of Technology Shocks

We analyze the labor market effects of neutral and investment-specific technology shocks along the intensive margin (hours worked) and the extensive margin (unemployment). We characterize the dynamic response of unemployment in terms of the job separation and the job finding rate. Labor market adjustments occur along the extensive margin in response to neutral shocks, along the intensive margin in response to investment specific shocks. The job separation rate accounts for a major portion of the impact response of unemployment. Neutral shocks prompt a contemporaneous increase in unemployment because of a sharp rise in the separation rate. This is prolonged by a persistent fall in the job finding rate. Investment specific shocks rise employment and hours worked. Neutral shocks explain a substantial portion of the volatility of unemployment and output; investment specific shocks mainly explain hours worked volatility. This suggests that neutral progress is consistent with Schumpeterian creative destruction, while investment-specific progress operates as in a neoclassical growth model.

Business Cycles, Unemployment Insurance, and the Calibration of Matching Models

This paper points out an empirical puzzle that arises when an RBC economy with a job matching function is used to model unemployment. The standard model can generate sufficiently large cyclical fluctuations in unemployment, or a sufficiently small response of unemployment to labor market policies, but it cannot do both. Variable search and separation, finite UI benefit duration, efficiency wages, and capital all fail to resolve this puzzle. However, both sticky wages and match-specific productivity shocks help the model reproduce the stylized facts: both make the firm's flow of surplus more procyclical, thus making hiring more procyclical too.

Markups, Gaps, and the Welfare Costs of Business Fluctuations

In this paper we present a simple theory-based measure of the variations in aggregate economic efficiency: the gap between the marginal product of labor and the household s consumption/leisure tradeoff. We show that this indicator corresponds to the inverse of the markup of price over social marginal cost, and give some evidence in support of this interpretation. We then show that, with some auxilliary assumptions our gap variable may be used to measure the efficiency costs of business fluctuations. We find that the latter costs are modest on average. However, to the extent the flexible price equilibrium is distorted, the gross efficiency losses from recessions and gains from booms may be large. Indeed, we find that the major recessions involved large efficiency losses. These results hold for reasonable parameterizations of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and steady state distortions.

Self-serving biases: Evidence from a simulated labor relationship

Previous studies have found evidence of a self-serving bias in bargaining and dispute resolution. We use experimental data to test for this effect in a simulated labor relatonship. We finda consistent discrepancy between employer beliefs and employee actions that can only be attributed to self-serving biases. This discrepancy is evident through stated beliefs, revealed satisfaction, and actual actions. We present evidenceand discuss implications.

Attribution and reciprocity in a simulated labor market: An experimental investigation

While papers such as Akerlof and Yellen (1990) and Rabin (1993) argue that psychological considerations such as fairness and reciprocity are important in individual decision-making, there is little explicit empirical evidence of reciprocal altruism in economic environments. This paper tests whether attribution of volition in choosing a wage has a significant effect on subsequent costly effort provision. An experiment was conducted in which subjects are first randomly divided into groups of employers and employees. Wages were selected and employees asked to choose an effort level, where increased effort is costly to the employee, but highly beneficial to the employer. The wage-determination process was common knowledge and wages were chosen either by the employer or by an external process. There is evidence for both distributional concerns and reciprocal altruism. The slope of the effort/wage profile is clearly positive in all cases, but is significantly higher when wages are chosen by the employer, offering support for the hypothesis of reciprocity. There are implications for models of utility and a critique of some current models is presented.

A sequential model for older workers’ labor transitions after a health shock

In this work we study older workers (50 64) labor force transitions after a health/disability shock. We find that the probability of keeping working decreases with both age and severity of the shock. Moreover, we find strong interactions between age and severity in the 50 64 age range and none in the 30 49 age range. Regarding demographics we find that being female and married reduce the probability of keeping work. On the contrary, being main breadwinner, education and skill levels increase it. Interestingly, the effect of some demographics changes its sign when we look at transitions from inactivity to work. This is the case of being married or having a working spouse. Undoubtedly, leisure complementarities should play a role in the latter case. Since the data we use contains a very detailed information on disabilities, we are able to evaluate the marginal effect of each type of disability either in the probability of keeping working or in returning back to work. Some of these results may have strong policy implications.

Toward a theory of labor market institutions

Standard economic analysis holds that labor market rigidities are harmfulfor job creation and typically increase unemployment. But many orthodoxreforms of the labor market have proved difficult to implement because ofpolitical opposition. For these reasons it is important to explain why weobserve such regulations. In this paper I outline a theory of how they may arise and why they fit together. This theory is fully developed in aforthcoming book (Saint-Paul (2000)), to which the reader is referred forfurther details.